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The focal point of this dissertation is the recent discussion on the ethics of 
immigration. The main question considered is: “Should a state promote immigra-
tion?” Promoting immigration means allowing immigrants to enter inside and also 
offering them rights in view of treating them properly in the course of integration 
within the host communities. In answering this question, three perspectives are criti-
cally examined: utilitarian, liberal egalitarian and libertarian. 
    In the first chapter I assess the utilitarian arguments on immigration and 
weigh the objections related to them. The core of this chapter represents the analysis 
of the consequences of immigration on the following categories: immigrants, native 
workers, home and host countries, with implications on issues such as national cul-
ture, labor market, entrepreneurship, capital flight, remittances and brain drain. 
In the second chapter, I discuss the liberal egalitarian arguments concerning 
immigration, the difficulties met in promoting the symmetry between the right of exit 
and right of entry. Issues discussed in this chapter include freedom of movement, 
asymmetry between exit and entry, and the cosmopolitan account of open borders.  
In the third chapter I present the libertarian position on immigration, reveal 
the gaps in the argumentation and the inconsistency of promoting closed borders 
within this framework. The main problems reveal a discussion on self-ownership and 
freedom maximization, the conflict between the collective consent and the individ-
ual’s decision in the case of immigration.  
The final conclusion argues that the moral principles presented so far for each 
framework can make us sustain open borders and promote immigration, even in the 
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 Immigration is a contemporary issue that is debated across many disciplines. 
The fervent discussions in the past twenty years have linked immigration with at-
tacks on the national culture, citizens losing their jobs to alien workers, threats on 
national security, terrorism and racism. A rich literature exists on immigration in po-
litical theory, which focuses on different aspects of this process. My focus in this 
thesis, however, is more modest: to offer a closer look to the philosophical argu-
ments on the ethics of immigration.  
 This thesis examines three philosophical perspectives on the ethics of immi-
gration: utilitarian, liberal egalitarian and libertarian perspectives. I weigh whether 
the existing arguments on the issue of immigration capture correctly its ethical di-
mension, which I believe is wider and more complex than presented in the traditional 
literature. The importance of presenting both parts of the debate is crucial. This is the 
reason why I draw together the inconsistencies in the argumentation and suggest new 
arguments that can fit with the original examined framework from an ethical point of 
view.  
 I begin with the assumption that immigration presents a close link between 
the state and the individual, in particular citizens within a nation-state and immi-
grants. The relation can also be viewed from the perspective of duties, according to 
the distinction between general and special duties. The utilitarian perspective is tradi-
tionally presented as being in favor of immigration, but different arguments attack 
the main thesis that immigration is beneficial for the welfare of individuals. The lib-
eral egalitarian perspective is mainly in favor of immigration but recognizes some 
particular cases where it should be restricted and resumed after a certain interval of 
time, thus favoring closed or porous borders. The libertarian perspective is inconsis-
tent with its arguments and lacks clarity in presenting a solid position on this issue. 
As the literature on the subject of immigration is very wide, I mainly focus on the 
philosophical literature supported by empirical economic facts and a broader discus-
sion on international human rights. 
 Within this introduction firstly I begin to define the main concepts (political 
and economic concepts) behind the discourse on immigration: ‘immigration’, ‘refu-
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gee’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘economic migrant’, ‘home country’, ‘host country’ (or ‘send-
ing country’ and ‘receiving country’), ‘labor market’, ‘brain drain’, ‘debt-
forgiveness’, ‘remittances’, ‘capital flight’, ‘high-skilled workers’, ‘low-skilled 
workers’, ‘foreign aid’, ‘globalization’. The philosophical discussion is determined 
by a proper understanding of these specialized terms. Throughout the thesis, I focus 
only on the broader sense of the term ‘immigrant’ understood in all its instances 
(refugees, asylum seekers, economic immigrants). When I refer to a particular cate-
gory I use the specific denomination for it in order to avoid confusion.  
 Secondly, in this introduction I explain the important assumption behind the 
overall discussion on immigration, which reflects the relation between states and 
immigrants. I explore the debate over general and special duties and specify the im-
portance of understanding the relevant distinctions. 
Proceeding to the first part of the introduction I start defining the main con-
cepts used throughout the thesis. ‘Immigration’ refers to the entrance of foreign indi-
viduals (called ‘aliens’) on the territory of new countries with the purpose to gain 
permanent residence. The factors that lead to immigration are part of a broader proc-
ess of migration and can include economic, religious, political motives. Immigration 
is often accompanied by violence or reactions of nationalism from the residents of 
the host states if high influxes of immigrants are registered. To give just two exam-
ples from Europe, Germany has had a long process of integrating Turkish immi-
grants and recognizing them as citizens with full rights after they legally worked on 
their territory for many years. The nationalist reaction was to treat Turkish immi-
grants as foreigners “separate from the rest of society, with fewer social rights; even 
their children born and raised in Germany had little chance of becoming German 
citizens.”1 
The second example is from France where nationalist reactions are visible at 
the social level because legally France recognizes immigrants as French citizens eas-
ily if they prove they belong to the French culture or are born on France’s territory. 
Despite acquiring rather easily civil and political rights, nevertheless the resentment 
against immigrants is highly noticeable, translated in a racist attitude and discrimina-
tory behavior. In 2005 riots emerged in France as non-white immigrants protested 
                                                
1 Philippe Legrain, Immigrants: your country needs them (London: Little, Brown Book Group, 2009), 
259 
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that they were not fully integrated in society and continued to be discriminated be-
cause of their skin colour. Journalist Philippe Legrain notes: “The French model of 
assimilation exacts a heavy toll on personal freedom, by striving to erase cultural dif-
ferences, without delivering the equality and national cohesion it espouses.”2 And 
these are only two important examples from Europe but the list can be extended for 
the American continent as well.  
In the category of ‘immigrants’ we include refugees, asylum seekers and eco-
nomic migrants. According to the UNHCR the term ‘refugee’ applies to any person 
who  
 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result 
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.3  
 
I also offer Matthew Gibney’s definition of the term ‘refugee’ because it in-
cludes a broader account than the previous standard definition. He correlates the term 
‘refugee’ with the term ‘migrant’ and describes it as a person who ultimately needs 
protection because he is being persecuted in his home country. Hence, he classifies 
refugees as “those people in need of a new state of residence, either temporarily or 
permanently, because if forced to return home or remain where they are they 
would—as a result of either the brutality or inadequacy of their state—be persecuted 
or seriously jeopardize their physical security or vital subsistence needs.”4   
Asylum seekers are different from refugees in the sense they arrive at the 
borders of the foreign states in search of asylum. We can simply distinguish them 
from refugees by saying that they are the individuals located at the borders of foreign 
states with the demand of asylum. Other individuals that escaped from home coun-
                                                
2 Ibid., 261 
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, 1967: 16, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf 
4 Matthew Gibney, The ethics and politics of asylum-Liberal democracy and the response to refugees 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 7 
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tries due to a situation of war and violence and are located elsewhere not nearby the 
borders of foreign states are considered to be refugees. The asylum seekers’ arrival at 
the borders of a state implies a moral duty for that particular state. They are perse-
cuted in their home countries and they knock at the doors of new states with the same 
moral claim as refugees. Should that state open its borders to asylum seekers because 
otherwise they experience persecution back home and should they have priority over 
other immigrants?5 This is the main moral question that needs to be answered in rela-
tion to the asylum seekers’ claims.  
In relation to the moral claims invoked in the case of asylum seekers, their 
situation raised a fairly new discussion on humanitarian principles and practice. If 
asylum seekers are left to suffer without states collectively assuming responsibility 
for their misfortune, their international human rights are violated according to the 
humanitarian practice. Supporters of international human rights thus claim that asy-
lum seekers’ continuous struggle of entering foreign lands in search for either food, 
shelter, protection or education is unacceptable in the modern age, where United Na-
tions should play a role in keeping them safe (comparing nowadays’ situation with 
post-World Wars’ case where refugees and asylum seekers were given special atten-
tion and their rights as asylum seekers were recognized individually).6 This remark 
points to the relevance of bringing up the issue of humanitarianism when speaking of 
open borders and asylum seekers, supported by claims of defenders of international 
human rights in the broader context of immigration. Likewise, this would reinterpret 
the traditional view over the asymmetry between the right of entry and the right of 
exit in support of granting both exit and entry to foreigners, an issue that will be dis-
cussed in depth later in the chapter on liberal egalitarianism.  
Next, economic migrants can be defined as those migrants who are attracted 
by host countries from an economic point of view because they want to escape fam-
ine or worse conditions in their home countries or/and because they search for better 
jobs or economic support, which is not available in their home countries. Compara-
tively, economic migrants use a weaker moral claim to enter foreign states than refu-
gees and asylum seekers, which makes it easier for host states to refuse their entry 
based on moral grounds or at least invoke conditions of selecting between immi-
                                                
5 Ibid., 9-10 
6 Joppke, ed., Challenge to the nation-state, 111 
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grants. Economic migrants are a representative category of immigrants and tend to 
outnumber the rest of the groups presented as people in need of better opportunities 
immigrate more than asylum seekers or refugees. The difference between economic 
migrants and refugees or asylum seekers is that while economic migrants can change 
their destination and search for other host states, refugees and asylum seekers are 
forced to look for protection at the borders of a limited amount of countries, usually 
the neighboring states surrounding their home countries.  
Another distinction is between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors used as a traditional 
method to explain why economic migrants prefer some states instead of others and to 
justify high influxes of immigrants in a given interval of time, for example. To define 
‘push’ factors, merely in order to provide an outline for the general mechanism of 
migration, these are considered to be “negative influences that encourage people to 
emigrate from a country, such as political instability, a low standard of living, civil 
war, etc.”7 On the other side, ‘pull factors’ define “positive influences that draw im-
migrants to a particular state such as a high standard of living, democratic political 
institutions, excess demand for labour, etc.”8 
The host country (or the receiving country) is the country that welcomes the 
foreigners on a temporary or permanent basis. Conversely, the home country (or the 
sending country) is the immigrants’ country of origin, from which people emigrate 
for various reasons. The host country will choose between different immigration 
policies: open borders, closed borders or porous borders meaning partially open bor-
ders. Open borders means allowing unrestricted exit and entry to everybody (e.g. 
European Union allows free movement for EU citizens, countries from South Amer-
ica that signed the Mercosur agreement, Australia and New Zealand also allow free 
movement and open borders for their citizens according to the Trans-Tasman Travel 
Arrangement), which can attract cross borders circulation of goods as well.9 I will 
use official documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to remind the 
legal connotation of the right of free movement, free association and assembly and 
integrate it in the relevant philosophical framework. These documents will show why 
                                                
7 Ibid., 11 
8 Ibid. 
9 Christian Joppke, ed., Challenge to the nation-state: immigration in Western Europe and the United 
States (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 65 
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is important to link the ethics of immigration with philosophical frameworks, creat-
ing new arguments over older or traditional disputes on the issue of immigration.  
Closed borders means restricting the migration of non-citizens who search for 
residence in host countries permanently or temporarily. Another policy is semi-open 
borders (or partially opened borders or porous borders) and allows the host country 
to impose certain requirements of acceptance, which can encourage economic ex-
changes between immigrants and the residents in the host country and can overall 
benefit the economy of the host state. This could also mean that the host country 
wants to welcome a specific category of immigrants in preference to other categories 
for different purposes, more likely economic. For example, a state can welcome low-
skilled workers or high-skilled workers, a certain nationality of immigrants like Latin 
Americans or White Europeans or professionals specialized on a specific labor sector 
like doctors, nurses, technicians, etc. or it needs to limit the amount of immigrants 
for specific purposes (e.g. protecting the political institutions, public services or the 
infrastructure of the state). 
The case of open borders is an influential trend in the contemporary political 
economy supported especially in the financial press. Open borders and immigration 
are usually associated with the term of ‘globalization’ and those in favor of it ac-
knowledge that host states adopting this policy experience consistent economic and 
social benefits.10 In the words of contemporary social theorists “globalization refers 
to fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence, ac-
cording to which the significance of space or territory undergoes shifts in the face of 
a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of human 
activity.”11 For example, globalization can be matched with the industrial revolution 
(18th-19th centuries) and with other major events that shaped our society since its 
early stages; in our times we associate globalization especially with technological 
inventions: the internet, the radio, television, global networking, and other economic 
factors associated with the rapid connection of the entire global market. In this cur-
rent framework, globalization is considered to include other major processes, which 
                                                
10 See Jacob M. Appel, “The Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy”, Opposing views: Issues, 
experts, answers, May 4, 2009, http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-
immigration-policy. 
11 William Scheuerman, “Globalization”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/ 
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sometimes we perceive as happening individually, such as immigration. Neverthe-
less, political economists, for instance, like to associate the phenomenon of immigra-
tion with the broader context of globalization.12  
 Capital flight refers to capital flow from one country to another triggered by 
either immigrants that reside in a host country or the residents themselves. Capital 
flight is considered to cause financial crisis as the local capital is estranged in foreign 
banks or outside the territory of origin.13 In relation to immigration, this capital is 
sent back in home countries in the form of ‘remittances’14. As remittances represent 
an important part of the capital registered by the home countries, this aspect is highly 
relevant for the sending countries and the home population. Remittances affect the 
host countries because the capital flow determines local banks to lose immigrants’ 
deposits, but in return host countries can register a return of capital from the families 
of immigrants situated in home countries (e.g. money sent to students or young pro-
fessionals studying or working in foreign countries). Capital flight can be registered 
in both directions: from host countries to home countries and vice-versa. In this con-
text, we are speaking of capital circulation between countries, which favors the 
global market overall.  
As I was talking of low and high-skilled workers, these terms are relevant in 
connection with the level of professional expertise of immigrants. Low-skilled work-
ers are the workers that possess little professional expertise and minimal education 
(compared to unskilled workers, which are not trained or educated). Another classifi-
cation, taken from the press, describes ‘low-skilled workers’ as “those without GCSE 
grade A to C qualifications or level two qualification in NVQs or other vocational 
qualifications.”15 While these classifications of low and high-skilled workers can 
vary across continents, the main idea is that local low-skilled workers can be easily 
replaced with low-skilled immigrant workers or with workers in other parts of the 
                                                
12 Cf. John Ravenhill, ed., Global political economy (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 100-101: “Of course glob-
alization is not simply a matter of trade in goods and services; it also involves international flows of 
the factors of production themselves-the migration of workers between nations, and international in-
vestment and lending that transfers capital across borders.” 
13Darryl McLeod, “Capital Flight”, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/CapitalFlight.html 
14 See Jonathon W. Moses, International migration-globalization’s last frontier (London: Zed Books, 
2006), 127-128 
15“What is a ‘low-skilled job’?”, BBC News, November 8, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/uk/3993029.stm 
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world, where the wages are less than in richer countries for the same job executed by 
low-skilled workers in these richer countries.  
High-skilled workers are workers who are professionally trained or possess a 
higher education diploma. This means that there are high-skilled workers who might 
possess a higher education diploma, but do not possess enough or relevant experi-
ence in a certain labor sector. Nevertheless, they are considered to be high-skilled 
workers vis-à-vis the educational background they possess, which can make them 
desired workers in a specific labor sector. However, both categories constitute an 
important percentage of the overall mass of immigrants, which defines immigration 
mainly through an economic dimension. 
Next, the term ‘brain drain’16 refers to the emigration of highly skilled work-
ers described in the traditional literature as having a negative effect for home coun-
tries. My interest in using the term of ‘brain drain’ is a practical one: I need to de-
scribe the overall effects of migration, on the home countries as well and analyze if 
these effects are indeed negative as traditionally described. The main point here is 
that while a lot of educated individuals from developing countries and poor countries 
consider emigration to be in their personal interest, still the home countries claim that 
these individuals have a moral responsibility to come back and sustain the nation as 
this is a part of the nation’s investment in its citizens. These arguments will be ana-
lyzed in the thesis in the chapter on utilitarianism.  
Foreign aid is a plausible substitute for immigration, in the following per-
spective: rich countries subject of large inflows of immigrants can offer foreign aid 
to developing or poor states that face huge fluxes of emigration. In other words, rich 
countries can choose and, some authors highlight, can be made responsible to pay 
foreign aid to poor states in order to regulate and equilibrate the rates of incoming 
foreigners world-wide as part of their moral duty as rich nations towards poor 
states.17 Poor countries can use foreign aid to invest in their economies and correct 
the flawed labor sectors, create new jobs for low or high-skilled workers in order to 
                                                
16 Moses, International migration, 173 
17Cf. Anup Shah, “US and Foreign Aid Assistance”, Global Issues, April, 2009, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/us-and-foreign-aid-assistance: “Even though these targets and 
agendas have been set, year after year almost all rich nations have constantly failed to reach their 
agreed obligations of the 0.7% target. Instead of 0.7%, the amount of aid has been around 0.2 to 
0.4%, some $100 billion short.” 
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avoid mass emigration. In return, the future immigrants will find more reasons not to 
immigrate and stay within their countries if enough opportunities are provided for 
them.  
Hence, foreign aid is associated with the notion of development, which also 
triggers the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing countries’18. Aid is sent 
from developed countries to developing countries in order to help their markets and 
establish new jobs for their residents. The aid also determines economic relations 
between the developed country that offered the aid and the developing country, 
which is responsible of initiating new businesses.  
Debt-forgiveness is a second plausible substitute for immigration because old 
debts of poor countries to richer countries can be forgiven or reduced in order for 
poor countries to stabilize their economies and contribute more to the labor market’s 
development.19  
Finally, the term ‘labor market’ defines the interaction between employers 
and employees, which determines the labor services, the wages, the incomes and the 
employment rate. The labor market is the witness of all economic changes on a do-
mestic and international level. Consequently, labor markets can be classified as do-
mestic labor markets or international labor market, host countries’ labor market if we 
refer to receiving countries and home countries’ labor market if we refer to sending 
countries. The importance of framing the immigration process within a certain labor 
market is crucial because this can determine the exact consequences of immigration 
on a certain category of individuals (e.g. immigration will influence the domestic la-
bor market on the aspect of job competition between incoming workers and native 
                                                
18 See Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., The concise Oxford dictionary of politics (Oxford: 
OUP, 2009), 8 
19See Anup Shah, “Debt Cancellation and Public Pressure”, Global Issues, July, 2005, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/36/debt-cancellation-and-public-pressure: “Also, the IMF and 
World Bank are the biggest remaining creditors to the poorest countries, so there is a long way to go, 
even though the previous link shows that the IMF and World bank can afford to cover the costs of 
cancellation without affecting their ability to function. Accompanying some of these announce-
ments at possible partial debt cancellations, has been vocal concerns about ensuring that the freed up 
money is used for things like poverty eradication, health and education provisions and so on, instead 
of any continued corruption or wasteful spending. While the concerns are fair, the following quote 
highlights why those concerns should not be a stop gap: <<[F]ears that the money will not be used 
well cannot be offered as an excuse [to not cut the debts of the poorest nations] here either. ... All 
these countries have jumped through every hoop and over every hurdle put in their way in order to 
qualify for debt relief, meeting highly unpopular conditions that, if implemented in western countries, 
would provoke electoral obliteration for the government of the day.>> 
— Adrian Lovett, Tear up the envelope!, DebtChannel.org, May 30, 2001.” 
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workers, as well as casting an immediate effect on the group of native employers and 
the wages; similarly, within the international labor market the effects of immigration 
will be different like employment rate, capital flight, employment demands and of-
fers). 
 
General duties v. special duties 
 
 In the second part of the introduction I focus on the main distinction between 
general duties and special duties. I make another distinction between the ethical uni-
versalist account and the ethical particularist account that usually accompanies the 
discussion on the states’ duties towards immigrants. In my thesis I assume and de-
fend the position that states should incorporate special duties within the broader ac-
count of general duties and circumscribe the ethical particularist account within the 
ethical universalist account. In the following paragraphs I provide a very brief over-
view of the origin of this discussion supported by philosophical arguments, which 
can outline a more substantive ethical background in favor of immigration.  
I distinguish between the duties of a state to let the immigrants enter its terri-
tory and the duties of a state to assist the immigrants in their integration after they 
entered the community and discuss them in this order. The background for sketching 
the duties of the states towards immigrants consists in understanding the role of the 
state vis-à-vis its citizens and strangers. As far as the duty of the state towards its 
citizens is commonly understood, this involves protection from the external attacks 
and making sure the citizens are given priority in regards to their civil rights and lib-
erties. Considering that a state does not limit itself only to the perimeter of the terri-
tory it defines via a particular nation-state, there is much more to extract from the 
simple definition of a state. The prolongation of the internal duty is reflected in the 
outside world in the simple purpose of representing its citizens.  
A state has a further duty to the outside world of representing its people and 
also in regards to the consequences of their actions. For example, if Italy speaks in 
behalf of its people and starts a war with the surrounding countries then the conse-
quences of its actions will affect other nations as well. The collective moral obliga-
tions are thus applicable to other countries affected by the actions of a certain nation-
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state. The state personifies the individuals inside it and has duties towards them as 
well as towards other individuals from other nation-states.20 
 Following the application of moral duties of states for citizens and strangers 
we can distinguish between general duties states that should have towards all indi-
viduals and special duties that states have towards their citizens. Special duties are 
best illustrated by the special relationships a state or an individual holds for other in-
dividuals (e.g. states have a special relationship with their citizens just as parents 
have with their children, workers with their colleagues etc.). It can be objected from 
an ethical perspective that if states take care only of their citizens other individuals 
do not matter in issues of maximum importance. If refugees, for instance, or asylum 
seekers and even economic migrants are considered to be a threat for the citizens of a 
nation, then this ultimately can lead to the violation of human rights, political rights 
and it further raises important ethical disputes.  
 
No state can claim that its duties extend only to its own citizens, any more than any 
head of a family can declare that he has no duties except to those who belong to his family: 
he has special duties towards them, but he has duties to all who can be affected by his ac-
tions, inasmuch as they and he belong to the same worldwide human family. By just the 
same token, the citizens of any country share with others the citizenship of the universal so-
ciety of human beings, and the state, which represents them therefore has moral duties to-
wards other states and citizens of those other states.21 
 
 The distinction between general and special duties can be better understood if 
linked with the distinction between the ethical universalist account and the ethical 
particularist account. These distinctions accompanied by relevant empirical evidence 
will be presented in depth in the chapter on utilitarianism. The ethical universalist 
account is focused on general duties and regards universal human rights to be impor-
tant in all circumstances. The ethical particularist account, on the other hand, holds 
that special duties are more important due to special relations they generate between 
individuals. I propose in this thesis to circumscribe the ethical particularist account to 
the ethical universalist account and aim for a balance between general and special 
                                                
20 Michael Dummett, On immigration and refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), 46 
21 Ibid., 49-50 
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duties. In order to maintain a correct ethical perspective, we need to understand the 
reasons for correlating the two sets of duties, which define and protect basic human 
rights.  
 Philosophers like Michael Dummett have shown the importance of general 
duties in issues such as immigration and in particular in regards with the situation of 
refugees. In these types of situations, imposing only the perspective of special duties 
means to violate basic human rights, which in real world cases have dramatic conse-
quences. For example, Dummett defends the rights of immigrants based on the gen-
eral duties account and arguing that states have moral duties for refugees and in gen-
eral for all immigrants, which cannot be replaced with the justification that a state 
has special duties only for their own citizens: “The idea that its duty is only to its 
citizens stems from a faulty conception of the purpose of the state’s existence – its 
mission, in today’s jargon.”22 
Belonging to a nation-state means much more than taking care of its citizens; 
it morally extends to taking care of all individuals because we are all human beings. 
The duties of states are applied domestically but they should be applied globally as I 
will argue throughout my thesis. This issue of applying the general duties globally 
will be discussed in depth in the chapter on liberal egalitarianism, when I will com-
pare the open borders policy with the no borders policy.  
 
 Structure of thesis 
 
 This thesis explores the current debate on the issue of immigration from three 
perspectives: utilitarian, liberal egalitarian and libertarian. My main aim is to analyze 
the traditional philosophical arguments on immigration that usually picture immigra-
tion as a threat to society, and to show if there is an inconsistency with these argu-
ments and the framework they are part of. I integrate the philosophical discussion 
within a broader view, the ethical dimension, and establish if the existing arguments 
are conflicting with morality. I propose new approaches within each framework that 
can draw a better understanding on the issue of immigration and sustain this with ar-
guments.  
                                                
22 Ibid. 
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 The thesis is divided in three chapters. The first chapter explores the utilitar-
ian arguments on the issue of immigration. I present the overall utilitarian frame-
work, with the definition of utilitarianism and then proceed to the traditional utilitar-
ian arguments about immigration. I sum up discussions from economy and political 
theory and propose new philosophical arguments in relation to the issue of immigra-
tion. I evaluate the view contrary to immigration and propose arguments in view of 
sustaining it.  
The second chapter focuses on the liberal egalitarian framework and its ar-
guments on the issue of immigration. I start by defining the liberal egalitarian posi-
tion and then propose Rawls’ account as a model of a liberal egalitarian theory. I 
proceed to a very brief presentation of Rawls’ theory of justice and explain its main 
features. Next I address the question of whether immigration is a moral right. The 
answer to this question takes the form of the exposition of the liberal egalitarian ar-
guments, which is divided in two parts connecting the value of freedom with the 
value of equality. In this chapter, I also examine the possibility of conflict between 
freedom of association and freedom of movement, the asymmetry between the right 
of exit and the right of entry, and the radical view of sustaining no borders within the 
cosmopolitan framework.  
The third chapter shows the libertarian position on the issue of immigration. I 
explore the definition of libertarianism and then present the traditional libertarian 
arguments on immigration in the right and left libertarian account. I proceed by 
showing the relation between self-ownership and immigration and analyze the argu-
ments for and against immigration, pointing out the inconsistency of sustaining 
closed borders within the libertarian framework.  
I conclude this thesis stating that in all three analyzed frameworks open bor-
ders and immigration should be promoted despite its potential negative effects be-
cause from an ethical perspective our general duties towards all human beings should 







Chapter One  
 
Utilitarianism and immigration 
 
In this chapter I explore the utilitarian arguments focused on the issue of im-
migration. In the first section I define utilitarianism and present three types of theo-
ries: hedonist utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism and objective list theories. In 
the second section I analyze the utilitarian position on immigration by pointing to the 
consequences of immigration on different categories of people, from immigrants to 
native workers, including host and home countries, divided according to the follow-
ing subsections: immigrants, national culture, labour market and entrepreneurship, 
capital flight and remittances, brain drain. In the third section I present Wellman’s 
objection of supporting immigration in the utilitarian framework and my arguments 
in response to this objection. I conclude that utilitarians should be promoters of im-
migration and they provide sufficient solutions for richer states to assume their re-
sponsibilities vis-à-vis poor nations by respecting the general moral duties. 
 
1. Definition of utilitarianism 
 
The utilitarian theory is part of the broader view, consequentialism, which 
holds that “normative properties depend only on consequences”23. Classic utilitarian-
ism represented by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick, opposes 
the deontological view and denies that: “moral rightness depends directly on any-
thing other than consequences, such as whether the agent promised in the past to do 
the act now”24. So according to classic utilitarianism we judge the consequences of 
an agent’s action and classify the action as wrong or right according to these conse-
quences, for example not to the promise given previous to the performance of the 
action.  
Utilitarianism rests, in essence, on two principles: “1) the consequentialist 
principle that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the goodness, 
                                                




or badness, of the results that flow from it, and 2) the hedonist principle that the only 
thing that is good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is pain.”25 These 
two principles entail the greatest happiness principle, which holds that “the rightness 
of an action is determined by its contribution to the happiness of everyone affected 
by it.”26 
Utilitarianism also promotes the impartiality principle, according to which 
everyone’s happiness has the same weight and when the individuals maximize the 
good; this is impartially considered, without reference to a particular agent (agent-
neutrality)27. Utilitarians are interested in maximizing the well-being of individuals, 
which is considered to be the good. To define the concept of ‘well-being’ I refer to 
the concepts of health and happiness. Well-being is often understood in relation to 
these notions, according to which an individual measures his degree of well-being. 
Therefore if the individual enjoys a good health and is happy then we can draw the 
conclusion that he also enjoys well-being.  
I use Scanlon’s distinction between the ‘quality of life’ and ‘well-being’. Ac-
cording to Scanlon’s account, the first notion consists in enjoying stable material and 
social conditions in our lives and being more successful than other individuals who 
possess equal material and social conditions as us. In opposition, the notion of ‘well-
being’ involves also the concepts of happiness and success rather than limiting only 
to material good and social conditions.28 Well-being may be a narrower notion than 
the notion of ‘choiceworthiness’. The notion of ‘choiceworthiness’ refers to selecting 
a life that has more value for ourselves even though it presents a low level of well-
being or vice-versa, not selecting a life because the sacrifice in our well-being would 
be greater than the value it presents for us.29  
This definition leads us to three different accounts on well-being, which I 
briefly analyze in the following subsections. In short, these accounts are the follow-
ing: hedonism (Scanlon presents experiential theories referring to something that 
                                                
25 Anthony Quinton, Utilitarian ethics, (London: Duckworth, 2003), 1 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Julia Driver, “The history of utilitarianism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ 
28 Thomas Scanlon, What we owe to each other (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity, 1998), 111 
29 Ibid., 112-113 
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“contributes to well-being if, but only if, it affects the quality of one’s experience”30), 
desire theories (which, according to Scanlon’s account, hold that “a person’s life can 
be made better or worse not only by changes in the experience of living that life but 
also by changes in the world that affect the degree to which the world is the way that 
person desires it to be”31) and objective list theories (‘substantive good’ theories in 
Scanlon’s account, which hold that “there are standards for assessing the quality of a 
life that are not entirely dependent on the desires of the person whose life it is”32). 
To clarify the notion of well-being in the context used, it is a “prudential 
value” different from other aesthetic or moral values.33 Welfarism is the theory that 
supports well-being as the key value. Next, I will analyze these three well-being ac-
counts in more detail in answering the question: ‘What does well-being consist in?’ 
 
1.1. Hedonist utilitarianism 
 
I start by examining the hedonist position, which plays an important part in 
the overall utilitarian theory. We can define hedonism in the following manner: “the 
value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures and pains in the conse-
quences (as opposed to other goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on).”34  
Jeremy Bentham classified the pleasures according to intensity and duration. 
John Stuart Mill, following Bentham and trying to ‘cure hedonism’ from the objec-
tion of ‘philosophy of swine’, added a third factor: quality. Hence, we can distin-
guish between intellectual pleasures and bodily pleasures, following Mill’s account, 
which means that we can dissociate between high and low pleasures. For a hedonist 
well-being consists in pleasure, thus trying to find and commit to the right balance 
between pain and pleasure. Maximizing pleasure becomes the central purpose of this 
position. 
In this context, the value of the pleasures is set by their quality (the intellect is 
considered to be the source of higher pleasures versus the body, which is the source 
                                                
30 Ibid., 113 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33Roger Crisp, “Well-being”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, 
http://seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/well-being/ 
34 Ibid.  
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of lower pleasures). Another measurement can be set according to the quantity of 
pleasures: if one individual experiences more pleasures then we can say that he is 
happier than another individual who experiences fewer pleasures. Then the point of 
reference becomes the quantity not the quality.  
According to this classification, we can distinguish between qualitative he-
donism and quantitative hedonism. Mill’s account on qualitative hedonism rests on 
the idea of preference: “He distinguished higher and lower qualities of pleasures ac-
cording to the preferences of people who have experienced both kinds”.35 Later, this 
distinction opened the road for another type of utilitarianism, called preference utili-
tarianism. I will expand on this type of utilitarianism in a following section.  
An objection addressed to hedonist utilitarianism is the experience machine 
objection formulated by Robert Nozick. Many philosophers interpreted this objection 
to be fatal to hedonism, but others have tried to rescue hedonism despite this objec-
tion (see Roger Crisp’s account). I very briefly present Nozick’s experience machine 
objection and Roger Crisp’s response to this.  
Nozick’s objection is intended to attack hedonism understood as “a form of 
mental state theory according to which what matters to well-being is experiences 
alone”36. The experience machine then is a machine that offers to an individual the 
desired experience he aims to have without accomplishing the required action, e.g. if 
someone wants to climb Mount Everest plugged to the experience machine he is able 
to have this experience without actually climbing Mount Everest. The result is that 
individuals can have the experience they want without performing the action itself. 
The conclusion is that if we have this experience machine that offers us our desired 
experiences then we lack the feeling of achievement present only in performing the 
real action. If the experience machine offers us the experience we desire so much, 
nevertheless, the feeling of actually performing the experience is missing along with 
the sensation of achievement and inner satisfaction, the most important elements for 
our personal satisfaction. 
Roger Crisp answers this objection on behalf of hedonists by making an ap-
peal to the notion of accomplishment. Besides the traditional answer that the experi-
ence machine is not good enough to offer us the ‘real experience’, the claim is still 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Roger Crisp, Reasons and the good (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 117 
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strong that both types of experiences can be equally enjoyable (climbing Mount Ev-
erest and virtually climbing it). Crisp intends to formulate a distinct argument that 
can sustain hedonism linked to the notion of well-being.  
He uses the notion of accomplishment in relation with the notion of well-
being37 and holds that for us, internally, being accomplished is more important than 
having an experience, which is measured externally (for instance, if I complete writ-
ing my novel then this action will accomplish me as an individual because it will 
make me happy and it will also be very valuable to me personally, but to the exterior 
world this action might not count as much being viewed as an ordinary action, ac-
complished maybe by many other individuals).    
Roger Crisp follows this line of thought and holds that accomplishment in-
volves ‘performing the action’ not simulating it, as it is the case of the experience 
machine. The enjoyment people have from the realization of an action is strongly 
connected to the personal excitement of performing that action with respect to the 
value it holds for the agent himself. Having a simulation can merely bring an excite-
ment to the agent though of not the same intensity or/and value as the action itself 
can bring. Next, I shall focus on preference utilitarianism, the arguments involved 
and the objections to this position. 
 
 1.2. Preference utilitarianism 
 
 The development of preference utilitarianism comes in response to the expe-
rience machine objection. Preference utilitarianism (Roger Crisp refers to desire 
theories in this case) aims to fulfill the individual’s preferences or desires, which re-
main unsatisfied in the case of the experience machine. Another way to see the 
emergence of preference utilitarianism is in relation to ‘welfare economics’, which 
considers that it is very hard to measure the desires and preferences of individuals 
because they are in their heads. The answer to the question ‘What does well-being 
consist in?’ is ‘desire/preference satisfaction’.  
                                                
37 Cf. Crisp, Reasons and the good, 123: “Accomplishment as a constituent of well-being is tied in 
various significant ways to values other than well-being. When someone writes a great novel, the 
greatness of the novel itself-its aesthetic value, or its historical significance, say-is essential to under-
standing why it is that we count such activities as potentially part of well-being.” 
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In the perspective of welfare economics, these desires can be measured ac-
cording to the individuals’ testimonies, which constitute an important content for 
utility maximization and desire satisfaction.38 Preference utilitarianism holds that an 
individual ought to perform an action if and only if that action maximizes the prefer-
ence fulfillment. In this context, the desire satisfaction is the purpose of an action, 
regardless of whether it brings pleasure or not.  
 Preference maximization means that if a person desires to accomplish an ac-
tion then he should do it, because this is his preference. The main objection ad-
dressed to this view is that: if a person has a preference to kill, steal from, torture or 
hurt another person then, according to this account, this preference should be given 
as much weight as any. But this conflicts with the preferences of the victim, who ob-
viously would prefer not to be put in danger. The problematic aspect refers to fulfill-
ing a preference; the content of a preference must also be taken into account and 
verified as being safe for other people as well. The response that preference utilitari-
ans offer is that preferences must be good in order to be maximized.39 Still the ambi-
guity resides in the fact that preference utilitarians must offer an impartial set of 
preferences that count as good in order to maximize them instead of others.  
 So the desire theories or preference utilitarianism offers us an account of de-
sire/preference satisfaction different from hedonism, which is focused on pleasure 
maximization. We can distinguish between maximizing the pleasure in performing 
an action and maximizing the desire of performing an action because the two values 
(pleasure and desire) are different notions that cannot be equivalent. Next, I shall 
analyze the account of objective list theories and the objections encountered.  
 
 1.3. Objective list theories 
 
 Objective list theories are considered in the literature to be opposed to desire 
theories because they present a list of items that constitute well-being, but might not 
contribute to desire satisfaction. Objective list theories can be compared to hedonism 
                                                
38Roger Crisp, “Well-being”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, 
http://seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/well-being/ 
39 Ibid.: “Preference utilitarians can respond by limiting the preferences that make something good, 
such as by referring to informed desires that do not disappear after therapy”. 
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as the latter might be considered to be a “list” theory. In essence, “objective list theo-
ries are usually understood as theories which list items constituting well-being that 
consist neither merely in pleasurable experience nor in desire-satisfaction.”40 
On the list we can count all goods that form well-being, but if someone puts 
on his list friendship and pleasure, then from this perspective it can be proved that 
friendship and pleasure can also affect people’s well-being.41 The tool of selecting 
the items that go on the list is the reflective judgment. One objection is that objective 
list theories are élitist because they prescribe some items, which are good for people 
even though they do not acknowledge them, want them or enjoy them. In a way, they 
are prescribed contrary to the will of individuals. The response can sound that even if 
they prescribe goods that benefit people independently of pleasure maximization and 
desire satisfaction, still we can select those items when they satisfy our desires or 
bring pleasure. In this way, the list becomes applicable to what individuals really 
want.   
 
2. Utilitarianism and immigration  
 
In order to apply utilitarianism to immigration I need to take into considera-
tion whether the individuals benefit or not from the consequences of immigration. I 
plan in this section to analyze the effects of immigration on different groups of peo-
ple in order to evaluate the impact of immigration on their well-being. All the groups 
of individuals (immigrants, the remaining people in home countries, the native popu-
lation in host countries, local entrepreneurs from home and host countries) are con-
sidered to be equal in the utilitarian framework. I focus on the following division 
within this section: the effects of immigration on immigrants, the national culture, 
labour market and entrepreneurs, capital flight and remittances, brain drain. Each is-
sue will be analyzed in relation to further implications on the sending countries, re-
ceiving countries and immigrants. 
It is important to remind the fact that utilitarians aim to follow strictly the im-
partiality principle and separate between general duties and special duties, giving 
priority to the first category. I present Robert Goodin’s account on general duties, in 




relation to his criticism of special duties and also present his vulnerability model 
(protecting the vulnerable individuals) explored in his book “Protecting the vulner-
able”. His account is relevant for this chapter as immigrants are the vulnerable indi-
viduals in this paradigm and the host countries should always try to respect the gen-
eral duties even though the tendency is to protect the compatriots and the native 
population’s interests as a priority.  
In analyzing the case of compatriots vis-à-vis the immigrants, Goodin states 
that we have ‘general duties’ towards people in general because they are people and 
‘special duties’ towards particular individuals because they share a special relation-
ship with us (e.g. family members, friends, lovers, compatriots, etc.). Utilitarians fa-
vor the general duties and find the argument of giving priority only to special duties 
to be flawed.  
Next, Goodin argues that as modern moral philosophy is universalistic, one 
important corollary is impartiality (e.g. Kant’s Categorical Imperative requires us to 
do different things for particular people, but this is not a manifestation of partiality 
for them, it is a manifestation of our impartial respect towards each single individ-
ual). Therefore, sustaining special duties means to violate the impartiality principle 
and obey the particularist framework, in which special duties count more than gen-
eral duties. Goodin will apply this distinction to the case of compatriots and foreign-
ers and argue that we should obey the general duties for all individuals including 
immigrants.  
By ethical particularism I mean showing a particular preference for a group 
of persons within a nation, community, which can reveal a special relationship with 
the agent. For example, a person might feel a certain affiliation with a particular 
group from the same ethnic community based on the fact that they share common 
customs, language or common history. In the same sense, a person might show a par-
ticular preference for members of a nation or for individuals within the same family, 
to friends, lovers, etc. Thus, the preference for a certain group of people falls under 
the description of ethical particularism because it reflects a special behavior the agent 
shows to that particular group (or individuals within the group). In relation to ethical 
universalism, ethical particularism is therefore sympathetic to special treatment of 
certain groups of people or particular individuals and it does not offer a universal at-
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tention to all people (thus revealing a particular attention only to ‘some’ individu-
als).42  
Then, in the same perspective, utilitarians and Kantians argue that this par-
ticularist manifestation of special duties is derived from general moral laws.43 So 
even if we state our responsibility towards our fellow countrymen, this action does 
not override our responsibility derived from general moral laws, like helping for-
eigners. The two sets of duties can work together obeying a single principle: the im-
partiality principle. Having a special relationship with our countrymen does not ex-
clude having a responsibility for other individuals, including immigrants. 
Another point Goodin makes it that some people have special duties towards 
other people in contrast with the universality principle (special duties demand special 
treatment towards particular other people). For example, in the case of immigration, 
it is considered that the nation-states possess special duties for their citizens and they 
need to offer special treatment to these individuals prior to other persons, including 
strangers. Then the clash between special duties and general duties refers to a moral 
debate, which aims to prove that the immigrants are a part of the general duties of 
nation-states. Insofar as poor strangers will always want access in different nation-
states, the claim that nation-states should take care first of their citizens due to the 
special duties restricting the access to newcomers is debatable on this basis.  
Goodin sustains that the manifestation of special duties within particularism 
contradicts the impartiality principle (which reflects the general moral law), reflect-
ing a contradiction within morality itself (special duties are a part of the general du-
ties we should have towards all individuals and if we disregard the general duties 
then we also violate the general moral law).  
Goodin sees a problem with the special treatment we give to our fellow coun-
trymen, from the perspective of general moral laws. Because these general moral 
laws assign us the duty and responsibility to treat all the people alike (the utilitarian-
ism’s point of view), then disfavoring the immigrants according to this justification 
represents a violation of the general moral laws.  
                                                
42 I used this distinction following the description of ethical universalism and ethical particularism 
from Alan Gewirth, “Ethical universalism and particularism”, The Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 6 
(1988): 286, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2026720.pdf 
43 See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a public philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 265-267 
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Goodin does not agree that in some cases special duties can override general 
duties. Goodin argues that, on the contrary, these special links to particular individu-
als have negative effects on both categories of individuals (either those within the 
favored group or those outside it).44 Thus, discrimination is not the proper solution 
for obeying the special duties because all individuals are part of the universalistic 





I start by presenting Goodin’s vulnerability model, which stresses the duties 
we should have towards the vulnerable. This discussion is important because in our 
case the immigrants are the vulnerable individuals. If immigrants’ rights are re-
spected in receiving countries then the negative effects of brain drain for instance, in 
the sending countries, can be reduced and the exploitation of immigrants avoided.  
Goodin’s definition of ‘vulnerability’ comes down to “a matter of being un-
der threat of harm; therefore, protecting the vulnerable is primarily a matter of fore-
stalling threatened harms.”45 The distinction between positive and negative duties 
does not apply in this case as well as in the case of special responsibilities. Goodin 
argues that positive duties are on a par with negative duties46 and what counts in pro-
tecting the vulnerable can be subject to either positive or negative duties. In relation 
to protecting the vulnerable it is important to understand the duties we have towards 
the vulnerable: mainly, it refers to the duty of providing the vulnerable ‘primary 
goods’, e.g. food, shelter, water. The notion of ‘vulnerability’ implies, in Goodin’s 
terms, two agents: the powerful agent and the vulnerable agent. These two agents are 
in a relationship, from which one individual will always make use of his power in 
order to constrain or establish a negotiation in his favor but in the detriment of the 
vulnerable individual.47 
                                                
44 Ibid., 269 
45 Robert Goodin, Protecting the vulnerable: a reanalysis of our social responsibilities (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1985), 110 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 112  
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 Another important notion that comes in conjunction with the notion of ‘vul-
nerability’ is the notion of ‘responsibility’. The definition of ‘responsibility’ 
“amounts to being held to account for the consequences of your actions and 
choices.”48 These notions play an important part in understanding the relationship 
between co-nationals (or fellow countrymen) and immigrants (or foreigners). As 
Goodin observes this relationship is the embodiment of the vulnerability model. In 
this scheme, immigrants are the vulnerable ones and are dependent on the powerful 
ones, the fellow countrymen.  
However, not all immigrants can be classified as being vulnerable if for in-
stance they are not in an inferior position in relation to the host countries and their 
citizens. For instance, it might be argued that there are immigrants who are well-off 
and have enough resources and capital to travel or reside in foreign countries on their 
own expense and their status does not qualify them as being inferior to the citizens of 
the host country or the ones from the home country for that matter. But, this is not 
problematic for our case, as we are interested to motivate states in opening their bor-
ders and receiving the worst-off: e.g. those immigrants who are in an inferior posi-
tion vis-à-vis the host countries. For the immigrants who are not in an inferior posi-
tion the argument of protecting the vulnerable might not work in the utilitarian 
framework, but still other considerations have to be weighted: e.g. maybe these well-
off immigrants only want to visit foreign states. If they would invoke utilitarian rea-
sons to be accepted within then it can be objected that they are not vulnerable indi-
viduals under Goodin’s account.  
Immigrants are vulnerable to any sort of deal the members of a richer state 
(or a powerful state on that matter) might propose to them in the perspective that 
immigrants will accept it due to their inferior position. To apply the notion of ‘re-
sponsibility’ means that the members of a richer state will be responsible of any con-
sequences they cast upon the immigrants, in the scenario where they refuse to help 
them or respond to the duty of providing them the ‘primary goods’.  
Goodin’s argument goes even further: the principle of protecting the vulner-
able is fundamentally consequentialistic in form.49 This means that we need to evalu-
ate the consequences of our actions on the vulnerable ones. If the consequences are 
                                                
48 Ibid., 113 
49 Ibid., 114  
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negative then we are violating the principle of protecting the vulnerable, if the con-
sequences of our actions are positive on the well-being of those vulnerable, then we 
are respecting the principle. 
Goodin extracts two interpretations of the principle of protecting the vulner-
able: 1) the consequentialistic interpretation, which frames “your actions and choices 
in such a way as to produce certain sorts of consequences, namely, ones that protect 
the interests of those who are particularly vulnerable to your actions and choices”50; 
2) the welfare consequentialistic interpretation, according to which “actions and 
choices are evaluated on the basis of their consequences, and consequences are 
evaluated on the basis of their impact on people’s welfare”.51  
The first interpretation seems to me to be the most plausible in this context, 
because Goodin is interested in protecting the interests of those vulnerable and sec-
ondly is interested in the welfare of individuals. The second interpretation I find to 
be secondary to the first one and this is the reason why we should apply the first in-
terpretation of the principle in our discussion. The effects of our actions on the over-
all welfare of individuals are nevertheless important and should be taken into consid-
eration within the utilitarian framework.  
In the utilitarian framework, immigration has a positive influence on the lives 
of immigrants and their well-being. The reason for leaving the home countries in the 
first place means that immigration is the solution to get out of a difficult eco-
nomic/financial situation or/and to find better opportunities for education or/and pro-
fession. Thus, immigration improves the situation of immigrants in the sense that 
they find better opportunities of education, to work and live. In return, the immi-
grants also pass important financial changes because they have to contribute to the 
host countries’ tax scheme and assure that they live and work on the foreign territory 
in full legality. The level of improvement in the well-being of immigrants is in direct 
proportion with their adaptation to the foreign customs, life conditions, work expec-
tations and social interaction. These factors represent the key to a successful integra-
tion in the host countries and determine in a high degree the future evolution of im-
migrants’ well-being in all aspects of life. 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
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Next, I focus on Singer’s account of applying the case of refugees to the utili-
tarian framework. Singer argues that the refugees face three options for their situa-
tion: “voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country they first flee to and re-
settlement”52.  
As voluntary repatriation is not a possible alternative for refugees due to the 
conflicts in their home countries, which in most cases have not ceased and local inte-
gration in the country they first flee is an impossible option due to the scarcity of re-
sources and political instability of the neighboring countries, the resettlement option 
is the only possible alternative left for them53. Moreover resettlement is a temporary 
solution for the refugees who are in this difficult situation (the policies of the coun-
tries of their first settlement are hard on refugees because they cannot afford the eco-
nomic challenge to welcome a big number of such individuals) and perhaps this rep-
resents their only way to survive from a life-threatening situation.54 
Even in the case of asylum seekers, the argument is compelling for welcom-
ing those individuals who are in a stringent need to be accepted within a richer state 
that can offer them basic support and primary goods. In the events of their immediate 
death, the responsibility for these asylum seekers is important and should be avoided 
with any costs. It does not pay to offer the justification of inconvenience when hu-
man beings are on the edge of their lives. Singer perceives that this argument can be 
extended for refugees as well, whose problem will not disappear overnight if asylum 
seekers will be helped. Singer notes that refugees are dependent on the benevolence 
of states. If they are allowed to enter this is due to “an ex gratia act.”55 If the refugees 
cannot prove that they belong to that specific community (either politically or ethni-
cally) they cannot oblige the community to accept them within.  
Further on, Singer offers a criticism of this position in the case of refugees. 
He presents the consequentialist argument according to which the interests of all in-
dividuals should be taken into account. Therefore, the refugees’ situation is a press-
ing situation that should be solved. In this instance, we need to “identify those whose 
interests are affected.”56 Obviously, the pressing problem of refugees is an urgent 
                                                
52 Peter Singer, Practical ethics (Cambridge:  CUP, 1993), 251 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 252 
55 Ibid., 255 
56 Ibid., 256 
 30 
matter that overrides the importance of compatriots’ safety or well-being. Next, the 
group affected by the acceptance of refugees is made from the nation’s residents. 
They perceive this integration as a threat, but as previous arguments have shown they 
will benefit in the long run from the immigrants’ presence.57 
The refugees are different from other types of immigrants. Because they can-
not return back to their home countries, they will make their best to integrate within 
host countries and to create a safe environment for themselves and for native resi-
dents. Singer takes into account other possible negative consequences of refugees 
intake: 1) accepting a large number of refugees from poor countries will determine a 
continuous inflow of refugees to that host country in the future; 2) the sending coun-
tries of these refugees will reduce their efforts and lose their ambition in finding a 
solution to the political and economic problems they currently face; 3) also sending 
countries (countries with politic conflicts and economic problems are not probably 
best seen as ‘sending countries’ in the normal sense of this expression) will slow the 
population growth in order to prevent new generations from fleeing the country.58 
The other set of consequences is dependent on the action of not welcoming 
refugees: “economic stability and world peace depend on international co-operation 
based on some measure of respect and trust”.59 Rich states and states with vastly un-
occupied territories should accept more refugees in the light of the international co-
operation. Another argument is that if we redouble the number of refugees currently 
accepted by richer states then this action will not cause severe damages to host coun-
tries, according to Singer. He sees no evidence in the support of the claim that a large 
influx of refugees will cause harm or reduce the local resources dramatically. On the 
contrary, the positive effects of welcoming refugees will weight more in the balance 
than the negative effects.60 
 
 
                                                
57 Ibid., 257: “We should not assume that residents of the recipient nation will be affected for the 
worse: the economy may receive a boost from a substantial intake of refugees, and many residents 
may find business opportunities in providing for their needs. Others may enjoy the more cosmopolitan 
atmosphere created by new arrivals from other countries: the exotic food shops and restaurants that 
spring up, and in the long run, the benefits of different ideas and ways of living.” 
58 Ibid., 257-258 
59 Ibid., 258 
60 Ibid., 261-262 
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2.2. National culture 
 
In this section I consider the effects of immigration on the national culture, 
the arguments for and against the idea that immigration has in general a negative in-
fluence on the national culture. The general background related to worries about 
multicultural immigrants’ ‘invasion’ in the culture of nations can be sketched thus: in 
the contemporary age nation-states are faced with a large number of immigrants. 
This action poses two problems: the first problem is that if the nation-states decide to 
welcome immigrants within their communities, then they have to protect their culture 
from a possible assimilation or severe mixture with the other immigrants’ influence, 
and the second problem is that if they decide to reject these immigrants they are 
faced with an inflexible method of dealing with pressuring economic and social fac-
tors, which might lead to the loss of political and economic relationships.61 
The main issue that nation-states consider to be pressuring is: how exactly the 
cultural minorities should be integrated if the nation’s culture will be affected either 
in the present or long term by the mixture of ‘old’ and ‘new’ elements? This is an 
essential question present even in anterior centuries, but very stringent in our times. 
Immigration affects dramatically the shape of a nation and also its elementary fea-
tures. Throughout history this problem separated minorities from the main culture, 
ethnic populations from native population, creating social and political conflicts. 
From a philosophical perspective, the interest remains concentrated on the arguments 
formulated in favor of immigration process, which is my main aim in this thesis to 
show. 
For this section the main question is: how does immigration impact the well-
being of immigrants in the first place? I intend to prove that immigration has positive 
consequences for immigrants and for the residents of host states, including the cul-
ture of both immigrants and established citizens.  
Following the literature on immigration there is an important distinction to 
present between public goods and private goods. The market usually controls in a 
                                                
61 Cf. Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, The age of migration-International population movements in 
the modern world (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 41-42: “Immigration of culturally diverse people 
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very efficient way private goods, like the food industry, film industry, etc., whose 
goods are afterwards sold to private individuals according to a set price. Immigra-
tion, however, is considered to affect public goods, among which the culture of na-
tions. In this perspective, nations are very sensitive to the effects of immigration 
upon their cultures because any alteration involved in this process also affects the 
nation itself as an entity.  
I define the notions of public good, private good and nation in the following 
paragraphs. A public good refers to “any good that, if supplied to anybody, is neces-
sarily supplied to everybody, and from whose benefits it is impossible or impractica-
ble to exclude anybody. [Also] each individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual’s consumption of that good.”62 Examples of public goods 
are: the clean air, the national defence. Another remark to be made is that some pub-
lic goods are built or supported by private parties not only by the public authority. 
The idea is that the government usually supplies these public goods, not the market 
in order to avoid further complications with the free riders. A private good is made 
for consumption and has the qualities of being rivalrous and excludable. An exclud-
able private good refers to the idea that consumptions by one consumer prevent si-
multaneous consumptions by other consumers. A rivalrous private good means that it 
can reasonably be possible to prevent a class of consumers (e.g. those who have not 
paid for it) from consuming the good. In this context, private goods always aim for 
profit, while public goods do not.63 
The national culture can be considered a public good according to the above 
definition. It can be argued that a national culture is opened to all citizens of a nation 
and it is their pride to learn from it, develop it and pass it on to future generations. 
Just like in the case of parks or statues from public squares, for example, a national 
culture is a public good because it can be accessed by anyone who is a member of 
that nation and can also be subject to external interference and also cannot be sold. 
The general argument against immigration focuses on the idea that immigration is a 
menace for the national culture. We can draw the analogy between a national culture 
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and public parks or streets or monuments to which everyone has access in order to 
better understand the reasons for considering national cultures as public goods. For-
eigners can threaten a national culture if they do not respect it, similarly with the case 
where foreigners can make public damages in a park, on streets, or other public do-
mains. In this sense it is important to impose restrictions on borders from the host 
country’s perspective. 
There is another argument that runs in the same perspective: there are some 
communities that need protection from the external influence because they foster 
‘dying cultures’ (e.g. the Native Americans’ reservations in US foster cultures that 
are very fragile to a possible mixture with immigrants and are also protected by local 
laws). These communities cannot represent open markets for potential immigrants, 
because their cultures need protection and they cannot offer economic openness to 
foreigners.  
The concept of nation refers to “the population within, sharing a common 
culture, language, and ethnicity with a strong historical continuity. This manifests 
itself in most members in a sentiment of collective, communal identity.”64 In the lit-
erature the concept of nation-state is also used frequently, referring to a “sovereign 
entity dominated by a single nation.”65  
 I begin by presenting the arguments focused on this issue and the objections 
addressed by philosophers to the idea that immigration threatens the cultures of na-
tion-states. As it can be observed, the national culture is a public good and the mar-
ket has no practical ability in managing it for a better outcome. Samuel Scheffler ex-
presses his concern regarding the use of the terms ‘nation’, ‘national culture’, and 
‘multiculturalism’ in the context of immigration. He offers an account of his own 
experience coming from a Jewish background. His view is that a culture needs to 
adapt and evolve and changes vis-à-vis external factors that are a part of this process. 
Immigration is one of these external factors, which involves the circulation of peo-
ple.  
 Firstly, Scheffler draws our attention on two important aspects of immigra-
tion: 1) “the presumption that each individual ultimately ‘has’ a single, well-defined 
culture is false, and if we decide fundamental political questions based on that pre-
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sumption, we are bound to go seriously astray”66; 2) immigrants’ culture and the host 
country’s culture experience noticeable changes as an effect of immigration.67 I think 
Scheffler makes an important point concerning the need of change, which is inherent 
in our human society. As cultures are constantly evolving based on the external in-
fluences, immigration should not represent a problem for the essential elements 
within a national culture. A culture is shaped according to external influences 
throughout history and moreover it grows according to the rationalization and power 
of adaptation to new foreign elements, either by incorporating those elements within 
its pattern or modifying them.  
 Secondly, Scheffler argues that the national culture will change “because the 
introduction into society of a new set of people presents the old residents—the puta-
tive bearers of the national culture—with a new predicament. (…) It will change be-
cause changing is what cultures do when they confront new situations, and immigra-
tion, by definition, presents the host society with a new situation.”68 The culture of a 
nation has the essential trait of changing as it is evident in all nations’ history involv-
ing changes at the level of the language and also at the level of customs.   
Although immigration represents an influential factor for the change of the 
national culture, nevertheless, the definitional trait of a culture remains unchanged. 
This is Scheffler’s main thesis in relation to this point: a national culture must prove 
that it has the ability to survive the external changes including immigration among 
others. As a language changes in the light of new foreign influences these also enrich 
its vocabulary and make it more flexible. Otherwise, the point of adapting to the re-
quirements of the modern age becomes useless. To deny the importance of immigra-
tion is the same as admitting that a culture should embrace a conservative attitude 
towards the international events.  
National culture has a direct influence on the well-being of both immigrants 
and remaining citizens in the home countries as well as on the well-being of citizens 
in the host countries. In sum the effects are positive because immigrants will gain 
important experience from the interaction with the host countries’ citizens and will 
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contribute to the enrichment of the national culture. Immigrants tend to form cultural 
and social clusters in order to preserve their national customs. However, due to social 
and economic interaction with the members of host states they will adopt their social 
and cultural characteristics that will be passed onwards to friends, families or future 
generations of immigrants.  
The case of Native Americans constitutes the most relevant empirical evi-
dence where immigrants destroyed the local culture and killed many local inhabi-
tants. It is true that in this case immigrants forced their way into the culture and the 
lives of local inhabitants, which constitutes a violation of human rights. We are 
speaking of conflicts and wars lead for other reasons than peaceful ones. In our 
times, however, when immigrants do enter into conflict with the local culture and the 
local residents measures of punishment and of deportation/exclusion from the local 
territory have to be inflicted. In our theoretical case we presume that immigrants 
have proper intentions and want to cooperate with the existing inhabitants in order to 
follow the argument. 
A rectification might be useful in the case of natural reservations like the 
ones in the US, which protect the habitat of Native Americans and their “dying cul-
tures”. I refer here to ‘old cultures’ that barely survived the process of assimilation 
after long conflicts and forced social interactions with foreigners. In these situations, 
immigrants have to obey certain rules imposed to local residents as well: e.g. if im-
migrants want to pass through the territory of such reservations they would have to 
use established paths for general access without harming or desecrating the reserva-
tions or damaging the culture protected by these reservations. If it is necessary they 
have to obtain special permission to pass through their territories and paths of access 
will be available for their trespass. I propose that mutual agreement between local 
authorities and immigrants might be the best solution for a peaceful cooperation in 
which both parties’ rights should be respected.  
Immigrants will pass an important share of cultural and social knowledge to 
the citizens from the host countries the result being the enrichment and development 
of the host countries’ culture. Further more, the immigrants will learn from their cul-
tural experiences with the residents in the host countries and they will pass these in-
fluences once their return to their home countries sharing an important knowledge 
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about the national cultures of host countries. The exchange of cultural information is 
vital for intercultural relations between states and immigration plays a valuable role 
in this process of cultural enrichment. The home countries benefit from interaction 
with the returning immigrants even from the distance through the exchange of infor-
mation. The home countries’ national cultures enrich in the same manner as the na-
tional cultures from the host countries.  
Thirdly, connected with the above point, it is important to remember Schef-
fler’s remark concerning culture’s influence in structuring people’s lives. His argu-
ment is that a culture should face the foreign challenge in order to select those ele-
ments, which can enrich it and modernize it. The foreigners’ influence through their 
customs and language is not threatening but challenging: the national culture can 
adapt in view of a new important experience for its people and its development.69 
National cultures are constantly changing as a result of the immigrants’ inter-
action with the host countries’ population. The general effect is positive on each 
category presented so far: host countries, home countries, immigrants, remaining 
citizens in the home countries and native citizens in the host countries.  
 
2.3. Labour market and entrepreneurship 
 
In this section I present the consequences of immigration on the labour mar-
ket and entrepreneurship. I start with the effects on the host country. The attitude to-
wards immigrants has changed in the 20th century mainly because of large inflows of 
immigrants waiting to enter richer, developed states in search for new opportunities. 
After a big influx of immigrants in the US at the beginning of the 20th century, things 
started to change in the attitude of host countries. This involved the reappearance of 
nationalistic feelings, negative opinions about the effects of immigration and the fear 
that foreigners will rapidly steal the jobs of native residents.70 The predominant 
negative thinking towards the effects of immigration started to be severely criticized 
in the contemporary literature. I next focus on the arguments that try to counterattack 
these negative trends on immigration. 
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Moses proposes an efficient analysis of the benefits of immigration on host 
and home countries from the perspective of open borders policy. Firstly, in the case 
of receiving countries, Moses argues that economists reached the conclusion that in 
the 20th century immigration had a positive effect on the American economy (due to 
important research applied to this geographical area). More immigrants are attracted 
to USA and the impact on the local economy is visible as industries developed rap-
idly and the majority of immigrants permanently settled in America.  
Secondly, in the case of open borders Moses states that there is a real uncer-
tainty on the assumption that immigrants actually compete with the native 
workforce: the data shows that the incoming workers aim for undesired jobs and thus 
cover an important sector of the job market, insufficiently exploited by the native 
workers. In fact, native workers turn down low-skilled jobs and are more interested 
in high-skilled jobs that offer more money and benefits. Foreign unskilled workers 
are interested to take these jobs, thus filling a gap in the job market and helping the 
local entrepreneurs to develop and run their industries. 
There is serious doubt on the assumption that immigrants are usually less 
skilled than the native workers or that immigrants’ skills level depends mainly on the 
countries considered for analysis. This means that the general tendency has changed 
a lot in the recent years as high skilled workers are attracted to richer states that offer 
them higher salaries and better opportunities. In many cases, the incoming workers 
are more ambitious than the local workers and very hard working, aiming for specific 
labor sectors that need specific professional skills (e.g. doctors, engineers, profes-
sionals dealing with technical domains).71 
Thirdly, the impact of immigration on the local wages is not negative, it only 
decreases the low-skilled workers’ wages but the overall wages in the developed 
world are positively influenced or are not affected at all.72 This point is very impor-
tant as it proves that incoming immigrants positively influence the labor market and 
also the distribution of wages on the local job markets. Because unskilled native 
workers might feel threatened this effect is unjustified because a spirit of competi-
tiveness determines the high skilled native workers to earn more in the long run. The 
effect on the labor market is positive where the balance between wages is realized for 
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the benefit of both immigrants and native residents. The only negative effect is no-
ticed on the unskilled native workers that are indeed threatened by the incoming low-
skilled/unskilled foreign workers.  
The structure of the labor market is based on a compact layer of unskilled 
workers supplied by incoming workers and high skilled workers are dependent on 
filling the gaps within the lower labor sectors. The wages are dependent on a homo-
geneous job market that can supply labor force at the lower level in order to promote 
higher salaries for high skilled workers.  
Moses’ conclusion in the case of host countries is that the overall effects of 
immigration are positive, not negative: “Allowing immigrants to supplement the 
shrinking and ageing populations in the developed world might generate even greater 
national savings. Without the influx of younger immigrant labour, the developed 
world may find its standard of living failing rather substantially over the next fifty 
years. Here the economic argument for liberalizing human mobility is clear-cut and 
powerful.”73 I consider Moses’ interpretation of the economic facts to be encourag-
ing and applicable to the overall utilitarian framework. As host countries are impor-
tant in controlling immigration worldwide the fair conclusion to draw from these 
data is to encourage host countries to be optimistic about the overall consequences 
immigration can have on people’s lives.  
 As I have already shown immigrants supply host countries with fresh labour 
force that usually compensates for the unfilled gaps in the labor market. The follow-
ing aspects need to be mentioned in regards to the consequences of immigration: 1) 
immigrants are constantly in search of new job opportunities and are attracted by 
welcoming labor markets (in consequence, they benefit from the labor market secur-
ing new and more rewarding jobs than in their home countries); 2) not all the immi-
grants are fully integrated in the host countries, in the professional area or in society; 
3) a large percent of immigrants still aim for low-skilled jobs in order to make sure 
that they have work once they arrive in the host country; 4) high-skilled incoming 
workers are usually more successful than their predecessors in occupying the desired 
professional positions; 5) immigrants’ success in the host countries depends on the 
chosen location (e.g. US and Australia are more open to immigrants from all kinds of 
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backgrounds than Western Europe), 6) the second generation born from immigrants 
settled in host countries have a high rate of success among native generations and 
first generation of migrants (they can integrate better in all backgrounds inheriting 
valuable input from their parents’ experience and the host country’s educational 
training).74  
 Among the immigrants that wanted to find better opportunities and secure a 
safe future for them or their families, we can encounter immigrants who started their 
own business in the host countries. The entrepreneurial spirit is noticeable among 
those immigrants that found the necessary capital and had the ambition to start a 
business. This influence is a positive one for the category of immigrants in general 
and also for the host country’s economy because it generates new jobs and diversi-
fies the labour market. Immigrants that couldn’t find suitable jobs for their skills or 
desired to start afresh in a new country began to create local and in many cases prof-
itable businesses.75 
On the other hand, we can also measure the impact of immigration on the lo-
cal businessmen or entrepreneurs. The local employers usually find cheaper labor 
force among the incoming workers and are satisfied in filling the gaps in the labor 
sector in this way. The negative effect of this action is that while immigrants settle 
for low-skilled jobs they can also fall into traps set by the local employers who find 
many ways either to exploit them or refuse to pay them correspondingly. In these 
cases, the best solution is to demand a fair immigration policy that protects the rights 
of immigrants. This negative consequence deepens in the case of illegal immigrants: 
many of them are treated badly, violently and sometimes can be tricked in entering 
prostitution, joining drug chains or are sold as slaves on the black market.76 
 The consequences of immigration on the native population are positive in the 
sense of diversifying the labor market, occupying unwanted jobs, stimulating the lo-
cal market through the creation of new businesses (entrepreneurial migrants) or cre-
ating positive competitiveness between native workers and foreign workers. The 
negative effects are those related to local immigration policies (if they promote anti-
discrimination towards immigrants then these immigration policies should be applied 
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consistently) and to local employers’ attitude towards immigrants. The negative con-
sequences are those mentioned above and they generate racist feelings among the 
native population, which usually are motivated by a bad application of immigration 
policies or lack of proper immigration policies.77  
The native population can dramatically influence the process of integration of 
newcomers by invoking either a welcoming attitude based on anti-discrimination or a 
racist attitude, which usually creates violent conflicts, separatism and can lead to 
wars.  
 
 2.4. Capital flight and remittances 
 
In this section I consider the effects of capital flight and remittances on home 
countries, host countries, immigrants and the remaining population in the home 
countries. Overall, the sending countries gain a lot of income from the immigrants’ 
residency in richer states. Compared to the local income, the foreign income that 
comes in the home countries is very valuable as it balances potential financial crises. 
Sending countries are dependent on remittances (the capital immigrants send back 
home) and this constitutes an important share of the annual income.  
This process is still ongoing as the EU is making the entrance of foreign indi-
viduals possible within European states. The difference in being allowed to work 
full-time or part-time is not highly relevant here; the essential point is that a strong 
labour force enters in European states each year and is responsible of generating im-
portant capital. There are two possibilities for directing this capital: 1) some immi-
grants choose to store their wages within the host countries contributing to the local 
economy of host countries, 2) other immigrants choose to send their wages back 
home creating the phenomenon known as capital flight. In the second case, the send-
ing countries benefit from capital flight and the receiving countries lose an important 
capital used mainly to reinforce the financial market.78  
In sum, the positive effects of capital flight and remittances are: 
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• Migrant remittances can have a major positive impact on the economic development 
of countries of origin, 
• Migrants also transfer home skills and attitudes – known as ‘social remittances’ – 
which support development.79 
 
From an economic and social perspective, the consequences of remittances 
are positive permitting the immigrants to secure an important return if they return in 
the sending countries. The remittances can be evaluated as financial deposits or so-
cial and professional skills useful for the immigrants and for the home countries as 
well. 
The home countries and the remaining population will overall benefit from 
immigration because their co-nationals send an important share of their wages back 
home, either to their families or home banks. This helps reinforce the local economy 
and stabilizes the local industries. Also the remaining workers in sending countries 
will not be forced to pay extra taxes as an effect of labour force loss. On the other 
side, immigrants themselves secure their wages in a disciplined way: they pay taxes 
in the host countries and they send back remittances securing an extra share of their 
incoming either as savings for their families back home or simply as aid.  
The effect of remittances on the well-being of the immigrants is positive: they 
secure a stable economic situation for their families back home or they secure their 
savings in the home countries’ banks reinforcing the home countries’ financial mar-
ket. Either way, immigrants are positively influenced by capital flight because this is 
their only way of securing their future planning in either home countries or host 
countries. The effects of remittances on the host countries do not influence the over-
all situation because remittances cannot positively or negatively affect the host coun-
tries’ economy in a serious way. At the most, remittances can be used as investment 
in the host country reinforcing the financial market. Otherwise, it cannot be deduced 
that remittances sent to home countries will cast serious negative effects on host 
countries.  
 In conclusion, if immigrants choose to stay in host countries or return back 
home, the social remittances represent a powerful advantage for them on the profes-
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sional level. The labor market distributes these social and financial remittances for 
the benefit of the entire international framework (immigrants traveling in different 
foreign states use their social and professional skills for the benefit of the receiving 
countries, in return if they come back to the sending countries they invest in the local 
labour market and contribute to a general increase of entrepreneurship). 
 
 2.5. Brain drain 
  
But even if remittances largely contribute to the development of the sending 
countries, the supposedly negative effect of immigration (or emigration) is repre-
sented by the phenomenon of ‘brain drain’. Brain drain involves the loss of educated 
individuals from poor or developing countries and constitutes a reason of worry for 
the sending countries. Here are four points that highlight this trend, from a positive 
perspective, which I analyze in detail. 
1) Brain drain should not be interpreted as a negative consequence of immi-
gration. When educated individuals leave their countries of origin this can entail 
positive effects in the long run. It involves brain circulation between sending and re-
ceiving countries generated by high skilled workers. The loss of educated individuals 
can be weighted with the incoming educated or high-skilled individuals from other 
states. The brain circulation permits a constant flux of high skilled individuals to 
leave and enter nation-states for the benefit of sending and receiving countries as 
well as for the immigrants themselves (this refers to a balanced outlook on both emi-
gration and immigration).  
To give an example for brain drain: top students that leave their home coun-
tries to study in richer states in top universities are asked to come back to their home 
countries once their study period is finished. This type of agreement is used by sev-
eral developing states in Europe to reduce the negative effect of brain drain and 
strengthen the local economy and education benefiting from the social and profes-
sional skills the students acquire in the host countries. Emigration is seen as a poten-
tial harm for the home countries because it generates positive benefits for the host 
countries (as they experience as immigration) and in return the home countries are 
left with a smaller amount of high-educated people.  
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This example is typical for the ‘brain circulation’ phenomenon because send-
ing countries are controlling emigration for the benefit of both sending and receiving 
countries (receiving countries do not have to deal with a large number of students in 
search for jobs after they finish their studies and the sending countries are benefiting 
from the original investment in their students once they are integrated in the local 
labour market). The negative effects of brain drain can be controlled systematically 
and in agreement with the outgoing students creating a balance between the negative 
effects of emigration (from the home countries’ perspective) and the positive effects 
of immigration (from the host countries’ perspective). 
2) The second point refers to another effect of brain drain within the circular 
labour migration, which can stimulate economic development across states. Hence, if 
high skilled workers and professionals are leaving their countries in search of better 
opportunities they can influence the labour market from each state they visit or reside 
in temporarily. As skills are transferable from one group of workers to another, the 
effect of brain drain can have a significant positive influence on the international la-
bour market in this perspective.  
3) The third point refers to migrant Diasporas that can communicate with the 
home countries exchanging ideas and resources. Even if the home countries experi-
ence the negative effects of brain drain in the present moment or in the short term, 
nevertheless, the positive effects reveal themselves in the long run. The communities 
of migrants within the host countries tend to socialize and keep contact with the 
home countries representing important clusters of economic and social reinforcement 
for these. The role of migrant Diasporas reflects a positive consequence of brain 
drain once the social cohesion is strong enough to generate exchange of resources, 
skills and information. 
4) The fourth point shows that if home countries tend to stabilize their 
economies or reinforce them, then the chance of brain drain is reduced. The educated 
individuals do not need to find opportunities in richer states or neighboring states and 
can contribute to the development of their home countries’ financial market.  
Moses backs up these observations and focuses his analysis on the American 
history. His analysis includes historical evidence and economic research. In short, 
Moses agrees with the fact that both sending and receiving countries benefit from the 
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‘brain circulation’, involving important economic gains.80 As to remittances, this 
phenomenon is highly influential for developing and poor countries, as it was men-
tioned above. Moses balances the benefits brought by remittances with the effects of 
restraining immigration in the developing countries and the conclusion is striking: 
immigration controls deprive developing countries of an important capital used for 
enforcing their economies and stabilizing the financial market.81  
Analyzing the effects of immigration on the remaining population from the 
home countries we can distinguish between positive and negative trends. As it was 
already shown home countries benefit from immigration through brain drain and re-
mittances. The workers that remain at home benefit from brain drain at the level of 
the labour market: “With fewer workers remaining (after emigration), their relative 
bargaining power (vis-à-vis employers) increases-empowering them to demand 
higher wages.”82 
From another point of view, the costs of brain drain have an immediate effect 
on the remaining population. With fewer individuals to pay the taxes and help the 
local economy, the population registers an increase in local taxes and there are more 
gaps to fill within the labour market. One category of individuals severely affected 
by this process is the local entrepreneurs and employers. Without a high-skilled la-
bour force and in general with fewer workers they need to supplement the labour 
force with new employers, important costs that will affect the local businesses in the 
long run. But remittances will partly cover for these costs and will help stabilize the 
local economy. So, as costs of emigration are noticeable, important benefits fill the 
gaps in the local economy and labour market and offer the remaining population a 
source of capital.83  
Seglow argues that there are a few problems with the utilitarian outlook on 
migration in general. Seglow points to the fact that those high-skilled individuals 
who choose to leave their countries of origin might be those ones the sending coun-
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tries can dispose of and once they arrive in the host countries they suffer from mar-
ginalization and discrimination.84 
As it was already pointed out, high-skilled individuals that leave countries of 
origin create negative effects in their home countries because it takes time for an 
equal amount of high-skilled individuals to take up their places in either the profes-
sional domain or in education. I do not believe that sending countries can dispose of 
their high-skilled individuals so easily without claiming that this action affects them 
in a negative way in the present time. For instance, medics from Romania are mas-
sively leaving the country, as well as students following undergraduate or postgradu-
ate programs in technical fields like: IT, biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, 
etc85. These students or young professionals are very valuable in their home coun-
tries either as future professors or practitioners. This situation is also present in other 
European countries like: France, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Greece, etc. If these 
individuals leave their countries of origin the gaps created in the labor market will be 
noticeable, contrary to what Seglow claims. 
If immigrants suffer from marginalization and discrimination in the host 
countries this can only be an effect of the general attitude on the issue of immigra-
tion. As I previously argued, this attitude can be corrected if host states realize that 
they have general duties towards immigrants and they should leave aside any type of 
racist treatment. Of course, this measure can be enforced if immigration laws are cor-
rectly stipulated in favor of immigrants’ rights and if these laws are obeyed in host 
countries. The fault does not pertain to sending countries for the marginalization of 
their fleeing citizens, this is a general issue that can only be corrected by being mor-
ally impartial and displaying a general understanding for the condition and legal 
status of immigrants.  
Brain drain is an important issue for home countries implying negative and 
positive effects. The measures home countries and host countries adopt are important 
in regards to the protection of immigrants when they arrive in the host countries (by 
recognizing immigrants’ rights and applying the relevant immigration laws). These 
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measures can also help to minimize the negative effect of brain drain in the home 
countries (by creating scholarships or professional contracts with an obligation to 
come back after the period of study/work in the home countries and practice their 
profession there for, at least, a limited period of time) and to maximize the brain cir-
culation between home and host countries.  
This implies a general awareness on the impact of immigration on the inter-
national scale, which can only bring benefits to the parties involved if these measures 
will be taken. Within the utilitarian framework, negative effects of issues such as 
brain drain can be minimized if the political institutions and the immigration laws 
correspond to the needs of all parties without giving preference to a certain category 
(e.g. giving preference only to host countries because they are richer and they can 
impose their own rules without consulting the immigrants versus the scenario where 
both immigrants, home countries and host countries discuss these issues and collec-
tively choose rules to regulate the negative effects of immigration). 
 
3. Wellman’s objection 
 
I present a general objection addressed to the utilitarian account of immigra-
tion. As utilitarians like to consider that immigration contributes to the well-being of 
all parties involved and because of this reason states should favor open borders, 
Wellman describes an interesting objection to this. He argues that sometimes parents 
want to raise their children in a suboptimal way comparative to the Platonic model of 
raising the children collectively without their parents’ involvement being taken cared 
of by all members of the community. The argument goes on that it is justifiable for 
parents to desire this degree of sub-optimality because as parents they prefer to raise 
them in their private cluster.  
Another example refers to the fact that Norway’s refusal to join EU can be 
considered a case of inefficiency because EU and Norway could be better-off if 
Norway joined EU. However, Norway chooses inefficiently to remain neutral to this 
aspect and therefore this action is condemnable from a utilitarian perspective. In the 
same respect, states cannot be condemned to refuse entry to some immigrants ineffi-
ciently because this is part of their internal logic as particular states and their effi-
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ciency is their own private matter to decide.86 Thus, if Norway refuses to join EU 
then it can also refuse other individuals to join its territory.  
I examine the first example in depth: the analogy with the parents is not ap-
plicable for the case of states. First of all parents are connected with their children on 
a different level than states are connected with their citizens. States do not give birth 
to citizens or promise them to give them food otherwise they would die. The relation 
between parents and children is a parental one, based on blood liaison, which in-
volves a high degree of responsibility and care. If a parent chooses to raise his child 
within the private sphere of the family this can also be an efficient way to educate 
and raise the child maybe even more so than in the case of collective education. A 
second thought can be addressed to the fact that the Platonic model of raising the 
children does not really relate to our case of immigration, even if it stands on utilitar-
ian grounds.  
We can imagine immigrants mixed with citizens of a particular state without 
that state to dispense of its special obligations towards its citizens. Having special 
duties towards citizens does not overrule having general duties towards immigrants 
and letting them inside, as Goodin argues, for example. This is not comparable with 
the case of parents that can raise their children only in the private sphere of their 
homes under their care. If the parents are unfit to take care of them then a form of 
taking care of them collectively is justifiable. 
In reference to the second example, Norway’s refusal to join EU might stand 
on different considerations than Norway’s refusal to admit immigrants. Utilitarians 
can argue that even though Norway had inefficiently chosen not to enter EU, based 
on economic, social matters, it still can decide to accept immigrants in an efficient 
way. I do not think Wellman’s argument works very well in reference to the two 
cases, other than proving that Norway has its own right to choose whatever policy 
finds fit. Analyzing the data on the immigration process in Norway we find out that 
the number of immigrants has risen considerably from 1950, showing important 
growth in 2000. The public reaction nevertheless is not overall in favor of immigra-
tion but still facts show that Norway accepts immigrants from different backgrounds, 
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including asylum seekers and students attracted by friendly Norwegian educational 
schemes. 87 
These data might prove that in fact immigration policies do not stand on the 
same grounds with other political policies. Moreover, even the countries neutral in 
issues like joining EU have a friendly policy of immigration despite the public skep-
tic reaction towards this issue. Encouraging friendly immigration policies can attract 
a lot of benefits for countries such as Norway, which can refuse to join EU for other 
reasons proving that opening the borders to immigrants does not necessarily conflict 
with the decision to join or refuse to join other treaties/unions etc. 
 To conclude this section, the negative consequences of immigration on all the 
categories of individuals presented so far including the sending and receiving coun-
tries can be prevented or dealt with in a safe manner by adopting the right immigra-
tion policies and showing the right attitude vis-à-vis the immigrants themselves (this 
means adopting an antiracist attitude and respecting the legislation with regards to 




In this chapter I analyzed the consequences of immigration, the arguments 
focused on the positive and negative effects of welcoming foreigners. As I have 
shown, the balance between special and general duties can point to the most urgent 
matters without decreasing dramatically the level of well-being of the existing resi-
dents within nation-states. Utilitarians proved that the effort of helping the vulner-
able, offering aid to refugees, assisting the economic immigrants with primary goods 
is worth pursuing. In the next chapter, I shall consider the liberal egalitarian argu-






                                                





Liberal egalitarianism and immigration  
 
 In this chapter I present the liberal egalitarian account of immigration. In the 
first section I define liberal egalitarianism. In the second section I expose Rawls’ ac-
count of liberal egalitarianism. In the third section I focus on the arguments in favor 
of freedom of movement and open borders from the perspectives of two values: free-
dom and equality. I explore the main question if immigration is a moral right based 
on the argument that freedom of movement should be counted as a basic liberty. 
Also in this section I dispute the arguments on the asymmetry between the right of 
entry and exit and argue for the symmetry between these two rights. In the fourth 
section I compare freedom of association with freedom of movement and explain 
whether there is a conflict between the two. In the fifth section I propose a short 
thought experiment that promotes the principle of just immigration and how this 
works in the original position. 
In the sixth section I extend the case of open borders to no borders within 
cosmopolitanism from the perspective of finding solutions for global inequalities and 
world poverty. Finally, in the seventh section I assess whether immigration under-
mines the liberal egalitarian values. I conclude that liberal egalitarians should favor 
in general open borders and freedom of movement with the possibility of imposing a 
radical policy like no borders policy. 
 
1. Definition of liberal egalitarianism 
  
In order to give a proper definition of ‘liberal egalitarianism’, I need first to 
define the terms ‘liberalism’ and ‘egalitarianism’. Liberalism refers to “a political 
ideology whose central theme is a commitment to the individual and to the construc-
tion of a society in which individuals can satisfy their interests or achieve fulfill-
ment.”88 As key values, liberalism gives importance to individualism and freedom 
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among other values. Though individuals are free to pursue their plans as long as they 
respect the freedom of all, equality plays an important part in highlighting the idea 
that all individuals are equal since birth and they should enjoy equal opportunities. In 
this context, liberals favor the principle of meritocracy (people are promoted accord-
ing to their abilities rather than their social background89) and stress the idea that in-
dividuals can get different merits depending on their different talents and desire to 
work. Hence, even if individuals are morally born equal they can reach different re-
sults according to particular skills and investment in labor.  
Egalitarians, on the other hand, encourage equality between individuals in 
terms of wealth and income. An egalitarian can refer to different types of equality, 
for instance moral equality (all individuals are morally equal by birth and should be 
treated with the same dignity as human beings) rather than resource equality (all in-
dividuals should be equal in wealth, income or resources). Apart from this distinc-
tion, egalitarianism can be instrumental or non-instrumental. Instrumental egalitari-
anism values equality as a means to some independently specifiable goal90 whereas 
non-instrumental egalitarianism values equality for its own sake—as an end, or as 
partly constitutive of some end.91  
To illustrate this distinction, imagine that a person aims to promote solidarity 
within a group of people and equality is a good measure to realize this aim. In this 
case he qualifies as an instrumental egalitarian for using equality as an instrument for 
another purpose. However, a non-instrumental egalitarian will promote justice within 
a group of people because he also values equality as part of the notion of justice, 
morally speaking. This person values equality as an end in itself not as an instrument 
for realizing another purpose.  
Liberal egalitarianism values both freedom and equality within the same po-
litical doctrine. For example, a liberal egalitarian can find that equality should take 
priority over freedom in his theory valuing more equality of wealth or income, 
whereas another liberal egalitarian might favor freedom on the background of equal-
ity considering that individuals are free to attain their level of wealth according to 
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their capacities. I shall explore more this definition in the following section, when I 
shall present Rawls’ theory of justice.  
 
2. Rawls’ liberal egalitarian theory 
  
 I briefly summarize Rawls’ account of liberal egalitarianism. Rawls’ theory 
of justice is a perfect example of a theory combining the values of freedom and 
equality. Rawls argues for both basic liberties and equality of opportunity for all in-
dividuals and sets a redistribution scheme for the worst-off. His theory of justice fo-
cuses on the principles of justice, which guide the entire social framework and the 
distribution process. The two principles of justice are accompanied by two rules of 
priority. I shall argue that among these liberties, freedom of movement can be chosen 
as part of basic liberties under the veil of ignorance in the original position. If indi-
viduals will choose freedom of movement they will also prefer the principle of just 
immigration, described in the following sections. The two principles of justice and 
the priority rules are the following: 
 
 First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total sys-
tem of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
 Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity. 
  First priority rule (the priority of liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked 
in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. 
There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties 
shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. 
 Second priority rule (the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare): The sec-
ond principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximiz-
ing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. There are 
two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the 
 52 
lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of 
those bearing this hardship.92  
 
 Rawls’ liberal egalitarian account gives priority to an equal share of liberty to 
all individuals. Within a system of liberty for all each individual has an equal right to 
a set of basic liberties that is compatible with the initial liberty system. This means 
that if an individual does not enjoy an equal right to these liberties he is outside the 
liberty system and in consequence deprived of basic liberties. Referring to equality 
of wealth and income these social and economic benefits should satisfy in the highest 
degree the least advantaged person according to the just savings principle and should 
respect the equality of opportunities for all.  
 The first priority rule advocates for a less than equal liberty that must be ac-
ceptable for those with lesser liberties and such an account must strengthen the over-
all system of liberties. The second priority rule of justice over efficiency and welfare 
indicates that in the case of inequality of opportunity and excessive rate of saving the 
second principle of justice intervenes in order to favor the worst-off. In other words, 
the second priority rule entitles the second principle of justice to take control in mat-
ters where the worst-off are disadvantaged by either of the circumstances reminded 
above. The two priority rules act in cases where freedom and equality need to be bal-
anced in favor of the worst-off. Rawls chooses these priority rules to maintain a bal-
ance between the principles of justice and real world cases where the accumulation 
of resources or basic liberties come into conflict.  
 Both principles of justice create a balance between the worst-off and the bet-
ter-off in order to help the situation of the worst-off in the perspective of fairness. 
Moreover, the principles of fairness aim to establish both political and liberty rights 
for all individuals in order to create a balance of opportunities not only from the 
egalitarian perspective but also from the liberal perspective. This liberal egalitarian 
account helps improve the well-being of individuals from two perspectives: as free 
agents enjoying an equal right to basic liberties and as political agents enjoying the 
equality of opportunity.  
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Rawls’ account tries to avoid the situation where individuals feel constrained 
by the socio-political system they live in by providing them with an equal right to 
basic liberties and equality of opportunity. If the worst-off reach the desperate point 
of bankruptcy the system is there to assure that they will be helped with resources 
acquired from the better-off according to the principle of just savings (those who 
own more will contribute to help the worst-off, thus not abusing the basic liberties 
system or the equality of opportunity). 
The original position contributes to the overall background of social coopera-
tion because individuals choose the principles of justice in this state. Rawls describes 
the original position as  
 
a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the 
notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects 
of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural 
circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are 
situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will af-
fect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis 
of general considerations.93 
 
Leaving aside the risk of inequality and violation of liberty in the real world 
circumstances, Rawls proposes the original position as an alternative to weigh our 
general principles in advance to acting in real life. The principles of justice will then 
permit all individuals to think in advance before committing any violation or abuse 
on other persons. Rawls’ original position is a thought experiment in which we all 
are under the same circumstances and no rules of acting are set. In this scenario, eve-
rybody will tend to rationalize their choices before passing to actions and second, 
everybody will try to assume the other individual’s position as an alternative role for 
their own situation. As matters are not fixed yet, individuals can establish the rules 
according to which they want to live bearing in mind not only the costs of the action 
but also the responsibility that follows from performing it.  
Another purpose of the original position is to trigger a rational framework for 
social cooperation, which can be initiated by anyone who needs to evaluate the alter-
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natives for him and for the other individuals and weigh the consequences of actions 
before performing them.94 In addition to these principles of fairness, Rawls sub-
scribes to the idea of social cooperation, which embodies “the central liberal ideas 
that cooperation should be fair to all citizens regarded as free and equal”95. Rawls 
argues for the positive distributive thesis of equality-based reciprocity, which simply 
states that all social goods must be distributed equally among all members of society 
unless an unequal redistribution will be for the advantage of all. Justice must start 
from the presumption that if all individuals are born equal then all cooperatively pro-
duced goods must be distributed equally among all individuals. Then, if inequality 
arises according to the idea of justice, all individuals must benefit from it particularly 
the worst-off.96 The liberal background is lead by the redistributive scheme from 
which everybody benefits especially the worst-off.  
In sum, the advantages presented by the justice of fairness account over the 
utilitarian theory refer to the idea that: “the four-stage sequence formulates an order 
of agreements and enactments designed to build up in several steps a hierarchical 
structure of principles, standards, and rules, which when consistently applied and ad-
hered to, lead to a definite constitution for social action.”97 
 
3. Is immigration a moral right? 
 
In the current section I focus on the arguments establishing immigration as a 
moral right. I consider that immigration can be classified as a moral right, part of 
freedom of movement in its double apprehension as freedom of exit and freedom of 
entry. Immigration cannot be a legal right because it is not recognized by the law and 
cannot be integrated within the legal right of entry because such a right is not recog-
nized in the law. I further argue for a moral right of immigration supported by phi-
losophical and ethical reasons.  
In proving this, I firstly present the arguments in favor and against freedom of 
movement from two perspectives: from the perspective of freedom and from the per-
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spective of equality. Whether immigration can be considered a moral right will de-
pend on the arguments I provide for the symmetry between the right of exit and the 
right of entry. Secondly, I focus on the distinction between freedom of association 
and freedom of movement and if these freedoms conflict and if they can be compati-
ble within the liberal egalitarian framework.  
 
3.1. Freedom of movement 
 
I make a distinction between the arguments formulated through the perspec-
tive of freedom, considered as primary value and the arguments formulated through 
the perspective of equality according to the definition of liberal egalitarianism. Each 
category of arguments will highlight the advantages freedom of movement brings in 
terms of either freedom or equality and I discuss them in turn. 
 The right to freedom of movement is enshrined in article 13 from ‘The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights’ from 1948. Thus, freedom of movement is con-
stituted of the freedom to move within the boundaries of a state and the freedom to 
exit and return to the home country: “1) Everyone has the right to freedom of move-
ment and residence within the borders of each State; 2) Everyone has the right to 
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”98  
From this definition we can observe that there is an asymmetry between the 
right of exit and the right of entry. The right of exit from one’s country is acknowl-
edged as a human right and one can also move freely within the borders of its coun-
try. I argue for the symmetry between the right of entry and the right of exit and pro-
pose that freedom of movement should be considered as a conjuncture between these 
two rights, as a more extensive freedom.  
 
a) Freedom-based arguments for freedom of movement  
 
 I start by explaining the orthodox view according to which freedom of 
movement is based on the moral asymmetry between the right of exit and the right of 
entry. Whereas the right of exit is acknowledged as a right in the Universal Declara-
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tion of Human Rights, the right to enter still poses problems for the majority of po-
litical philosophers. I argue that in a liberal egalitarian perspective the right of exit 
should be symmetrical with the right of entry because if people come out of countries 
without a place to go this action does not seem justifiable from the perspective of 
individual freedom.  
My main argument is that even if states can oppose the entrance of individu-
als as they choose their own admittance policies, nevertheless exiting a country 
without having another area of access to enter does not offer the individual a basic 
liberty or human right in the first place. The membership to one community should 
be subject to change because all individuals enjoy the liberties of free movement.99 I 
will return to this argument shortly. 
As liberal egalitarians consider freedom of movement as a basic liberty eve-
ryone must enjoy, we can focus on the two parts that form it. Freedom of movement 
is constituted of freedom of exit/right of exit (to have the right to exit your own 
country) and freedom of entry/right of entry (the right to enter another state than the 
state of origin). As we already have seen, the right of exit is stipulated in the article 
13 from The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at number 2. What happens 
with their right of entry to other territories if individuals are free to exit the home 
countries and return? For instance, we can interpret freedom of movement as being 
available only for tourists that travel in purposes of study or business and reside tem-
porarily in foreign countries. But what happens with the rest of people like asylum 
seekers, economic immigrants and refugees? Their need is more urgent than travel-
ing with tourist purposes and waiting for consent from host countries usually turns 
into an ordeal on their behalf. Does the right of exit have a correspondence in the 
right of entry? Moreover, how can liberal egalitarians plead for a moral symmetry 
between exit and entry? 
 An interesting account is presented in the ‘International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ 
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adopted in 1990.100 In the article 39 it is stipulated that migrant workers and their 
families benefit from freedom of movement within the state of employment and are 
also free to apply for residence.101 In the article 38, states of employment should 
authorize under all their efforts the migrant workers’ absence and recognize the du-
ties they might have towards the states of origin.102   
 There are some difficulties in proposing the open borders policy for liberal 
egalitarians. One difficulty is that in proposing freedom of movement and opening 
the borders to all immigrants, in facing massive influxes of strangers from different 
cultural and political backgrounds this might endanger the liberal egalitarian institu-
tions when dealing with redistributive issues. This might happen when social institu-
tions cannot redistribute correctly the resources possessed at present between resi-
dents and immigrants and when the influx of immigrants can supersede the supply of 
existing resources. The liberal egalitarian institutions have to be solid and trained in 
dealing with immigration in order to integrate them adequately within the local 
community.  
 It can be replied here in favor of freedom of movement that basic liberties 
have lexical priority so the objection that the influx of immigrants might endanger 
the stock of resources is not strong in this perspective because basic liberties can 
only be restricted for the sake of liberty. In this case we cannot argue soundly that 
immigrants are ruining the stock of resources from the host country and therefore 
they should be constrained from entering. Maybe the objection would work better if 
immigrants would constrain the residents’ degree of liberty, but even in this case a 
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terms on which such temporary absences are authorized.” 
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liberal egalitarian framework is not concerned with the degree of liberty but with ba-
sic liberties as such.  
 To return to my previous argument about the freedom of movement as incor-
porating both the right of exit and the right of entry, allowing the right of exit but re-
stricting the right of entry in my view undermines the human right for freedom of 
movement in the first place. Let us consider, for the sake of the argument, the case of 
asylum seekers who desperately need to find a new home, at least on a temporary 
basis until the political or economic situation in their home countries is ameliorated. 
According to the UDHR, freedom of movement is at half way in accomplishing its 
purpose from the perspective of human rights. An asylum seeker has the right to exit 
his home country but due to calamities, wars, famine or other desperate situation he 
urgently needs to enter another territory and access the existing resources (either in a 
financial manner or directly by consuming resources).  
 If the surrounding or available states to welcome the asylum seeker forbid 
him the right to enter their territories as part of their border policy the asylum seeker 
will soon die. According to UDHR this situation is acceptable because there is no 
stipulated right of entrance on foreign territories if the concerning states do not ex-
plicitly allow this. The death of the asylum seeker is acceptable under this definition 
of freedom of movement. My questions are: could a liberal egalitarian find this situa-
tion just and moreover, what is the purpose of a right of exit without a right of en-
trance in situations like these? 
 The answer to the first question is that a liberal egalitarian would find this 
situation very unfair because such a human right stipulated by UDHR conflicts with 
basic liberties everyone should enjoy. This means that under a life-threatening situa-
tion an individual should be helped with resources, humanitarian aid, which defines a 
normal conduct for any human life. In the case of asylum seekers, a liberal egalitar-
ian can argue borders should be opened even if temporarily to allow these individu-
als to escape a life-threatening situation and be helped. At least temporarily, these 
individuals should have access to the host countries’ resources mainly because no 
other alternative of helping these people is available. 
 However, in the case of other immigrants a liberal egalitarian can impose 
some conditions: the situation of immigrants must be weighed thoroughly before ac-
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cepting them but should be evaluated in an efficient time according to the urgency of 
the request. If economic immigrants, for example, are not in a life-threatening situa-
tion but still their condition is not a decent one for a human being their request 
should be analyzed (if the country does not allow open borders for the current mo-
ment) and the selection of these immigrants should be made carefully based on how 
much they will consume in the future and the stock of resources existent in the pre-
sent moment in the host country. 
 To answer the second question an adjustment on the current human right of 
freedom of movement is necessary from a liberal egalitarian perspective: a right of 
entry is necessary when life-threatening situations are met and where immigrants 
face a very poor life in their home countries, which according to the decent living 
standards are unacceptable. In these situations, states should welcome at least a 
minimum number of immigrants in direct proportion with the available resources 
they have at the current moment as part of their moral duties and in respect for the 
basic liberties. 
 Freedom of movement should be perceived as a basic liberty in this scenario, 
where the lives of immigrants depend on their admittance in host countries. It is true 
that many immigrants would try to use this right in their own benefit, but neverthe-
less, if such a right is not recognized, innocent people will die or their lives will be 
seriously threatened due to the absence of a right to entry. Moreover, immigration 
should be considered a part of freedom of movement enclosed in the right of entry 
and recognized individually as a moral right (e.g. in the case of a asylum seekers or 
refugees the moral constrain in opening the borders is even higher than in the case of 
economic migrants but nevertheless the moral right of immigration should be open to 
all human beings as part of their basic liberties). If open borders are not applicable in 
a certain state due to economic or political reasons at a given moment in time, still 
porous borders should be considered as an alternative according to these needs im-
migrants justifiably possess.  
I stress the importance of considering the right of entry as part of freedom of 
movement even if the current political and economic conditions of different states 
contradict this fact. Improvement can be realized in terms of integrating immigrants 
along with the improvement of economic and maybe political conditions in host 
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countries. The distinction is between the moral action of recognizing the right of en-
try as symmetrical with the right of exit and as part of the overall human right of 
freedom of movement contrary with the current empirical economic/social/political 
situation of host states. This point will move forward our discussion of integrating 
immigration within freedom of movement based on a moral argument.  
Another sensitive remark to be made is the fact that many host countries ig-
nore the moral need of immigrants who wish to enter their territories due to eco-
nomic factors. I argue that it is a wrong interpretation of two different perspectives: 
one is economic and the other is moral. Arguing that it is justifiable to reject the right 
of entry based on economic factors means not to answer the real moral problem: are 
immigrants supposed to die, starve or experience moral and physical pain in order 
not to conflict with the welfare of host states? Are the two problems even on the 
same level in our discussion?  
I answer no, because avoiding the moral problem by defending the welfare of 
nation-states is not a proper solution and does not answer the real question here. 
Treating this question properly would mean to agree with the fact that many immi-
grants (among which the desperate cases of asylum seekers, refugees or economic 
immigrants) will die or experience serious harms if the host countries do not open 
their borders. This means that further on we need to recognize the right of entry as 
symmetrical with the right of exit and as part of freedom of movement, understood 
as a human right. Next, agreeing with these parameters, immigration will naturally 
fall under the category of basic liberties and as part of the human right of freedom of 
movement.  
In this way we answer the moral problem we are faced with. To answer the 
second problem, economic or political flaws can be solved in different ways. One 
solution will be immigration and another will be foreign aid and debt-forgiveness, 
which will work together in reducing global inequalities. This in the future will re-
duce severely the numbers of emigrants and will lead to an even distribution of im-
migrants across richer countries. I add another solution: richer states that face a big 
influx of immigrants, either asylum seekers or refugees can make a common agree-
ment of distributing these people according to the skills they possess or according to 
the willingness of integrating different nationalities within their communities. This 
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will create a market of immigration, which can function justly if we apply the princi-
ples of justice and the principle of just immigration. These issues will be treated 
properly in the next subsection when I treat the same issue from the equality perspec-
tive. For the sake of the argument I wanted to establish the possibility of the symme-
try between the right of exit and the right of entry and enumerate my main arguments 
for this.  
One problem is the economic situation of the incoming immigrants, which in 
the majority of cases are poor and have to find jobs in order to sustain themselves. A 
second problem is the number of the immigrants, which means a lot of bureaucratic 
work for the local political institutions (registering the immigrants, making sure they 
possess visa or the necessary documents, etc.). A third problem can be the security 
issue of making sure, firstly, that the immigrants are not potential criminals (or ex-
criminals) and secondly, that the immigrants are either in the process of getting a job 
or performing a legal activity on the territory thus avoiding the most immediate risk 
of stealing or performing an illegal action.  
The liberal egalitarians argue that the expulsion of members is not justified. If 
we assume an international approach to the issue of free movement, then we can un-
derstand the need for symmetry between the right of exit and the right of entry. The 
rights of exit and of entry are seen in the same international framework, where the 
egalitarian perspective can be easily spotted. The universal right of exit needs to have 
a correspondence in the right of entry as part of the basic liberties Rawls described.  
Liberals promote freedom of exit in the first place because they promote in-
dividualism and freedom as core values of their theory. If individuals would be con-
strained to stay within the borders of the state, then their basic liberty of developing 
their abilities would be violated and would contradict the core values of liberalism. 
As opposed to communist regimes for example, liberals acknowledge the importance 
of freedom of exit as part of the fundamental liberty of human beings. However, the 
basic liberties and rights defended by liberal egalitarians conflict with the need of 
consolidating the social and political institutions in the decision of closing or opening 
the borders.  
I argue that this conflict should not exist in the first place because the core 
values, basic liberties and rights of human beings weight more than the consolidation 
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of social and political institutions. Ultimately, legalizing the right of entry would 
make individuals stand on different legal grounds and the crime of entry foreign 
countries illegally would be suppressed. This could also help countries to better regu-
late the influx of immigrants and collaborate with them discussing common issues 
about human rights and the need to consolidate the welfare system.  
Human rights are in Roger Nett’s account “the category of liberty that hu-
mans reserve for each other to provide for individual development and to give one 
form of ultrastability to the social system by limiting waste of talent and insuring 
creative variety.”103 Exploring the idea of freedom of movement means to rely on 
two dimensions: “one material, the right of people who are trapped in overcrowded 
areas or areas without sufficient resources to go where resources are not so taken 
up.”104 The other dimension is political referring to “the right of people to move 
away from oppression, persecution, unfair restriction, or even disagreeable social 
environments and social orders.”105  
I agree with the fact that freedom of movement can offer a solution for inter-
nal conflicts within a nation-state, which in many ways reflects the lack of communi-
cation or exchange with other states on all levels. Sustaining freedom of movement 
as part of human rights is the right track for gaining new experiences that can reduce 
feelings such as racism or discrimination.  
Nett offers some arguments in favor of freedom of movement. One argument 
says that freedom of movement would sharpen the need to obey local law but would 
make it easier to do so since one wouldn’t have to remain in a given milieu. Next, if 
local laws should be oppressive free movement would exert forces less explosive 
than an internal revolution to get them changed.106 Nett underpins freedom of move-
ment with basic freedoms and argues for an increase in communication and the 
reduction of frustration as an effect of suppression. Individuals respond better to 
novelty and create more variety in society107 because of freedom of movement. The 
main idea is that basic freedoms, among which freedom of movement represent the 
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“highest forms of human cooperation and a key to ultrastability in an advanced sys-
tem.”108 
 Opening borders means respecting the freedom of individuals and acknowl-
edging their rights for integration in foreign states. I am not arguing here for a liber-
tarian interpretation putting more weight on individualism or freedom than neces-
sary. I am weighting the importance of the two values within the liberal egalitarian 
account: freedom and equality.  
 My argument is that liberal egalitarians should protect more these liberties 
and assume the consolidation of institutions as derivative of accepting and integrat-
ing immigrants in foreign states. The excuse of consolidating institutions is old and 
has been used for a long time as a pretext for closed borders. Promoting open bor-
ders, however, means to assume a new status and priority of the fundamental liber-
ties of people and opt for closed borders only in cases of emergency. Even though in 
some cases the restrictions are needed for further improvement in the institutional 
structure, nevertheless, the liberal egalitarians should return to an open border policy 
after these changes have been made otherwise the excuse of closing the borders is 
not justified in the first place.109 
Liberal egalitarians should promote it because it offers stability for the indi-
viduals in terms of their development as fulfilled persons capable of following their 
liberty of action and desire for self-accomplishment. Moreover, this argument is 
valid for the autonomy of all individuals that are capable or have the desire to evolve 
in terms of capabilities, finances or personal education. If home states cannot provide 
these items for their citizens, then they should be free to find them elsewhere in other 
richer states. If however, the home states do possess all the basic requirements for 
education or professional development and the citizens are still attracted to the idea 
of immigrating in other countries then the reason for doing this must constitute the 
ground of personal achievement within the need for autonomy. 
 I propose the following example to illustrate this last argument: in the recent 
years, EU has experienced a massive brain circulation, immigration/emigration from 
the category of young people who wanted either to pursue their studies in different 
countries or work elsewhere than their countries of origin. Young people from all 
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over EU felt the need for specialization in universities other than the local ones or 
believed that they could get better-paid jobs and valuable work experience in richer 
states from EU (e.g. Erasmus/Socrates scholarships are a proof of this as many stu-
dents prefer to follow other degrees in foreign countries or stay there and work in-
stead or returning to their home countries). Freedom of movement within the states 
of EU is a perfect example for illustrating the individuals’ need to get better or dif-
ferent education, better jobs and valuable work experience in other countries than 
their own. Because I mentioned the notion of need, I further explain the connection 
between basic needs and basic liberties. This account will permit a reinforcement of 
open borders constituent of the basic human liberties.  
According to Rawls, a liberal society meets the requirement of basic needs, 
which stipulates that all individuals should have their basic needs satisfied and the 
available resources would be distributed according to this criterion. Also in relation 
to the example of EU these basic needs correspond to resources like education, jobs 
and work experience, which are necessary for the citizens living within EU. Freedom 
of movement helps distribute these resources according to individuals’ needs and 
represents a support for immigration. We can see that immigration in this case helps 
those individuals who lack these resources to access them in different countries 
within EU. Because Rawls conceives society as self-sufficient and closed, citizens 
enter it only by birth and leave it only at death110 this means that at least in the ideal 
world we do not need immigration and that the right of entry and exit are not a basis 
for freedom of movement. However, in the real world individuals are constantly in 
need of resources and as some states cannot offer them the necessary amount to sat-
isfy the basic needs, people tend to immigrate in order to accomplish these needs. 
My argument is intended to illustrate that in the real world freedom of 
movement sustains the basic needs of individuals and helps them acquire the neces-
sary resources, as Rawls argued it should happen in a fair society. Applying the idea 
of basic needs to EU as we observed earlier, it is noticeable that the basic needs are 
linked to basic liberties. Individuals enjoy freedom of movement in EU and the redis-
tribution of resources is realized according to their basic needs and basic liberties.  
Rawls enumerates the basic liberties in ‘A theory of justice’. These are: 
                                                




 political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech 
and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which 
includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment 
(integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary ar-
rest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.111 
 
Among these basic liberties Rawls enumerates we cannot identify freedom of 
movement, but considering all these liberties linked to one another we perceive that 
freedom of movement should be part of them because it helps realize all of these lib-
erties in turn. For instance, if individuals have freedom of movement understood as 
the symmetry between the right of exit and the right of entry they can easily have 
freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault (the case of asylum 
seekers), the right to hold personal property (the case of economic immigrants), free-
dom from arbitrary arrest and seizure (the case of refugees) and political liberty, 
freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought (the 
case of all immigrants). Freedom of movement incorporates all these liberties and 
moreover without it we cannot link the liberties between them or consider them real-
izable under empirical conditions. I argue that freedom of movement should auto-
matically fall under the category of basic liberties due to its trait of uniting and en-
riching the meaning of human liberties.  
I argue for a broader account of basic liberties backed up by human rights, 
which should include freedom of movement as the symmetry between exit and entry 
and immigration as a natural consequence of the right of entry. Rawls, in my opin-
ion, limits the account of human liberties to a domestic framework putting too much 
importance on the notion of state’s sovereignty. This account does not render things 
clearer but it subordinates human rights to a state’s feature112. As states have faults 
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and can easily override individuals’ basic liberties what alternative is offered in this 
situation? I propose open borders with the help of freedom of movement. Immigra-
tion is part of the non-ideal theory and falling under Rawls’ account of the ideal the-
ory we exclude from the start the possibility of immigration.  
The distinction between negative rights and positive rights can help illustrate 
states’ duties in relation to human rights. To have negative rights means to refrain 
from performing an action that might endanger human rights. Positive rights refer to 
the idea of intervening in order to protect human rights. The distinction refers to re-
fraining from doing an action and protecting and providing human rights. So states 
should intervene in the protection of human rights and the positive rights should be 
enforced and applied more than the negative rights of not doing anything.113 Defend-
ing freedom of movement in its symmetry between exit and entry could move things 
forward in protecting more the basic liberties of individuals and providing them with 
assistance, as obviously is the case for immigrants.  
 But some liberal egalitarians can object that the asymmetry between these 
two rights is more plausible than the symmetry. They can offer the following exam-
ple: if I knock at a door leading to an office, the person inside can select either to let 
me in or not. If she lets me inside the office she also has a duty to let me exit the of-
fice. However, it might be argued that she does not have a duty in the first place to 
let me in.  
 Applying this simple case to our discussion, liberal egalitarians can argue that 
states do not have a duty to let immigrants inside but they have a duty to let them exit 
once they have been admitted inside. This account reads freedom of movement as it 
is stipulated in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented at 
the beginning of this section. The problem is that this stipulation can be attacked 
with the arguments I formulated so far. The principle of meritocracy I discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter highlights the idea that individuals need freedom in 
their actions in order to labor and earn their social status according to merit/abilities 
                                                                                                                                     
up a view — which is needed for other purposes anyway — of which human rights are the most im-
portant. Massive violations of the most fundamental rights can then be used as grounds for non-




not to social background. As immigrants desire to achieve the greatest level of 
autonomy restricting them the right to enter amounts to restricting their autonomy.  
 Even if the states do not explicitly have the duty to allow the immigrants in-
side however we can say that they are ‘constrained’ by the moral force implied by 
the particular requests invoked by immigrants. Like in the case of the asylum seeker 
or a refugee, letting the person die outside your office door will prove to be an inhu-
man gesture and moreover a crime because it can be argued that it was in your power 
to save that person and assist her with a minimum care but you chose not to open the 
door.  
When it comes to life-threatening situations: imagine that a person is dying of 
thirst outside your office door without any water (or food) being available nearby 
and all the other doors are locked without any person inside the offices. Then, if you 
are the only person that can offer the dying person a glass of water (or food) and you 
still choose to let that person die, further on the police can charge you of murder by 
negligence for example. Analogously, the same can be argued for states choosing to 
close their borders in front of desperate people whose life is threatened. These states 
can be accused of negligence for letting human beings die when it was in their power 
to assist them and offer them a minimum of resources for their basic needs. 
This type of argument can create a duty for the person inside the office and 
likewise for residents inside a state to open their borders/the door for these people 
whose life is threatened or their living resources are scarce thus being degraded to an 
inferior position as human beings. In the case of economic immigrants this type of 
argument can work if a liberal egalitarian can see the relevance of a trade between 
the immigrants and the residents. For instance, if immigrants are let inside the for-
eign states they can be charged with a percentage from their future earnings or can be 
taxed more than the residents in order not to affect the existing stock of resources.  
This type of measure however can be enforced only in the cases where the 
host states are really affected by the number of incoming immigrants and they ur-
gently need to impose this measure on them. In the long run, the measure of impos-
ing more taxes on immigrants can be dropped out and a redistribution of resources 
can be achieved without extra taxation. I agree with the measure liberal egalitarians 
want to adopt in order to strengthen their institutions or infrastructure but only in the 
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cases where it is really necessary to do so. However, I propose porous borders in the 
present difficult economic situations for all states and allowing full open borders in 
the future.  
 Focusing on the right of exit some arguments are addressed on the issue of 
brain drain in the liberal egalitarian framework. Joseph Carens argues that restric-
tions on freedom of movement are not justified when dealing with brain drain and 
with the action of enforcing moral duties in the home countries. These restrictions 
are a violation of the basic human rights and liberties and should not be treated eas-
ily. Carens recognizes the importance of special obligations of citizens in their home 
countries but the method of imposing restrictions on the freedom of movement is not 
a legitimate one from the liberal egalitarian perspective.114  
 Basically, the citizens of home countries must take the decision of leaving or 
staying based on their freedom of action and choice. If some individuals will want to 
respect the moral duties towards their home countries they should be free to select 
this without being coerced by their home countries. Carens points to a bigger existing 
problem that determines freedom of movement to be an important issue nowadays. 
There are many states that deny the basic liberties of their own citizens creating more 
inequalities on the international framework. As brain drain constitutes a reason for 
denying the right of exit preferring this action means violating article 13, which 
states that individuals have the right to exit their home countries.  
Coercions of this type represent a serious motive for individuals to choose 
immigration in order to escape from an abusive system. In Carens’ account this cre-
ates a moral problem because individuals are deprived of their basic liberties and if 
they want to escape from abusive systems from their home countries the possibility 
to do this is limited as host countries restrict their freedom of movement by denying 
them the right to enter. In return, host countries deny that they have an obligation to 
open their borders if their policy does not permit them in such situations met by im-
migrants. Having the right of exit, in this context, without having the right of entry 
represents a violation of basic liberties because individuals are forced to go back 
home without exploring and developing their capabilities as free individuals. 
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However, the problem resides in the injustice that should be taken care of not 
dismissed. This imbalance between the denial of human liberties and restrictions of 
freedom of movement creates a pressured political and social outcome reflected in 
the international scene of injustice.115 Woodward criticizes Carens’ account of free-
dom of movement and does not agree with the fact that immigration rests on a fun-
damental human right of free movement because such a right does not exist. Wood-
ward does not offer any argument in support of his claim.116  
In conclusion the task of a liberal egalitarian is to propose more openness for 
states’ borders and to stress the importance of respecting the basic liberties of indi-
viduals in what regards their desire to immigrate. In reference to racist or discrimina-
tory treatment from host countries or in general, liberal egalitarians should be serious 
in condemning this as well as the restrictions on freedom of movement.  
 
b) Equality-based arguments for open borders 
 
So far I have been discussing the case for open borders through the lens of 
the value of freedom. But liberal egalitarians also put an important stress on the 
value of equality, which ultimately influences the case of open borders. I shall briefly 
point a few arguments that highlight the necessity of opening the borders when talk-
ing about global inequalities.  
Before proceeding to various types of solutions for the inequality problem in 
the liberal egalitarian framework, I present different interpretations of the concept of 
‘equality’. According to Kymlicka’s account, we make a distinction between equality 
in the sense of “treating people as equals” (the government must treat its citizens 
with equal consideration, respect and concern) and equality in the sense of “equal 
distribution of wealth and income”117.  
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The first interpretation is a right wing interpretation of egalitarian theories, 
while the second is a leftist interpretation of egalitarian theories. Dworkin suggests 
that all political theories have at their core the idea that each person matters equally 
(idea also known as ‘the abstract egalitarian plateau’). This distinction illustrates the 
need of giving each individual equal concern and respect. Hence, the problem of ine-
qualities can only be solved if we conceive a liberal egalitarian theory that pays equal 
interest on people and following this criterion applies an equal distribution of wealth 
and income.  
Based on the Dworkinian account of egalitarian theories, I can support my 
argument that freedom of movement should be considered a basic liberty because 
individuals should be considered equally. Without the right of entry the majority of 
immigrants will continue to live in an underprivileged situation, increasing the lo-
cal/national inequalities between rich and poor and contributing in a large degree to 
an unfair global outcome. A liberal egalitarian should support the symmetry between 
the right of exit and the right of entry based on this argument and aim for treating 
people as equal in the first instance and then proceeding to reduce the global ine-
qualities, which will follow from giving the right consideration for the symmetry and 
rejecting the racist attitude towards immigration.  
The problem of inequality can be solved in the following perspective: if peo-
ple are left free to move the inequalities created in their home countries can be re-
dressed from an economic perspective. These measures can be applied to both home 
and host countries if they intend to offer assistance to individuals, who seek resi-
dence or temporary settlement, transfer of resources or foreign aid. Foreign aid can 
help to diminish emigration in poor countries thus contributing to reduce the ine-
qualities worldwide. Carens stresses the fact that immigration is only a consequence 
of a bigger problem: inequality. If the real problem is treated seriously immigration 
will become an easy issue to deal with.118  
 The ideal is to reduce global inequalities that affect the entire international 
framework. Immigration can be considered through the lens of a bigger issue that 
needs solving only through mutual collaboration and applying the principles of jus-
tice. The issue of admitting less skilled workers or well-trained individuals is rele-
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vant for the benefit of host countries for two reasons: admitting less skilled workers 
the native workers are not affected negatively by their concurrence (as usually native 
workers aim for different jobs than the immigrants or desire a better wage) and by 
admitting well-trained individuals (educated or professionally trained) the host coun-
tries improve their labor sectors and can drop the complaints that they have to deal 
with low-skilled immigrants.  
 
 To return to the criterion of need, if one accepts the brain drain hypothesis, it would 
seem appropriate to give priority to the least skilled and most needy among potential immi-
grants as this would have the least negative impact on the countries of origin. On the other 
hand, if one admits people with skills and education it may reduce the backlash problem 
(which appears to be a real or potential problem in every country that accepts immigrants, 
especially refugees).119 
  
Due to the promotion of equality in liberties and rights and to the aim of di-
minishing the economic, social and political inequalities as much as possible, immi-
gration realizes a great part of these actions. As money and goods are desired to 
travel across borders without restriction in a free market, individuals are comparable 
to these items in the sense of providing a framework of freedom of movement, which 
in the end creates equality of opportunity.120 
Closed borders will build up more inequalities between individuals and dif-
ferent parts of the world accumulating more poverty and injustice than releasing it 
for an overall distribution of resources. This argument is important because it ex-
tends the local need for a right of exit to a global framework where both the right of 
exit and entry are necessary for human development. As I talked before about basic 
needs and basic liberties the asymmetry will increase the inequalities determining an 
increase in the number of people that have unsatisfied basic needs constrained in the 
perimeter of their home countries. The symmetry between the right of exit and the 
right of entry will permit these individuals to satisfy their basic needs and not neces-
sarily to impose a financial burden on the residents from the host countries.  
                                                
119 Carens, “Migration and morality”, 44 
120 Joseph Carens, “Migration and morality: a liberal egalitarian perspective” in Brian Barry and R. E. 
Goodin, eds., Free movement: ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and money 
(New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 26  
 72 
In my opinion cosmopolitans are better in noticing the importance of freedom 
of movement in a global arena, where capital and individuals should move unre-
stricted. Laws need to be changed so as to allow freedom of movement between 
states not only within the national borders of a state. The needs we perceive today are 
not local anymore, they are global. The pressure to adapt to a global environment is 
growing rapidly and the laws regarding freedom of movement and immigration need 
to adapt to these contemporary realities. 
In his commentary James Woodward offers some corrections to the view held 
by Joseph Carens vis-à-vis immigration. Immigration is just one of the possibilities 
of reducing inequalities worldwide and probably not the best one. Immigrants that 
usually flee from their home countries are not the worst-off because it takes finances, 
connections and a lot of bureaucratic work to immigrate, items unavailable for poor 
individuals. The individuals that are needed in richer countries are skilled individuals 
suitable for many labor sectors in host countries and these individuals again are not 
the worst-off. Woodward stresses that in this context immigration is not an essential 
element in reducing inequalities.121  
Some solutions are proposed as substitutes for immigration. The first is for-
eign aid, which can substitute immigration by offering money and/or resources to 
poor countries. Immigration can be diminished with the help of foreign aid because 
the conditions in the countries of origin will change and individuals will find better 
jobs and opportunities of living. I respond to this that even though richer states are 
ready to offer foreign aid to poor countries there are many factors correlated with the 
correct administration of foreign aid within the poor countries. For example, coun-
tries in Africa have been receiving foreign aid for more than twenty years and still 
the situation in the African poor countries is critical. 
Local governments drastically influence the administration of foreign aid and 
they can spend it carefully on important sectors in the local economy or they can 
manage it badly without solving the critical issues. These cases are present in the 
poor and developing countries where the local governments are corrupted and they 
do not administer the resources and money received in an efficient way. Immigration 
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has a different impact on this situation: as middle class individuals immigrate in 
richer countries the effect on the poor individuals and the rest of the home country’s 
society is perceived through the remittances they sent back home.  
Moreover, these immigrants (at least a part of them) return home with new 
skills and capital that they wish to invest in the businesses or in the labor market in 
their home countries. In this scenario immigrants constitute an important element of 
investment and administration of resources and skills. Either they create new jobs for 
the ones that remained in their home countries or they exchange skills and knowl-
edge with them in a flexible process of labor market reorganization. The advantage 
of immigration over foreign aid is characterized by the flexibility of the reorganiza-
tion of the home countries’ labor sectors and the existence of remittances.  
Even though foreign aid might diminish or even replace immigration alto-
gether, I believe that there are many factors which constrain a correct administration 
of foreign aid in poor countries. Immigration continues to be the best solution for 
various, not necessarily poor, individuals who want better lives and a better political 
system that can administer their finances properly. As to the redistribution of goods, 
immigration can help reduce global inequalities better than foreign aid, which aims 
at particular countries in particular moments in time. Immigration is a process regu-
lated by individuals, which aim to arrive in richer states as a result of their needs. 
The distribution of goods is realized according to individuals’ needs and it is less ar-
tificial than foreign aid.122 
Hence, both foreign aid and immigration can work together as part of a big-
ger solution in diminishing global inequalities. On one side, foreign aid can focus on 
the remaining citizens in their home countries and the administrative management of 
resources and reinforcement of political institutions. On the other side, immigration 
can dispose of the skilled individuals who can either get a better education or profes-
sional training in host countries and who can also contribute to their home countries 
through the process of remittances. All of these corroborated effects act in a double 
perspective for the benefit of host countries and home countries.  
The second solution offered as a substitute for immigration is debt-
forgiveness. Richer states can ‘forgive’ the debts poor countries owed to them or par-
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tially reduce them in view of reinforcing the economies and infrastructure of these 
countries. As was the case for foreign aid, I believe that debt-forgiveness can help 
correct some critical issues in the poor/developing countries that experience big 
fluxes of emigrants. However, debt-forgiveness is only the start for these countries in 
reducing their problems. As the local labor markets usually need a lot of work and 
investment, immigration will still be a direct solution for individuals pressed by the 
local conditions of living and working.   
Likewise debt-forgiveness can complete the background of reducing inequali-
ties worldwide in addition to immigration for the same reasons pointed out in regards 
to foreign aid. My view is that immigration is a necessary element of achieving 
equality globally, but the options of foreign aid and debt-forgiveness cannot substi-
tute it they can only complete this task in addition to immigration. A liberal egalitar-
ian would be interested in combining these methods for the purpose of alleviating 
social and economic inequalities.  
I consider Woodward’s argument to be quite unsound in the light of severely 
reducing the importance of human liberties. Even if immigration is only one of the 
options in reducing the inequalities, this does not erase the importance of taking into 
consideration people’s desire to move freely and reside in new countries. The initial 
issue was of considering all human beings as equal, as being able to perform any ac-
tion they might desire (as long as it is not a criminal or abusive action).  
I think that even if the worst-off are not the constitutive part of those that 
immigrate, those that can immigrate help the worst-off from their home countries by 
sending remittances and creating jobs or reorganizing the labor sectors once they are 
back. The tendency is that low-skilled workers constitute the biggest part of the im-
migrants because they are attracted by bigger wages and they want to help their 
starving families with remittances once they have a new job in host countries. I do 
not think that immigrants are represented only by middle-class individuals, but are 
largely composed of low-skilled workers (e.g. people working in construction, 
agriculture, etc.) who choose to borrow money in order to get out of the country and 
help their families left behind.  
Next, Woodward argues that the immigrants selected by affluent countries 
are those that are not the worst-off and even more so, are skilled individuals that cor-
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respond to the professional needs of the host countries. Again, this claim is false be-
cause unskilled workers are wanted in a lot of richer countries for either supplement-
ing the gaps in the labor sectors, where the native workers refused the low skilled 
jobs, either for increasing the labor force along native workers. To back up these em-
pirical claims I refer to some recent economic data that partly recognizes the positive 
impact of immigration on the labor markets within the host countries123 and partly 
states that immigration has little influence on the economic situation of native work-
ers or does not influence it negatively.124 
States can find other substitutes for immigration such as foreign aid or debt-
forgiveness, which refer to offering poorer states aid in order to stabilize their econ-
omy and create more jobs for their domestic labor market or the richer states to for-
give a part of the debts that poorer nations owe to them. These actions can indeed 
help the poorer countries save their domestic economies and create more internal 
jobs but the need to immigrate can still persist for a longer period before these meas-
ures will be effective for the individuals concerned. Other arguments Woodward of-
fers for limiting free movement across borders are:  
 
 Competition within the labor market between immigrants and present citizens who 
are poor or disadvantaged may work to the disadvantage of the latter group and may increase 
income inequality. Another has to do with the direct impact of extensive immigration on so-
cial services like public education, health care, and unemployment, disability and welfare 
programmes of various kinds. A third, very closely related concern, has to do with the more 
diffuse consequences of immigration for the character, ideals and politics of liberal egalitar-
ian states.125  
 
 The first claim Woodward formulates is that the competition between the in-
coming foreigners and the existing native poor citizens may result in income inequal-
ity for the disadvantage of poor native citizens. Woodward does not offer any em-
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pirical evidence for this statement. I believe that his claim is false because if immi-
grants will enter the host country’s labor market with the intention of getting new 
jobs they have to aim at two levels: one is the low-skilled labor sector, in which the 
native workers are usually not very motivated to work in and if they are they are 
stimulated by the arrival of new workers, the second is the high-skilled labor sector, 
where the competitiveness between native workers and foreigners is said to stimulate 
the apparition of new job offers. These trends do not have a close connection with 
the poor native individuals in the host countries. The situation will remain fairly the 
same for them as it was before immigrants stepped inside the community.  
The real problem is that states need to solve the inequality problem before 
becoming a severe issue for local labor markets. A redistribution scheme of re-
sources is the solution Rawls provides and is applicable to all states where inequali-
ties take place whether or not big influxes of immigrants enter the territories. In sup-
port of my explanation I turn to some observations made by Alan Sykes. He notes 
that inefficient immigration restrictions affect more the wealth distribution domesti-
cally than if efficient immigration policies are applied. Changes in the immigration 
policies have no serious implications on the wealth distribution scheme.126  
 The second claim aims to make us aware of the potential negative effects of 
immigration on the welfare system of host countries, including public institutions, 
health care system, public education, unemployment, disability programmes, etc. I 
analyze the impact on unemployment first. Immigration does not affect unemploy-
ment except in the cases where incoming workers aim for the labor sectors that al-
ready face a significant level of unemployed workers. Overall, immigration helps 
reduce inequalities on the labor market and also increases demand in the 
workforce127. Immigrants should aim for the labor sectors that do not have a signifi-
cant number of unemployed workers in order to help stabilize the labor market. 
 The effects of immigration on public education are not negative because 
home countries are interested mainly in restricting emigration in order to protect the 
national advantage and escape the negative effects of brain drain. Immigrants’ chil-
dren are offered public education for the primary and secondary cycles and eventual 
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negative effects might be encountered when these children choose to leave the coun-
try along with their parents. Then the motive of worry becomes the lost in the educa-
tional subsidy provided by the local government.  
Another motive of worry might be temporary settlers that choose to spend 
more time than normal in a higher educational system, but this negative effect can be 
counterbalanced with the benefits of permanent citizens of interacting with foreign-
ers for an educational purpose.128 Hence, immigration does not negatively affect the 
public education and if some negative aspects appear these can be counterbalanced 
with other positive benefits for the local population.   
 Further on, the welfare system benefits from migration in the host countries 
more than in the home countries.129 The host countries benefit because the wages are 
stored in the local banks and the immigrants need to contribute to the local taxes. 
Some of them will choose to invest in the local market by accumulating more prod-
ucts, starting credits with local banks for further purchases or buying local housing 
assets. All these changes and local investments contribute to the welfare system in a 
positive way, attracting more investment in the local financial system.  
 Whereas the local taxes are concerned, the migrants usually pay enough taxes 
to benefit the government programs in comparison with what they receive in return 
in the form of benefits. The welfare system of the host countries benefit from the 
payment of taxes from the immigrants, due to the imbalance between the taxes paid 
and the benefits received, which attracts an external benefit on non-migrants.130     
Following the principles of justice, promoting the symmetry between exit and 
entry is consistent with the liberal egalitarian framework. Applying Rawls’ principles 
of justice at the international level we assure a redistribution of resources for all indi-
viduals without the need of foreign aid or debt-forgiveness as it was argued before. 
The just savings principle, in my suggestion, assures that present generations must 
save resources for the future generations in order to avoid critical situations that de-
termine critical inequalities between individuals.  
As these situations are real the just savings principle must be put into action 
alongside freedom of movement. Poor nations can regulate their inequalities with the 
                                                
128 Ibid., 172 
129 Ibid., 168 
130 Ibid., 171 
 78 
help of freedom of movement, assuring that their citizens emigrate in order to accu-
mulate financial resources for future generations and send them back home. Like-
wise, brain drain can constitute a reason for regulating the resources and saving them 
for future generations. Individuals who leave their home countries to get valuable 
experience in richer states can come back in their countries of origin and invest in the 
economy of their countries.  
The important issue to detach from these arguments is that in order for the 
just savings principle to work, both home and host countries should acknowledge the 
importance and relevance of freedom of movement and accept it as a regulating 
measure for the international arena. The distribution of resources and future savings 
can be assured only if immigrants are allowed inside richer states in view of reducing 
future global inequalities for future generations and protecting the worst-off. The in-
stitutions from poor countries can be saved and reinforced by applying freedom of 
movement and respecting the principles of justice.  
In the case of EU the symmetry is realized through social cooperation, in 
which the individuals are protected by the governments of each nation-state, where 
their liberties and rights are respected according to the principle of equality. This lib-
eral utopia is real after all in the context of intra-national treaties where the right of 
exit is symmetrical with the right of entry, recognizing an equal political right for all 
citizens within EU. It can be argued that the asymmetry between emigration and im-
migration is an old outlook for a new issue. The international political context needs 
the enlargement of freedom of movement as much as possible and does not need a 
communitarian outlook or a nationalistic one, which deprives individuals of their ba-
sic liberties and their equal political status.131 A transition to full open borders is hard 
to achieve in the first place, but the openness of borders is a ‘must’ claim for the lib-
eral egalitarian perspective involving partial/porous open borders as an intermediate 
step towards full open borders.  
Next, I refer to some objections to the egalitarian case for open borders for-
mulated by Christopher Wellman relevant for the liberal egalitarian framework. He 
proposes mainly two arguments in overruling the egalitarian case for open borders 
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 First, I suggest that the most compelling understanding of equality does not require 
us to guarantee that no one’s life prospects are affected by matters of luck; more minimally, 
equality demands that we address those inequalities that render people vulnerable to oppres-
sive relationships. If this is correct, then the particular theory of equality required to motivate 
the egalitarian case for open borders is suspect and should be rejected in favor of a theory of 
relational equality. Second, even if luck egalitarianism is the best theory of equality, it would 
not generate a duty to leave borders open, because a wealthy state’s redistributive responsi-
bilities can be discharged without including the recipients in the union.132 
 
 For the first point, Wellman attacks the idea that the presence of inequalities 
is enough to promote the claim that wealthy states should open their borders for im-
migrants. Even though the worst-off individuals are living in tough conditions be-
cause of matters of luck, this does not justify opening the borders in order to redis-
tribute the resources to the worst-off strangers.133 Instead Wellman puts the weight of 
the argument for opening the borders on the Samaritan duty we have to help those 
worst-off. If we feel we need to open the borders or invite the worst-off strangers in 
is it because we are sensitive to the Samaritan duty, a natural instinct of assisting 
someone who is worst-off than us. But to promote open borders policy only on Sa-
maritanism is a weak claim that wealthy states must discharge.134  
 To the second point Wellman argues that is not necessary for wealthy states 
to open their borders to immigrants because they can send a part of their wealth to 
the needy countries and reduce the numbers of immigrants. Moreover, asylum seek-
ers should not be granted asylum, even if their case seems desperate because a solu-
tion is available, which can avoid the political incorporation of these individuals in 
the new communities: justice exportation. Wellman proposes helping the unjust po-
litical states to overcome their difficulties by using, for example, “military force to 
create a safe haven and no-fly zone in Northern Iraq”.135  
In other words Wellman proposes alternatives to the action of welcoming 
asylum seekers or refugees by intervening directly to secure a safe political environ-
ment in their home countries; alternatives, which exclude the necessity of opening 
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the borders. I respond to these objections by giving some credit to Wellman’s ac-
count in what regards his interest in coming with alternative answers to the problem 
of refugees and asylum seekers. The first point he makes is reluctant to the idea, 
mentioned earlier, that special duties are bound to general duties in an egalitarian ac-
count.  
Hence, discharging the importance of opening the borders only with the justi-
fication of Samaritanism is not adequate in this context. Samaritanism is a somehow 
biblical example to make us understand the moral importance of other issues, such as 
immigration. The stake is much bigger than Wellman portraits it because the moral 
significance of opening the borders is backed up by the normative distinction be-
tween special and general duties. States should respect general duties vis-à-vis immi-
grants because they are morally equal with the citizens of a particular nation-state 
and because they should enjoy an equal amount of basic liberties. Wellman gives the 
issue of open borders a financial interpretation, which is vulnerable to the moral ob-
jections of respecting general duties. Wealthy states do not necessarily arrive at a 
certain degree of wealth through honest methods within the international framework. 
Much of the wealth of these countries is sustained by different transactions, which in 
the past disfavored the worst-off in foreign countries. 
The balance between poor countries and wealthy countries is subject to a lot 
of criticism. This is the motive why egalitarians promote open borders in the first 
place, due to the amount of wealth accumulated through Machiavellian actions. If 
indeed the actions of reaching a significant amount of wealth were pure and honest, 
then the benefit of doubt could be attributed to these countries that wanted to protect 
their richness from the foreigners’ hands. However, the situation in the entire world 
is not pure and injustice is another factor, which determines egalitarians to protest 
against the unjustified accumulation of power and wealth.  
 I object to the first argument formulated by Wellman: taking the side of 
wealthy countries is not a good way to handle this debate in the first place. General 
duties have their own established role in dealing with inequality and injustice, point 
overlooked by Wellman. In response to the second objection, I do not think Wellman 
proposes a very bright solution to the situation of asylum seekers and refugees. I do 
 81 
think that alternatives to immigration can indeed be promoted successfully, but we 
need not exclude immigration altogether.  
I argue that the idea of making a safe haven in the home countries of asylum 
seekers and refugees is a bad starting point for this issue. The motive is that while 
trying to save difficult political conflicts asylum seekers and refugees will still be at 
the gates of wealthy states waiting to be fed, taken care of and protected against vio-
lence. To intervene in political conflicts is a sensitive matter, which attracts further 
problems in the international perspective. These interventions need subventions from 
wealthy governments, which can be used for the asylum seekers in the first place. I 
do not assume that Wellman’s proposition is entirely bad, but is very inefficient in 
such urgent matters and more costly than actually assisting and welcoming the asy-
lum seekers. In the long run this can be an alternative if the funds are enough and if 
the military operations are smart enough in order not to destroy even more the coun-
tries of origin or to create a bigger war-zone following the military interventions. 
 Another thought is that immigration can be diminished as egalitarians aim 
with the help of wealthy states giving foreign aid to poor states. However this is a 
measure that needs time in order to be efficient. If we are realistic about this subject 
we can realize that poor countries cannot stop the flow of emigrants as long as their 
country is not able to deal with poverty or crime. Up to the point where these coun-
tries are helped with foreign aid for a longer period of time, which means that their 
institutions and the legal system is strengthened to a decent level for a modern state, 
immigration will still be the main action poor individuals will choose to redress their 
economic situation.  
In consequence, Wellman’s objections are not very efficient in the actual cir-
cumstances pertaining to the real world. As long as we aim for the well-being of 
wealthy states, the claims of poor immigrants or strangers in general will sound 
empty and void of moral meaning. The same for the alternatives proposed for substi-
tuting immigration: a realist will perceive the amount of aid richer states need to give 
to poor states, while they lose potential important benefits from immigration assum-
ing a recovery of the poor states on a long run of both financial investment and po-
litical cooperation.  
 82 
Furthermore, Abizadeh denounces in one of his articles the illegitimacy of 
closed borders within the democratic framework. He argues that in order to sustain 
the closed borders policy legitimately both foreigners and citizens must receive a jus-
tification for this action. In this case, “a state’s regime of border control could only 
acquire legitimacy if there were cosmopolitan democratic institutions in which bor-
ders received actual justifications addressed to both citizens and foreigners.”136  
A legitimacy gap arises in the case of the unilateral regimes of border control, 
which result from the doctrine of state sovereignty and are illegitimate in a democ-
ratic framework. For this point Abizadeh comes with an interesting proposition: to 
extend the political legitimacy to delegate jurisdiction over entry policy to states in 
the context of cosmopolitan democratic institutions (as he argues EU does under the 
current conditions of offering entry to individuals from the member states with the 
common agreement of all European states).137 
 To summarize the case for open borders, the defenders of open borders policy 
claim that: a) open borders are consistent with freedom of movement; b) closed bor-
ders restrict freedom of movement and if borders define designated boundaries that 
some individuals cannot pass, this means that there have to be strong reasons for im-
posing these restrictions in the first place, c) closing the borders affects people that 
are in danger in their home countries and desperately seek a place for refuge (in this 
case, their only chance of survival is to enter foreign countries, but the closed borders 
policy restricts their freedom in a severe way); d) closing the borders also means re-
stricting some people their freedom of selling and buying labor (free exchange of 
labor), which constitutes an important human liberty; e) closing the borders has the 
consequence of restricting people’s freedom of association (people that try to reunite 
with their families, friends, etc.) and which also affects people’s social duties (e.g. 
the duties of parenthood). These reasons can be integrated under a single principle: 
the principle of freedom. In this context, open borders are consistent with the princi-
ple of freedom.138 
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 By appeals to a second principle, the humanitarian principle, the case for 
open borders proves that: a) for some people the only chance of getting rid of pov-
erty is to travel abroad and hope to find new opportunities to improve their life stan-
dard in receiving countries; b) even in the extent where rich countries would contrib-
ute with foreign aid to poor countries and would get involved in assuring a free trade 
with those countries, there would remain a significant number of poor people who 
would seek for better opportunities elsewhere (their only chance would be free im-
migration); c) to deny these poor people the chance to find better opportunities of 
living by not hiring them or offering them assistance in the absence of a strong moral 
justification constitutes a perverse action.139 
 The economic arguments for restricting the borders are: a) a large number of 
immigrants entering a local market can unbalance the economy, lowering the wages 
of native workers or raising the prices for real estate; b) influencing in a negative 
way the publicly funded infrastructure of public goods and non-excludable goods, 
their availability or cost (e.g. health care, public education, welfare programs).140 
While the arguments are distributed between restricting immigration and allowing it 
the case for open borders can be sustained even in the presence of important remarks 
about the economic costs immigration imposes on local native population from host 
countries or on sending countries that experience the effect of ‘brain drain’.  
From a liberal egalitarian point of view, the capitalist tendency to control and 
exploit a particular market with valuable resources is unjust because it does not allow 
the access of the worst-off to the overall redistribution of resources. Excluding others 
from taking part of the local distribution means to monopolize a particular market 
and its assets thus claiming the arbitrariness of location and origin of birth. These 
arguments fall outside the application area of liberal egalitarian principles and are 
condemnable for promoting inequality among individuals.  
 The overall economic perspective is dominant for the case of open borders 
because applying the argument for free trade of goods and resources to people it 
should not be any less different than in allowing goods to move to a more productive 
market or allowing firms to initiate operations in cheaper areas of production. Immi-
gration is acting like these phenomena and is not different in its effects: some people 
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benefit from the new labor force while others lose some advantages and gain new 
ones. The important argument for open borders, from an economic perspective, is 
that the distribution of labor and welfare is made for the benefit of all although in 
some points it might affect certain agents.141  
 
4. Freedom of association 
  
 In this section I focus on the plausible objections that view freedom of asso-
ciation as entering into a conflict with freedom of movement. We can conclude that 
immigration cannot be a moral right due to the conflict between the two liberties. 
Further on, I answer the question if freedom of movement and freedom of associa-
tion are compatible within the liberal egalitarian framework. The discussion on free-
dom of association is linked with the discussion on open borders/closed borders in 
the liberal egalitarian framework and the arguments that support or reject these poli-
cies.  
 Turning to freedom of association, the following objection can be formulated: 
if states are free to associate with foreigners one can see the conflict between free-
dom of association and freedom of movement. The argument is that while individu-
als should have the basic liberty to enter foreign states if their basic needs require it 
or for other moral justified reason, this action will conflict with states’ freedom of 
association because, according to this scenario, states will not be permitted to be free 
in their association with foreign individuals. And if states will refuse to associate 
with individuals this action will constrain people’s freedom of movement. 
 I propose to take a closer look at freedom of association. In the first instance, 
freedom of association represents an individual right according to which: “1. every-
one has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, 2. no one may be 
compelled to belong to an association.”142 An individual has the right of association, 
which according to the above objection might enter into a conflict with freedom of 
movement. I agree that conflicts can emerge between refugees or asylum seekers and 
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residents who might refuse to associate with them. I argue that these conflicts can be 
overcome by weighting the moral force of the claims each party formulates.  
For example, let us assume that a group of asylum seekers comes to the bor-
ders of a state and ask for permission to enter. The residents from the state refuse to 
welcome them inside as part of their freedom of association/dissociation. They can 
argue that they do not like asylum seekers and they prefer to associate instead with 
economic migrants that can work on their territory according to the conditions im-
posed by them. In this case, asylum seekers are not of help or interest for them. 
However, asylum seekers can protest and argue that because they benefit of freedom 
of movement they should be let inside because they have a strong reason of entering 
(if they return home their lives will be in danger and they are exposed to serious 
physical injuries or are directly affected by famine, war etc.). The force of their 
moral claim is stronger than what the residents provided for not associating with 
them. A liberal egalitarian can weigh the two claims and choose the strongest moral 
claim, which in our case gives the right of entrance to the asylum seekers. 
Sometimes the reasons for freedom of movement are morally stronger and 
can override weaker reasons for refusing to associate with immigrants. In other 
cases, even if the two freedoms conflict at some point the dispute can be solved in a 
different manner: for instance the immigrants can choose another country for immi-
gration or can appeal to other groups within that state to let them in if the moral force 
of the residents’ claims overrides their claims to enter. Weighting the claims accord-
ing to their moral force is the solution to a conflict between the two freedoms in or-
der to avoid further disputes.  
 There are some reasons why states might object to an individual’s right of 
association: “Some countries have sought to hamper the ability of individuals to form 
associations by a variety of means: by claiming they do not agree with the political 
purposes of the associations; by denying legal personality which would be essential 
for day to day running and for taking on contractual relationships; by imposing cum-
bersome and partial registration processes; by imposing financial constraints.”143 
 Some consider that states have freedom of association as single entities, but 
the perception of this is mistaken because we are referring in this context to the indi-
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viduals inside a state that associate with foreigners. We can talk about states signing 
political treaties with other states, but this is a completely different matter. Freedom 
of association refers to individuals and the citizens forming a particular association 
within the perimeter of a state. I consider Wellman’s account to be flawed because if 
I want to associate with a state then according to his account I have to have the per-
mission of that nation-state in order to get accepted in. But I consider the interpreta-
tion of a state as an association to be wrong because freedom of association refers to 
an individual right. The individuals within that state have the right to associ-
ate/dissociate with foreigners and in order to reject immigrants they need to form ei-
ther a majority of votes or a unanimous vote for that action to be valid. Wellman 
writes rather radically: “And just as an individual’s freedom of association entitles 
him or her to remain single, a state’s freedom of association entitles it to exclude all 
foreigners from its political community.”144 
 The rectification I make here is that a state is composed from its citizens and 
as freedom of association is an individual right, the citizens have the right to associ-
ate/dissociate with whomever they want, not the state as an entity. The rather strong 
claim that ‘a state’s freedom of association entitles it to exclude all foreigners from 
its political community’145 is subject to debate. To exclude all foreigners from a po-
litical community the unanimous’ decision of all citizens from that particular state is 
required and also a justification in what regards the morality of that decision (as not 
being racist or discriminatory because we are talking about a political decision not a 
personal decision relative to a single individual). I agree with Wellman’s weaker 
claim that “there is a prima facie case in favor of each legitimate state’s right to con-
trol immigration”.146  
 If individuals are constrained by the states to enter within this reason consti-
tutes a violation of both their freedom of movement and freedom of association. We 
can formulate an argument for rejecting foreigners: the residents within a host state 
can refuse to associate with the incoming immigrants.  
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My worries are directed towards a real world scenario: there are some resi-
dents within a host state that want to associate with some or maybe all the incoming 
immigrants. It is very unlikely that all citizens from the host state would refuse even 
a temporary association with immigrants due to economic, cultural etc. reasons. My 
worries are focused on the fact that it is very hard to reach unanimity in the dissocia-
tion decision within a host country vis-à-vis immigration. I think that the desire to 
dissociate at one moment in time can be justified from a political perspective, where 
immigrants do not possess the relevant rights or the attitude of the residents within 
the host country is hostile to this issue.  
However, if there is desire to dissociate I consider that it is very hard to reach 
unanimity between all residents of a host country in order to refuse association with 
all incoming immigrants. My reasons rest on the economic, cultural and political 
tendency of the present age to associate with foreigners, which is highly noticeable 
and embedded in the market circulation. I argue that the freedom of association can-
not conflict with freedom of movement in such a degree where closed borders are 
necessary. At least the option of porous borders is preferable to a selection of the in-
coming immigrants where residents of the host country need either to reinforce their 
institutions or gain more control over their own resources.  
Because I reminded unanimity as a condition to render the association legiti-
mate, it can be objected that we do not need unanimity within a state in order to de-
cide not to associate with immigrants and render that decision legitimate. If voting is 
involved a majority can override the minority’s desire to associate with immigrants 
and the final decision can refuse the entry of those immigrants. I can argue here that 
in the case of associations, as Wellman describes them, the analogy between states 
and association is not the right one in making the case of refusing to associate with 
immigrants. 
My argument is that we need a legitimate association in the first place and 
then associations are part of the state and do not represent the state. We need to make 
sure that an association is legitimate and does not discriminate against other groups 
of people. For instance, there have been cases where in the USA large associations 
had rejected people from associating with them based on racist or discriminatory rea-
sons. These cases were brought to the attention of the Supreme Court and associa-
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tions were compelled to let the persons inside and were sanctioned for using dis-
criminatory rules of admittance. In securing a legitimate association we have to make 
sure it does not discriminate a particular group of people or individuals in particular 
(e.g. women, black people, gays etc.).  
Even if an association is legitimate and can refuse to associate with immi-
grants as part of its activity on a particular state, there are different moral claims to 
be made for each party (association and immigrants). Stronger moral claims will 
override weaker moral claims and if immigrants possess stronger moral claims to 
enter an association according to their freedom of movement then the grounds of dis-
sociating with these are overridden on a moral level. Alternatively, if an association 
can ultimately rule the state under the same rules of non-discrimination that associa-
tion/state can become legitimate to associate/dissociate with immigrants. The condi-
tion imposed in this case is that there is a set of rules according to which immigrants 
cannot be discriminated as it happens in many cases in the real world (see asylum 
seekers, refugees and even economic migrants). 
 
 5. The principle of just immigration 
 
I propose a short thought-experiment in regards to Rawls’ account of the 
original position: let us suppose that individuals under the veil of ignorance do not 
know if they will be immigrants or residents of a certain, well-ordered society. Under 
this scenario, people would want to be included into these richer/well-ordered socie-
ties and benefit from rights, which will offer them a decent or a better life. Or for 
other purposes, individuals would imagine that at a certain point they will change 
their minds and leave their countries of origin and search for new, better places. If 
this scenario is correct then individuals would most likely prefer an open borders 
policy that can guarantee them the freedom of movement and a chance to escape 
from perilous situations or poverty. Then, the principles of justice should follow this 
scenario in permitting immigration as part of basic human liberties and equality of 
opportunity. 
 It is obvious that if societies/communities are closed, then realizing the prin-
ciples of justice through the perspective of immigration we are not offering foreign-
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ers the right to achieve their basic liberties or equality of opportunity. Instead, we 
enforce coercion in their well-being, forcing them to stay within societies that are 
unable to achieve a proper scheme of justice. Supposedly Rawls would agree with 
open borders between all communities. Then an additional principle would emerge: 
‘the principle of just immigration’. This principle would assure that immigrants are 
treated with fairness once they enter foreign communities and would benefit from 
rights that would offer them equality of opportunity with the rest of the residents 
from that community.  
In return they would contribute to the society in paying their taxes and addi-
tional costs of living in proportion with their welfare level. I add that applying the 
‘principle of just immigration’ to future generations, this would take the following 
form: first generations of immigrants will contribute to a special fund (following the 
model of the just savings principle) available for future generations of immigrants. 
This fund will assure that immigrants will be treated fairly in the circumstance where 
the residents of the community or the community itself will experience a shortage in 
resources or finances. This fund will assure that even if the current resources of the 
community cannot permit the intake of new immigrants still the most important cases 
of admittance will be considered. In this way, the human rights are protected in the 
case of asylum seekers or refugees where their lives depend on admittance into stable 
states.  
The selection of admittance of future immigrants will correspond to basic 
principles of justice, allowing firstly the worst-off and secondly, if permitted, the less 
critical cases. However, if the fund for immigrants is justly managed, immigrants can 
in the long run assure that a bigger number of foreigners will be accepted if they con-
tribute in advance according to their level of welfare. So the principle of just immi-
gration will assure that immigration is possible and open borders come by default for 
all states if the fond of resources for incoming immigrants is managed by the current 
and future generations of immigrants. The responsibility of contributing to this fund 
is necessary for the acceptance of new foreigners.  
If in some years the current generation of immigrants cannot contribute with 
as much as the original generation of immigrants contributed to the fund, they can 
put a sum of capital/resources in direct proportion with their earnings in the current 
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year. In this way, the immigration process (e.g. incoming immigrants) is not affected 
by a shortage in the fund but is in direct proportion with the input of resources for 
that specific year (so the number of incoming immigrants will be in direct proportion 
with the percentage of resources/finances contributed to the fund for immigration). I 
add that immigration is a flexible process that regulates people and goods according 
to the market circulation and changes. Therefore, if the market experiences some dif-
ficulties the immigration process will be in tune with these changes in a natural, 
flexible way, without waiting for special regulations or conditions from 
states/communities. Thus, the intake of foreigners is in direct proportion with the 
current market circulation and it is regulated through market processes.  
I propose freedom of movement as a default basic liberty under the veil of ig-
norance in the original position, where individuals do not know if they will be in the 
situation of leaving their home countries at one point. The individuals will choose by 
default freedom of movement (implying the symmetry between the right of exit and 
the right of entry) as a basic liberty that can help them exit and enter states in order to 
assure their basic needs and regulate local/global inequalities. According to this sce-
nario, immigration becomes a part of basic liberties entailed by freedom of move-
ment.  
This thought-experiment is meant to prove that even under a veil of ignorance 
the possibility of immigration is taken into account and treated accordingly. Immi-
grants will not pose an extra burden on the existing citizens of host countries because 
the ‘just immigration fund’ permits them a just management of resources independ-
ent of the existing resources for the current citizens. Rawls reminds us that immigra-
tion is eliminated from the theory of justice due to ideal conditions still under non-
ideal conditions this scenario is feasible for immigration.  
 
 6. A radical perspective: from open borders to no borders 
 
 In this section I propose to analyze the cosmopolitan arguments in favor of 
the no borders policy. Passing from the open borders policy within the liberal egali-
tarian framework to the radical policy of no borders several new issues like global 
inequalities and world poverty are covered. These are the main reasons why cosmo-
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politans prefer the no borders policy instead of open borders or porous borders. In 
eradicating world poverty and alleviating global inequalities immigration should be 
maximized through a no borders policy. It can be argued that liberal egalitarians 
share common ideas with cosmopolitans up to a point. The differences between the 
two frameworks are discussed below. 
Providing a definition of the term ‘cosmopolitan’ would be useful to under-
stand the theoretical background for the following discussion. It refers to the idea 
that “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) be-
long to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated.”147 The 
philosophical implication of cosmopolitanism “lies in its challenge to commonly 
recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, parochially shared cultures, 
and the like.”148 
I need to make a distinction between moral, political and economic cos-
mopolitanism. Firstly, moral cosmopolitanism claims that we have a moral commit-
ment to help all human beings as part of the duty to aid foreigners who are starving 
or suffering associated with the duty of respecting and promoting basic human rights 
and justice (partly based on utilitarian assumptions supported by philosophers such 
as Singer, Unger and partly based on Kantian assumptions promoted by O’Neill or 
more ancient assumptions developed by Nussbaum).149 Secondly, political cos-
mopolitanism (which on a Kantian line is supported by philosophers such as Haber-
mas, Rawls, Pogge, Beitz) advocates either a centralized world state, a federal sys-
tem with a comprehensive global body of limited power, a more limited international 
political institutions that focus on particular concerns (e.g. war crimes, environ-
mental preservation) or finally defend a different alternative altogether.150 Thirdly, 
economic cosmopolitanism (promoted in general by economists, e.g. Hayek and 
Friedman, and criticized more by philosophers) argues in favor of a single global 
economic market with free trade and minimal political involvement.151  
                                                




150 Ibid.  
151 Ibid.  
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Rawls reminds us that the ‘immigration problem’ as he calls it should makes 
us aware of the responsibility we have for our asset, meaning the people’s territory. 
He argues that the risk of migrating in foreign territories without the consent of peo-
ple leads to the deterioration of territories.152 Rawls sketches the framework for in-
ternational justice in a rather pessimistic light, considering that a world-state would 
lose the international peace easily leading to a world of despotism, where concur-
rence between states is lost or where states would try to fight for autonomy against 
each other: 
 
Here I follow Kant’s lead in Perpetual Peace (1795) in thinking that a world gov-
ernment—by which I mean a unified political regime with the legal powers normally exer-
cised by central governments—would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a 
fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their 
political freedom and autonomy.153 
 
 However, political cosmopolitans in favor of a world-state reply to this objec-
tion that international justice can be maintained if states would merge or if a stronger 
form of world-state would be proposed instead of a non-coercive Rawlsian version of 
it.154 Even if Rawls considers that justice should be a local matter circumscribed 
within the national borders he perceives the idea of ‘peoples’ as treating other peo-
ples with respect in view of a social cooperation. If peoples agree with the fact that 
other peoples need assistance in a sense that escapes the local borders, then a Rawl-
sian distribution scheme would become cosmopolitan with the rule of opening the 
borders when other people need this. However, the reasons for opening the borders 
and welcoming immigrants would have to be circumscribed to the principles of jus-
tice and should not violate the basic human rights or steal from the welfare systems 
of other states.   
I contrast the Rawlsian account of international justice with the cosmopolitan 
version of it. The critical points where cosmopolitans differ from Rawls’ account are: 
                                                
152 Rawls, ‘The Law of peoples’ with ‘The idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 8 
153 Ibid., 36 
154 Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, “Cosmopolitanism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/#2 
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a) cosmopolitans believe that institutional reform can regulate the power vertically 
instead of permitting accumulation of power in the hands of leading institutions 
(Thomas Pogge); 2) unlike Rawls, political cosmopolitans (also classified as Rawl-
sian cosmopolitans because they borrow a lot of theoretical material from Rawls’ 
theory of justice)155 favor migratory movements under the heading of global justice 
(Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz); 3) Rawls fails to sustain the idea of ‘peoples’ as 
fundamentally contrasted with ‘states’ and consequently fails to sustain a broad per-
spective on global justice, which allows for inter-states cooperation.156 
 The first point refers to Pogge’s account that it is better to achieve interna-
tional peace, justice and prosperity if human rights are protected through an institu-
tional reform, which distributes the power vertically instead of concentrating them in 
central institutions. We can avoid despotism or monopoly through this reform and 
defend human rights by avoiding beaurocratic clashes in the international system.  
 The second point mentions the fact of favoring migratory movements be-
tween states as part of regulating global inequalities and maintaining international 
justice.157 This idea aims to criticize Rawls’ account of closed societies, which does 
not permit immigration as a method of reducing inequalities.158 Actually closed bor-
ders in Rawls’ account are justified because they maintain communities’ balance of 
justice. In allowing open borders, Rawls would permit an interference with the estab-
lished system of justice. The principles of justice would not sustain immigration un-
der this interpretation because they would also have to include foreigners in the just 
savings scheme, for example, or in the scheme of rewarding the worst-off.  
For the third point Rawls is being criticized that the term ‘peoples’ is not in 
fact very different from the term ‘states’ in the first place. In contrast with the Kan-
                                                
155 This is my reason of using the comparison with cosmopolitanism in the context of liberal egalitari-
anism, mainly because political cosmopolitans such as Pogge and Beitz enrich Rawls’ theory of jus-
tice and take it towards a radical view as mentioned in my title of the section (for more information 
see Michael Blake, “International justice”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/international-justice/#2.2). 
156 Seyla Benhabib, The rights of others-Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 72-
74 
157 Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, “Cosmopolitanism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/#2 
158 Cf. Benhabib, The right of others, 74: “Surely, Rawls meant to use the model of a closed society as 
a counterfactual fiction, as a convenient thought-experiment in reasoning about justice; yet, by not 
granting conditions of entry and exit into the political community a central role in a liberal-democratic 
theory of justice, he assumed that the state-centric model of territorially delimited nations, with fairly 
closed and well-guarded borders, would continue to govern our thinking in these matters.” 
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tian account of cosmopolitan law people are seen as cosmopolitan individuals who 
have the possibility to interact with each other as part of jus cosmopoliticum the-
sis.159 Moreover, “it is incoherent to envisage the constitutional government of a 
people without some form of territorial sovereignty.”160 This incoherency further 
leads to a dilemma in Rawls’ theory in explaining the term ‘peoples’ as being differ-
ent from ‘states’ and not ascribing them sovereignty.161 The dilemma refers to the 
idea that while ‘peoples’ do not have sovereignty ‘states’ have, but the distinction 
between the two is not very clear in Rawls’ account and this further complicates mat-
ters. 
 The cosmopolitan outlook on freedom of movement must not assume that 
borders are morally arbitrary. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan outlook on issues 
like immigration points out the moral relevance of permitting all individuals to move 
freely across borders because of their equal status worldwide. What cosmopolitans 
acknowledge is the necessity of applying the principles of justice within an interna-
tional framework not only within a domestic framework like in the Rawlsian scheme. 
If we take the problem of inequalities seriously then we have to reconsider the case 
of exclusion and provide all the necessary assistance in avoiding this issue.162  
In the cosmopolitan framework global inequalities become an important rea-
son for agreeing with a no borders policy. Immigration is one of the methods in alle-
viating global inequalities as circularity of goods and persons are necessary in the 
international market. This argument works on the same front with the egalitarian the-
sis of solving urgent issues such as world poverty.163 
 Finally, I stress the fact that under a moral cosmopolitan interpretation the 
‘no borders’ policy means to protect all human beings from sufferance, poverty, fam-
ine or war. This solution might seem radical for liberal egalitarians but represents the 
concern of obeying the moral commitment of respecting basic human rights and 
treating equally those in need with the residents within a particular state. If liberal 
egalitarians acknowledge the importance of such a moral commitment the step for-
                                                
159 Ibid., 75 
160 Ibid., 78 
161 Ibid., 78-79 
162 Blake, “Immigration”, 230 
163 I have already dealt with this issue in the section on equality-based arguments for open borders. 
See pages 72-74. 
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ward from open borders to no borders can take the cosmopolitan form described in 
this section.  
 
 7. Would immigration undermine the liberal egalitarian values? 
 
 In this section I answer the question if immigration can undermine the liberal 
egalitarian values: freedom or equality. In answering this question, I present a sce-
nario in which immigration can reach the desired outcome of reducing, in a fair de-
gree, global inequalities. The key question liberal egalitarians can ask if under these 
circumstances immigration is still needed for reducing inequality. My answer fo-
cuses in the direction of maintaining open borders and promoting immigration as part 
of a wider framework for basic liberties and equality of opportunity. From the point 
of view of freedom, immigration does not conflict with the liberal egalitarian values 
because individuals will always want freedom of movement as part of their basic lib-
erties. 
 Let us imagine that open borders are permitted within the liberal egalitarian 
framework. This method works very well and society experiences such an alleviation 
of inequalities that some people agree on the fact that immigration is no longer 
needed for achieving equality. I argue that immigration and open borders (or at least 
porous borders) are still needed. Further on a second scenario would be that we 
closed the borders because immigration was no longer needed and everybody was 
fairly equal with others in respect of wealth and income.  
In this scenario, I believe that society will soon reach a stage in which indi-
viduals will want to get richer by either investing or accumulating more properties 
despite the enforced liberal egalitarian distribution scheme. From financial games 
some will lose their wealth and some will get even richer. In a short term our desired 
outcome is changed back to where it was before: some individuals will be even 
richer than before and others will face bankruptcy or a severe cut in their wealth. 
However for the present time, individuals will not experience severe poverty or very 
dramatic situations but as soon as things evolve the situation can reach two possible 
outcomes: either those who lost will lose more money/resources/assets reaching a 
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severe stage of poverty or they will manage to gain back their wealth. Either way, it 
is a matter of time until some individuals will again reach the stage of poverty.  
My argument is that world equality can be achieved but it can be preserved 
only for a limited period of time, when financially/economically/socially people will 
have the desire to evolve in new countries with new opportunities for them to get 
rich or save their financial situation. Leaving aside the economic aspect, I argue that 
immigration will still be needed as an option of evolution from already familiar 
boundaries for cultural and social reasons. For a liberal egalitarian this aspect may 
not be important at the first sight but the sense of equality must not be interpreted 
only in an economic perspective: individuals have different reasons for immigrating. 
As Dworkin argued for the ‘abstract egalitarian plateau’ all people should be treated 
with equal concern and respect. Some will want to immigrate for cultural or social 
reasons while others will want to start afresh in a different cultural and social milieu 
either to have families or simply explore other areas of the human knowledge in dif-
ferent lands. Immigration does not undermine the liberal egalitarian values as it 
brings many benefits, which satisfied at some point can trigger in people the desire to 
immigrate again.  
 
 8. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I argued for the moral right of immigration as part of freedom 
of movement. I argued for the symmetry between the right of exit and entry and con-
cluded that freedom of association does not conflict with freedom of movement if 
practical solutions are provided. Liberal egalitarians should agree with the open bor-
ders policy in the context where they commit to the moral duty of protecting all indi-
viduals as part of justice and basic liberties. Liberal egalitarians can choose the ‘no 
borders policy’, but in this context they should agree with the cosmopolitan moral 
requirements of helping both residents and immigrants alike entailed by universal 
human rights. In the next chapter I shall explore the libertarian arguments on immi-






Libertarianism and immigration  
 
In this chapter I investigate the libertarian account of immigration. In the first 
section I distinguish between right-libertarianism and left-libertarianism and offer the 
readings of libertarianism as self-ownership and liberty maximization. In the second 
section I analyze the arguments focused on immigration from each perspective of 
libertarianism presented so far: as self-ownership and freedom maximization. In the 
third section I discuss the conflict between the collective consent on the issue of im-
migration and the individuals’ decision. The conclusion sets the libertarian frame-
work as being flawed in its argumentation on the issue of immigration because it 
fails to provide strong arguments about the fact that the individuals are free to choose 
to open or close the borders. 
 
 1. Definition of libertarianism 
 
 1.1. The principle of self-ownership: right and left-libertarianism. 
  
I define libertarianism as a political theory in reference to Kymlicka’s distinc-
tion between libertarianism as self-ownership and libertarianism as liberty164. In the 
libertarian theory self-ownership is the most important value and libertarians aim to 
protect the property rights of the individual as a consequence of self-ownership. A 
prominent libertarian in the philosophical literature, Robert Nozick, holds that the 
principle of self-ownership is the core principle in the libertarian theory because it 
protects the rights of individuals: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)”.165  
The self-ownership principle protects the property an individual possesses as 
well as his person, as a physical entity. To violate his person means to violate the 
                                                
164 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 103 and 132-133 
165 Ibid., 104 
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self-ownership principle. The most common comparison given to illustrate this prin-
ciple is the case of the slaveholder that owns a chattel slave: according to the self-
ownership principle the rights that each person has over herself are the same as the 
rights a slaveholder has over his slave.  
It is important to distinguish here that there are two important types of own-
ership: external ownership and self-ownership. If individuals do not hold property 
rights over a parcel of land, then anybody can claim it and work on it. If un-owned 
territories are claimed, then it is legitimate to consider these territories as external 
because anybody can come and claim them as their own properties.  
Libertarianism refers primarily to the self-ownership principle, which is the 
fundament of this political theory in comparison with Rawls’ theory, for example. 
Nozick states that redistribution of resources violates the self-ownership principle 
because when resources or properties that are owned by an individual are redistrib-
uted for the well-being of the disadvantaged, then this action represents a theft. So 
respecting the self-ownership principle becomes the core argument of the libertarian 
theory and Nozick formulates this principle in contrast with the Rawlsian redistribu-
tion scheme according to Kymlicka’s account: “If I own my self, then I own my tal-
ents. And if I own my talents, then I own whatever I produce with my self-owned 
talents. (…) Hence the demand for redistributive taxation from the talented to the 
disadvantaged violates self-ownership.”166  
When referring to external property Nozick argues that it can be appropriated 
by anyone as long as that person leaves enough and as good for everybody. Nozick 
relies on the Lockean theory of acquisition and on the Lockean proviso, which plays 
an important role in the libertarian theory because it sets a fair ground of property 
appropriation without necessarily involving a redistribution scheme: “Locke’s pro-
viso that there be ‘enough and as good left in common for others’ is meant to ensure 
that the situation of others is not worsened.”167 
In reference to the redistribution scheme, Nozick also argues that if another 
person has a legitimate claim over my resources then I can no longer be the full 
owner of my talents. Then self-ownership is transformed into partial ownership, 
where another individual has a legitimate claim to use my talents in association with 
                                                
166 Ibid., 105 
167 Nozick, Anarchy, state and utopia, 175 
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my right of ownership. According to this argument, self-ownership is no longer re-
spected and changes into partial ownership of talents or resources. If we address the 
question: who owns everything else, we can correlate the notion of self-ownership 
with the notion of property-ownership. I will come back to this idea later on in the 
next section.  
The entitlement theory is based on three principles. I shall very briefly de-
scribe them because they are relevant for understanding the overall libertarian 
framework. These principles are: the transfer principle, the acquisition principle and 
the rectification principle. Nozick describes them in the following manner:  
 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in ac-
quisition is entitled to that holding, 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with 
the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the 
holding, 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.168  
 
Based on the idea of self-ownership, the libertarian theory is divided into two 
distinct branches: the right-libertarian and left-libertarian. The right-libertarian thesis 
promotes the full self-ownership and denies that the redistribution of resources repre-
sents a legitimate action. The difference between the two branches of libertarianism 
is reflected in different interpretations of the Lockean proviso169. The right-
libertarians interpret the Lockean proviso as requiring that nobody is made worse-off 
by the appropriation or use of a natural resource than in the state of its non-
appropriation or non-use.170 Nozick makes use of this interpretation of the Lockean 
proviso in “Anarchy, state and utopia”.  
However left-libertarians interpret the Lockean proviso in the following 
manner: initially all natural resources belong to individuals in an egalitarian man-
ner171. Hillel Steiner and Michael Otsuka are promoters of left-libertarianism and 
specify that individuals have egalitarian claims to the natural resources of the land 
                                                
168 Ibid.,151 
169 See the definition of the Lockean proviso in Kymlicka, Contemporary political philosophy, 115: 
“Just as individual acts of initial appropriation are legitimate if they do not make people worse off 
than they were when the world was unowned, so capitalism as an ongoing system is just if no one is 
worse off than they would have been without privatization of the external world.” 
170See the definition of right-libertarianism in Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarianism”, Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/#2 
171 Ibid. 
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and also presuppose a redistribution of resources in the sense of exchange of re-
sources (Otsuka). I shall refer to these interpretations of the Lockean proviso later on 
when I discuss the case of immigration applied to each branch of libertarianism.  
The left-libertarian thesis is more sympathetic to an egalitarian redistribution 
of the unappropriated resources among individuals. These resources must be shared 
equally among individuals. This position leaves open to the individuals the chance to 
engage in redistribution schemes and obtain goods as a consequence of trade: “Left-
libertarianism is a theory of justice that (like right-libertarianism) grounds justice in 
moral (as opposed to legal) property rights. Left-libertarianism rests on two central 
claims: (1) full initial self-ownership for all agents, and (2) egalitarian ownership of 
natural resources.”172 
The difference between Rawlsians and left-libertarians can be summed up in 
two important points mentioned by Peter Vallentyne.173 These differences point out 
the fact that left-libertarians are not strongly committed to egalitarians principles of 
territorial closure and to a scheme of social cooperation. Although some individuals 
might claim a greater share of resources proportional to their talents, the left-
libertarians do not find this scheme of redistribution plausible in the light of a liber-
tarian account of resource acquisition.  
 
1.2. Liberty maximization 
 
A second reading of libertarianism is focused on the idea of liberty maximi-
zation. Kymlicka makes a distinction between two different accounts of freedom174: 
moralized freedom and non-moralized freedom. The first account claims that in order 
to be free to do an action I should have the right to perform that action, which in es-
sence reflects a paradox as I shall present later: “Whether or not a restriction de-
creases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted 
                                                
172 Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner and Michael Otsuka, “Why left-libertarianism is not incoherent, 
indeterminate, or irrelevant: a reply to Fried”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, Issue 2 (2005): 202, 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/fulltext/118691042/PDFSTART 
173 Ibid., 214-215 
174 Kymlicka, Contemporary political philosophy, 142 
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thing. For example, preventing someone from stealing is not a restriction on their 
liberty, on this view, since they had no right to steal.”175  
However, Kymlicka seems to refute this type of freedom because he consid-
ers that a definition of freedom should not be based on principles of rights when we 
try to derive rights from this definition of liberty (referring to the circularity of this 
argument).176 The non-moralized definition of freedom claims that liberty is not cor-
related with a right to perform an action. I am free to do whatever I want without 
necessarily having a right to perform such an action. In this context, 
 
we can then assign rights so as to maximize each individual’s freedom, compatible 
with a like freedom for all. Hence whether people have a right to appropriate previously 
unowned natural resources depends on whether according that right increases or decreases 
each person’s freedom.177   
 
Consider the case where an individual commits a crime and goes to prison for 
it, legitimately. In the first case of moralized freedom, the individual cannot claim 
that his liberty is infringed, because he committed a crime and he has no right to run 
away from prison (having the right to run away from prison gives a justification for 
not committing any crime, but in this case committing the crime also infringes the 
right to go out of prison from the perspective of freedom). In the second case of non-
moralized freedom, the individual can still claim that his liberty is infringed by being 
imprisoned although he committed a crime. In his view, his degree of freedom is se-
verely decreased by being imprisoned (not having the right to run away is not neces-
sary in this case as the individual might still object to the restriction of his personal 
freedom).  
The paradox for moralized freedom is that if immigrants do no have the right 
to immigrate then they cannot claim that their liberty is infringed when they are not 
permitted to immigrate, which points to the fact that it makes no sense to argue that 
immigrants should be free to immigrate if they possessed this right in the first place. 
                                                
175 Ibid.  
176 Ibid.: ”If the greatest equal liberty principle is to be foundational, such ‘moralized’ definitions must 
be excluded. If we are trying to derive rights from judgments of greater or lesser liberty, our definition 
of liberty cannot presuppose some principles of rights”.   
177 Ibid. 
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In the case of the non-moralized freedom, immigrants can hold that they are deprived 
of liberty even if they do not have the right to immigrate. Immigrants can argue that 
they should be free to immigrate in the absence of such a right claiming that immi-
gration is part of their basic liberties. 
Kymlicka might object from the perspective of the moralized definition of 
freedom in the following manner: if the individuals do not have the right to immi-
grate then their liberty is not constrained when they are not permitted to do so; hav-
ing the right to immigrate is identical with being free to immigrate. So what is the 
point of dissociating between the two arguments? This means that whenever I will 
have a right to do something I will also be free to do that action, and vice-versa, so 
there is no point in arguing for an action for which I do not have the right to perform 
because I lack this right in the first place and I cannot perform the action, meaning 
that I am constrained to perform it. Turning back to the case of open borders the in-
dividuals that are not free to enter foreign communities lack the right to do so and 
this is fairly obvious.  
But the whole argument is directed in the perspective of acquiring the right to 
immigrate (that is the right of entry into foreign states) and rejects the idea of not be-
ing free to immigrate. So the criticism is pointed on the account of moralized free-
dom that does not perceive the circularity of this argument. Under the account of 
non-moralized freedom having or not having the right to immigrate is not important 
because an individual can argue that he should be left free to immigrate according to 
his basic liberties and human rights.  
In order to avoid the circularity of the moralized account of freedom we need 
to reconsider the case of immigration from the perspective of the non-moralized 
definition of freedom. I link this idea with Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which 
states that people have a duty to treat all individuals as ends and not merely as 
means. I intend to prove that this correlation between the non-moralized definition of 
freedom and the Categorical Imperative can offer a clearer argument for immigra-
tion. I next analyze the Categorical Imperative and consider its place within the liber-
tarian framework.  
This Kantian interpretation of liberty refers to the fact that as long as indi-
viduals are aware of and respect the Categorical Imperative, they are free to use and 
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dispose of their talents. This means that individuals cannot use other individuals as 
means and ought to consider all individuals as ends in themselves. The CI (Categori-
cal Imperative) is “the fundamental principle of our duty”178 as Kant explains in ‘The 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’ and reflects the law of an autonomous 
will: “A categorical imperative, which declares an action to be of itself objectively 
necessary without reference to any purpose, i.e., without any other end, holds as an 
apodeictic practical principle.”179 Examples of CI are: “thou shalt honor contracts, 
thou shalt not commit suicide, thou shalt not overindulge in food and drink”180, ac-
tions which confine the individual to a universal moral duty. 
Kymlicka considers this interpretation of the libertarian theory as a continua-
tion from the self-ownership principle, which does not dissociate the theory into two 
readings.181 My intention in this chapter is not to analyze in a great extent Kym-
licka’s rejection of ‘libertarianism as liberty’182, but to concentrate on other argu-
ments that will help me back up the position that liberty maximization is an impor-
tant value within the libertarian theory.  
My interpretation is that Nozick aims to use the CI in the context of moral 
constraints. For example, ‘shall not infringe another person’s liberty’ or ‘shall not 
violate the side constraints of another person’ counts as an instantiation of the CI in 
the libertarian framework.  
The idea that libertarianism is a theory based on freedom maximization can 
be encountered in Nozick’s “Anarchy, state and utopia”. The creation of the minimal 
and ultra-minimal state is a proof that the individual needs his liberty apart from the 
state’s interference and authority in personal matters. The scenario where the state 
interferes in the lives of the individuals and forces them to participate in a redistribu-
tion scheme or imposes constraints on personal freedom is distinct from the libertar-
                                                
178Robert Johnson, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp 
179 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the metaphysics of morals (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Pub-
lishing, 1993), 25 
180 Ibid., xi 
181 See Kymlicka, Contemporary political philosophy-an introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 132-133: 
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first, and that, in order to be free, we need self-ownership. He gives us no purchase on the idea of 
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ownership”. 
182 See Kymlicka’s interpretation of libertarianism as liberty in CPP, 132 
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ian scenario where individuals benefit from maximal liberty in conjunction with full 
self-ownership.  
 
2. Libertarianism and immigration 
 
In this section I analyze the libertarian arguments focused on immigration 
and I try to offer responses to each scenario. Firstly, I present the case of immigra-
tion as is treated in “Anarchy, state and utopia” and draw a few questions for guiding 
the discussion. Next, I focus on the self-ownership instance of libertarianism and I 
respond to the analogy presented by Hillel Steiner in reference to immigration.  
Nozick does not offer any real argument on the issue of immigration183. Only 
the emigration topic is discussed in “Anarchy, state and utopia”.184 Nozick does not 
discuss whether libertarians should allow open access to all individuals and oppose 
the restriction of open borders. Nor does he describe the cases where outsiders seek 
asylum or want to become members of the same community. Nozick’s response to 
free access to communities is social diversity. If we create diverse communities then 
we can hope that everybody’s values can be satisfied. He does not bring into ques-
tion the idea of adherence to these communities or if entering a community should be 
promoted based on his anterior argument.  
He refers to the right of exit from a libertarian community if that community 
is sufficiently big to benefit from other residents’ work.185 The right of exit is acces-
sible to those that accomplish their duty towards their community and based on this 
condition they are free to join other communities.186 Free access constitutes the main 
problem: whether individuals are justified from a moral point of view to associate 
with other communities, to exit or enter foreign territories and the attitude a commu-
nity must adopt regarding this issue.  
                                                
183 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state and utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975) 
184 See Nozick, Anarchy, state and utopia, 299, 302, 321 
185 Ibid., 321: “Yet, I have argued, a nation should offer this opportunity; people have a right to so opt 
out of a nation’s requirements.” 
186 Ibid., 302: “Thus, it seems, we have the result that in every stable association, each person receives 
his marginal contribution; in each world whose rational members can imagine worlds and emigrate to 
them and in which no rational member can imagine another world he would rather live in (in which 
each person has the same imagining and emigrating rights) which he thinks would endure, each per-
son receives his marginal contribution to the world.” 
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To apply an analogous argument in the case of immigration to libertarian 
communities: an individual should have the right to immigrate in a libertarian asso-
ciation if he is willing to contribute to it. In the same way as he is free to emigrate 
once he contributed to the community he must be able to join other communities in 
view of a better social framework. Because Nozick argues that the right to emigrate 
from a nation should be available to all individuals, it is coherent and logical to con-
clude that a right to immigrate should stand on the same grounds. My argument is 
that if an individual is willing to subscribe to the requirements of a nation, that nation 
should let him in if he accepts to respect the self-ownership right of all members and 
not violate the rules of the community. Members and immigrants should agree on the 
rules of admittance within the libertarian community setting the right parameters for 
consent.  
It is argued in the literature that the right to emigrate (which is recognized as 
a right in the international law) should be backed up by the right to immigrate, thus 
holding a moral symmetry between exit and entry. The general argument they use is 
that if I can exit a community there is no point to benefit from such a right if I cannot 
enter other community. It is equal with saying that if I can go out from my house I 
enjoy the liberty of exiting a property, but if all my neighbors and the other people 
close their doors in front of me then it is useless that I enjoy the liberty of exit. In or-
der to fully enjoy this right I also need the right to enter other communities or foreign 
properties even if I have to ask for permission. It is obvious that I cannot enter for-
eign communities whenever I desire because I violate the self-ownership of the 
members in question.  
But if my quality as a person and immigrant does not pose any harm for their 
properties or persons, then I do not see the reason for being turned away. This argu-
ment can be attacked by libertarians if they respond that the reason why they restrict 
the access is because they want to do so. I object that the justification needs to rely 
on something more than an arbitrary decision if their self-ownership right is not 
menaced. Moreover, immigration can maximize the extent of autonomy of the exist-
ing members of the libertarian community because they can engage in businesses 
that can bring to both parties profit and also create a more extensive degree of lib-
erty. For example, if some residents want to create new businesses but they lack la-
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bour force they can invite immigrants to work on their lands. In this perspective, 
immigrants have a positive impact on the autonomy and liberty of action of residents 
in contributing to the growth of their wealth. For some residents immigration can be 
the only chance of becoming entrepreneurs and developing more their properties, 
having success and appropriating more properties. Inviting immigrants inside the 
community can be associated with enlarging the autonomy sphere of individuals and 
permitting them to have a bigger degree of liberty of action.  
I shall later refer to these arguments and prove that libertarians do not hold a 
very strong position for restricting the access in front of immigrants.  
If immigrants want to enter the community because they want to benefit from 
trade related exchanges, then the members can propose in return for immigrants the 
condition of agreeing with the self-ownership principle and with the libertarian rules. 
If common agreement is reached through negotiation nothing is lost in this process. 
Immigration can be assessed as a valuable process of acquiring more resources and 
making profit with external parties.  
Nozick claims that emigration offers the possibility for the individual to find 
a better outcome and an association that can satisfy his needs and requirements. 
Analogously, immigration illustrates the individuals’ desires to enter a better com-
munity, work or settle within based on the arguments presented so far. If Nozick 
agrees and proposes this type of exit from associations then he can also agree with 
individuals entering associations. The association can impose its requirements and is 
the choice of the individual if he agrees with them in order to be accepted. If this is 
correct, then we can intuitively assume that the right of exit is analogous with the 
right to enter in the libertarian framework based on the arguments Nozick suggested 
for exiting the association. I do not think that Nozick would oppose this reading of 
the symmetry between the right of exit and the right of entry, in the perspective that 
libertarians sustain a maximal extent of individual freedom.  
Next, I focus on Steiner’s account on immigration, on the right and left-
libertarian arguments and offer some examples that can clarify the case for open bor-




 2.1. Self-ownership and immigration 
 
In this section I intend to offer three different cases where Steiner’s analogy 
on immigration does not hold. Hillel Steiner’s account of transnational migration187 
is the main argument he presents for the case of immigration. His argument is that a 
community has a right to accept or reject immigrants based on their mutual consent. 
The libertarian position on migration is: if the individuals from a community are 
willing to accept the immigrants and if they are not constrained by any contractual 
obligation, they can allow them the entrance right. Conversely, if they refuse the 
immigrants’ right of entrance within their community then the state cannot oblige 
them to accept immigrants because this will interfere with their personal rights.188 
He uses the analogy of a multitude of cottages owned by some individuals on 
the borders of a lake. The individuals acquired all the rights over the common facili-
ties and also the right to veto against the acquisition of cottages by other foreigners. 
In this scenario, the individuals have rightful property rights because they bought the 
cottages from the rightful owner, who gave them the permission to own the common 
facilities. This analogy works perfectly for the case of immigrants who want to estab-
lish in a new community and where the members of the community rightfully own 
the properties of that land and also the common facilities having a full right to decide 
who joins their community or not.189 
Let me make a short clarification for a libertarian that might object that the 
case of immigration is not problematic because national boundaries do not matter, 
only the boundaries of private property matter and these are defended by the self-
ownership right. If national boundaries are of no interest for a libertarian then it is 
pointless to address the question of opening the borders. In this case, it is only a mat-
ter of allowing strangers on one’s private property and not within the whole commu-
nity. 
                                                
187 See Barry and Goodin, eds., Free movement-Ethical issues in the transnational migration of people 
and of money (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 87 
188 Cf. Hillel Steiner, “Libertarianism and the transnational migration of people” in Barry and Goodin, 
eds., Free movement-Ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and of money, 91-92: “If 
I am willing to lease, sell, or give away space to other persons and am under no contractual obligation 
to refrain from doing so, the state has no authority to establish whether they are insiders or outsiders 
before permitting me to do so”.  
189 Fabre, Justice in a changing world (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 127 
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I assume that a group of individuals establish a community and they have the 
interest of keeping it safe from the access of other individuals. My case refers to a 
libertarian community, which is located among other communities that happen to be 
non-libertarian. The rule of accessing the libertarian community will obey the same 
principles as any other community by appeals to the closed or open borders policy. 
Following this scenario, a libertarian community can choose to close or open the 
borders because they assume a territorial importance to the borders themselves. Ac-
cording to this example, a libertarian community should prefer open borders, case 
debated in this chapter.  
In short, the cases where Steiner’s cottage analogy does not work are: 1) ille-
gitimate transfer of property from the initial owners of properties to the present own-
ers thus rendering the entitlement process to be faulty, 2) external ownership applied 
to the case of immigration (un-owned parcels of land that are claimed by foreigners), 
3) in problematic situations like a corrupted political regime or scarce vital resources, 
immigrants can claim a partial-ownership of the land or resources with the members 
of another community, even if this partial-ownership implies retribution or exchange 
of goods (from a left-libertarian perspective).   
The following question arises: if this analogy holds up then we can say that 
the citizens own the country and the immigration policies? To answer this question I 
need to further develop the analogy Steiner presents. According to the analogy, if the 
individuals acquire legitimately property rights over the land and the resources, then 
a foreigner that wants to join the community must ask for permission to enter from 
the members of that community.  
I present my first objection to Steiner’s analogy: if the members are the le-
gitimate owners of the land, resources and properties then we can conclude that the 
decision the members reach over the immigration policy is legitimate, based on the 
argument of legitimate entitlement and transfers of properties. But to claim just a le-
gitimate immigration policy in the case of many states is exaggerated. Many states 
(e.g. USA-Native Americans, Australia, New Zealand-aborigines, etc.) have territo-
ries conquered through force from the native populations. The land ownership is not 
legitimate due to the appropriation through violence.  
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It might be objected that if the present owners have obtained the land through 
an illegitimate appropriation (e.g. violence), then the rightful owners should be found 
and their properties returned (or compensated according to the damage registered for 
their case). However, I do not argue that this scenario might happen and is valid to 
pay back the past injustices. But my argument focuses on a different perspective: in 
many cases, paying back and compensating the descendants of the rightful owners 
represents a long and painful process, which can take years to finalize. Although, this 
action is perfectly valid still there will be many descendants who will be impossible 
to trace. Even if this compensation process takes place I think that it does not cover 
the entire damage committed at one point in the past.  
My point is that the immigrants who claim a right to enter in these communi-
ties should be accepted on the following ground: the present owners are, from the 
rightful owners’ point of view, simple visitors or trespassers and they have the same 
status as the immigrants knocking at the doors of their community. The answer the 
members of such a community might give—“we do not want you here because this is 
our land and we can do whatever we want with it”—can be attacked based on my 
argument. The immigrants have the same status as the actual owners in asking for 
permission to enter the community (if not to claim the existing land). Because the 
current residents do not legitimately own the lands the immigrants can object that 
they cannot be refused entry according to this reason.  
However, even if the current residents worked the land and they can claim 
that they added value to it, still the restriction of entrance is not fully justified in this 
line of argument. From a left-libertarian perspective, the immigrants can start an ex-
change with the current members and settle on a way to commonly work the land or 
make business. Solutions are available for this scenario.  
In order to claim legitimate ownership rights over a land, the individuals must 
prove that the initial appropriation was itself legitimate and all the other transfers of 
properties and resources obey the same principle. If the initial acquisition was an il-
legitimate one, then all the chain of transfers suffers from an inconsistency on a legal 
ground. Fabre argues: “In so far as, according to libertarians, a state’s territorial 
rights are simply the concatenation of its individual members’ rights over their prop-
erty, and then states (which have acquired much of their territory through unjust 
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wars, colonization, and fraudulent treaties) cannot be regarded as the legitimate own-
ers of their territories.”190  
The analogy does not hold in the case of the states that acquired the land 
through violence owning the present land illegitimately according to the libertarian 
principles. The injustices realized in the case of the initial acquisition do not justify 
the decision of closing the borders in front of immigrants or adopting a restrictive 
immigration policy. Only in the case of the states where the initial acquisition can be 
proven to be legitimate then the case of restricting immigration is justified according 
to this argument.  
But in the other instance where the members of the states acknowledge the 
past injustices over the initial acquisition a negotiation over the property rights and 
immigration policy can be the right solution. Fabre offers a plausible argument for 
this situation: “In sum, libertarianism would seem to mandate open borders, at least, 
prima facie, as a way to rectify past injustices-just as some commentators have ar-
gued, you recall, that it also allows for coercive taxation as a way to compensate the 
worst off for breaches of the Lockean proviso.”191 
If self-ownership cannot be called on in this case to protect the current own-
ers and their properties vis-à-vis the restriction of immigrants, then the libertarians 
cannot fully justify this type of immigration policy. Apart from the cottage analogy, 
Steiner has further arguments for the case of immigration. 
My next scenario presents another objection associated with the idea of own-
ing external resources. If, for instance, in a community the members have legitimate 
rights over their resources and properties, but still there are some parcels of land, 
which are not claimed by anyone and no one resides on those parcels, can we con-
clude that foreigners have the right to claim those parcels? What is the libertarians’ 
response in the case of unowned lands within a community occupied by legitimate 
owners of land? In this scenario if nobody inside the community claims the land then 
foreigners who want to appropriate the land (maybe in exchange of other resources, 
or just to work the land and invest their talents over it) can do so without being re-
fused the entrance inside the community.  
                                                
190 Ibid., 128 
191 Ibid. 
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Nozick, from a right-libertarian perspective, would answer that if the land is 
not owned by anyone inside the community and nobody claims it and is left un-
worked or exploited and then a foreigner who can accomplish this task has a right to 
appropriate it. The parcels of land are not under the self-ownership right of other 
members and if the foreigners can work and add value to the lands then the libertari-
ans cannot reject this scenario.  
Otsuka, from a left-libertarian perspective, would offer the following re-
sponse: if the members of the community do not have legitimate property rights over 
the un-owned parcels of land, then claiming the Lockean proviso192, immigrants can 
offer something in exchange for the appropriation of those un-owned pieces of land. 
The exchange would represent an intention of acquisition in which the members of 
the community are offered either a part of the benefits produced from the land in ex-
change of opening the borders. Opening the borders is the repaid action in this con-
text not the appropriation of un-owned lands (the foreigners will pay a percentage of 
their benefits for the members’ effort to open the borders, not for the appropriation of 
the un-owned lands).  
I will analyze two situations mentioned by Nozick in “Anarchy, state and 
utopia” that can be useful to illustrate the case of immigration. In the first example, 
Nozick presents the situation of a water hole, the only one existent on a given terri-
tory, which is appropriated by a person. The individual has no right to claim the wa-
ter hole only for himself knowing that this source of vital natural resource is 
inaccessible for other individuals in the whole area. Nozick argues:  
 
Thus a person may not appropriate the only water hole in a desert and charge what 
he will. Nor may he charge what he will if he possesses one, and unfortunately it happens 
that all the water holes in the desert dry up, except this one. This unfortunate circumstance, 
admittedly no fault of his, brings into operation the Lockean proviso and limits his property 
rights.193  
 
                                                
192Cf. Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarianism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/#2: “Equal opportunity left-libertarianism (…) inter-
prets the Lockean proviso as requiring that one leave enough for others to have an opportunity for 
well-being that is at least as good as the opportunity for well-being that one obtained in using or ap-
propriating natural resources”. 
193 Nozick, ASU, 180 
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The second case refers to owning the single island on a given area and re-
stricting the access to it: “Similarly, an owner’s property right in the only island in an 
area does not allow him to order a castaway from a shipwreck off this island as a 
trespasser, for this would violate the Lockean proviso.”194 
Applied to the case of immigration, we can say that if a community or state 
that possesses resources vital for immigrants that are inaccessible for them, for a dif-
ferent reason, no fault of them or the resourceful country, it is wrong to conclude that 
the state in question should restrict the access of foreigners. If the vital resources 
needed by other individuals become a motive for claiming the Lockean proviso and 
the state or community in question has an obligation to share a part of their resources 
with the immigrants. But what if the case is presented in a slightly different perspec-
tive? If the immigrants live in a community or state where the political regime they 
choose proves to be a vicious one leaving all the individuals (or the majority of 
them) without riches, resources or properties?  
I present my third scenario applicable for the immigration case, in which 
Steiner’s analogy does not hold. Assuming that the members of that community 
chose rationally that type of political regime without any constraints from an external 
party, someone can conclude that the situation is the result of the members’ political 
decisions. No other external party can be accused of the outcome. Consequently, the 
members of that community chose to emigrate towards richer countries in search for 
new opportunities, resources, etc. If the members of the receiving state decide to 
close the borders according to the argument that the outcome of that specific com-
munity was the result of the political decisions of the members, rationally chosen, 
without any constrains imposed by an external party, therefore justified, and they 
have no duty to share any of their resources would this decision violate the Lockean 
proviso?  
According to the Nozickian response in the case of the water hole, the above 
situation is not about an appropriation of the single source of vital resources or about 
breaking the Lockean proviso in the case of the initial acquisition. Rather this is a 
case of two parties that had an equal situation, two communities with a territory of 
their own, resources and liberty of choice and after a sequence of events, one of the 
                                                
194 Ibid. 
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parties chose a political regime that proved to be the end of its fecundity. The first 
community caused no harm, so Nozick can reply that it cannot be obliged to share 
any of the resources with the members of the second community.  
But one can object to the fact that even in this case, considering that a politi-
cal regime is hard to predict and the historical events are hard to control by the mem-
bers of a specific state or community, anything can happen and cause this chain of 
events. The first community could have chosen a vicious political regime and face 
the same desperate situation. The argument used is that a political regime is hard to 
control and predict from the beginning and sometimes the members have no power 
in protecting themselves or correcting the course of events. Immigrants are appealing 
to a sense of morality and human cooperation that goes beyond the responsibilities 
caused by interrelated events. Should libertarians be sensible to this kind of argu-
ments in the case of immigration?  
Although the morality claim does not grip the libertarians as the opponents of 
this theory demand, I present the following argument in favor of offering immigrants 
a second chance. Consider that instead of a corrupted political regime, the first com-
munity deals with a dangerous disease capable of killing all members of the commu-
nity. However, the scientists find an antidote for the disease and they test it on a 
small number of people. It works and they are ready to use it for the entire popula-
tion in order to eradicate the plague. But in order to fabricate the medicine for the 
entire population they need to use a special container, which is fabricated only with a 
natural resource used by the second community not affected by the disease. The sci-
entists from the first community decide to ask for permission to work and reside for a 
short while in the community in order to produce the necessary medicine for the 
whole population. It is not possible to take the natural resource and come back to the 
original community and fabricate the medicine there. The conditions of fabrication 
are not the same and they need to stay in the foreign territory for a while whilst fab-
ricating the medicine.  
What will be the response of the second community’s members? If they say 
no, they will be responsible for the death of their neighbours (or anyway of many 
human lives) and they risk to be infected as well, since the disease cannot be exter-
minated in another way but producing the antidote. Saying ‘yes’ implies several con-
 114 
sequences: the scientists will use their land for a while, their resources (because they 
need to eat, sleep, etc.) including the natural element available only on their lands, 
and they will also enter into contact with some of their members thus creating possi-
ble connections.  
Weighing the two situations I think the members of the second community 
will decide to allow the scientists on their territory, even for a short while, in order to 
avoid the disease to spread further. They can ask for some deposits from the antidote 
to make sure that they will be protected in the future by the disease’s attacks. Apply-
ing this scenario to immigration we have the following outcome: the immigrants are 
the members from the first community and the libertarians are the members from the 
second community. The immigrants are in a desperate need of some resources from 
the second community and they need access to this community even for a short while 
in order to escape a fatal situation (or a very desperate one). If the libertarians make 
an effort to see that the same situation can happen to them in a short while or on a 
longer term they will make a compromise and offer them the necessary help.  
However, because they are willing to collaborate with the immigrants they 
can claim an exchange of goods or services. They also can impose taxes, action that 
usually happens with the immigrants that arrive in a new territory, or claim some 
benefits in return for their generosity. The libertarians are aware that anytime the 
situation can reverse and the same treatment can be applied to them. For this sce-
nario, I invented a mild moral claim in order to justify the acceptance of the immi-
grants on the libertarian territory. The obligation is not an absolute moral claim: the 
libertarians are still free to do whatever they want, as Steiner states.  
But the future consequences will be nevertheless important for their fate. In 
this case, the libertarians must take a risk in order to avoid a similar situation or just 
to assure a serious collaboration if things will turn into their disadvantage. This can 
happen anytime as no one can predict the future (for good or for worse). Using this 
claim as a hypothetical moral backup, immigrants and libertarians reach a common 
agreement in order to sustain a future collaboration if resources run scarce. In this 
scenario I am not excluding a left-libertarian claim for an exchange or taxation, as it 
happens in the real world for all the immigrants.  
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To conclude, this section provided enough examples to sketch a response for 
the immigration case: even in the cases where the ownership rights are not strong 
enough to invoke the opening of the borders based on the Lockean proviso there are 
other plausible arguments for a libertarian to welcome immigrants either from a 
moral or from a practical perspective.  
 
2.2. Liberty maximization and immigration  
 
 In this section I plan to analyze the arguments for immigration that fit in the 
libertarian framework understood as liberty maximization. The notion of respect 
plays an important part in Nozick’s account:  
 
Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with 
whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, 
in so far as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the 
same dignity.195 
 
 The meaning of being morally free is that we have the liberty to do whatever 
we want and that we also have the right to do what we want as long as we respect the 
Categorical Imperative and we never infringe other individuals’ liberty or consider 
them only as means. If we consider the reading of libertarianism as freedom maximi-
zation then the following question appeals to the issue of immigration: if we are free 
to do whatever we want, why should libertarians choose to restrict immigration? The 
minimal state is intended to protect the members from any serious violations and to 
avoid major situations such as war or external attacks. However if the borders are 
opened to all individuals, then if something like this will happen the minimal state 
will be there to protect the members and assure a safe outcome.  
The answer is that even if we are free to do whatever we want we lack the 
right to immigrate. But this answer also reflects a paradox because if we had the right 
to immigrate then it would be pointless to ask if we are free to immigrate. If we are 
limited only to the rights we already possess then how can we create new freedoms if 
                                                
195 Kymlicka, CPP, 104 
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rights are missing for those freedoms to be permitted? This involves a more serious 
problem: in the libertarian framework being free means to have a right to do some-
thing which obviously limits the sense of freedom and its application in a non-
desired way for libertarians.  
The objection to this scenario might be that if immigrants are allowed to enter 
into foreign states the application of CI will make use of the citizens of those states 
as mere means. I do not think that the motivation behind opening the borders is to 
use the citizens of a foreign state as a mere means. It can be sustained for example 
that closing the borders means to refuse to help other human beings, which under a 
Kantian consideration should fall under the general duties of all individuals. Opening 
the borders reflects a response to a human need for autonomy and freedom not for 
mere pragmatic reasons. I do not believe that it can be strongly argued that in open-
ing the borders immigrants use the citizens of a state as mere means because the fur-
ther interaction with them will have to fall under the CI. If people have general duties 
to help those in need, opening the borders can be interpreted in this broad perspective 
not in a narrow, egoistic manner. Human cooperation is necessary for further interac-
tion, which obviously should obey the CI from the perspective of both immigrants 
and residents.  
In order to prove that the citizens are used as mere means in this case we need 
to prove that the negative effects of welcoming the immigrants reflected upon the 
citizens are obviously greater than the positive effects the immigrants can bring for 
those states. I do not think that the application of the CI in this instance violates the 
will of the citizens in such a negative degree because we all are human beings and 
we can extract that the basic human freedom is necessary for a normal evolution of 
life (as in many cases immigrants are desperate persons threatened by either great 
poverty or other abuses in their home lands it is hard to prove that they should be re-
jected only with the justification that they use the citizens of richer states as mere 
means to their desire to enter).  
In the case of applying the instance of CI the members cannot protest against 
it because it is a universal moral duty they need to obey in an absolute manner. Once 
the immigrants are inside the host community and they violate the self-ownership or 
the basic rights of the members or their property rights then the normal punishments 
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of expulsion or retribution can be applied. The CI and the non-moralized definition 
of liberty both work to maximize the freedom of the individuals even in the case 
where they are immigrants and need to access foreign territories. My case is of ap-
plying the CI in the case of immigration in order to avoid the circularity of the moral-
ized definition of liberty and also to escape the problem of the a priori restriction of 
immigrants (if they never resided on the foreign territory how can it be proved that 
they committed something wrong or they will commit it?).  
Obviously I do not think that immigration conflicts with freedom. On the 
contrary, being free to immigrate and having symmetrically the right of entry and the 
right of exit permits an individual to construct a bigger sphere of autonomy and self-
fulfillment.196 I shall get back to these points in the next section. In this section, I 
wanted to point out the paradox of circumscribing the value of freedom to the al-
ready existent rights without provoking an enlargement of these rights for the benefit 
of the individual. I consider this action to be counter intuitive to what a libertarian 
really desires, which ultimately translates in maximizing freedom. 
Immigrants enter libertarian communities without being restricted because 
they have not committed any crime against the members or the community itself. 
However, if they will prove to be such criminals they will have to deal with the con-
sequences (exclusion). Or if they do not find any work or a good outcome for their 
situation they are free to move along without being restricted in their exiting (as long 
as they paid their debts to the host libertarian society, mentioned in either a contract 
or other type of agreement with a legitimate party resident in that community). Free-
dom maximization presupposes that everybody is free to enter or exit foreign com-
munities but they have to obey the libertarian rules or residing or doing business (I 
used here the non-moralized definition of freedom). 
Self-ownership suffices for the protection of properties and resources and 
each individual knows that he needs to respect the Categorical Imperative and not to 
harm human beings or use them only as means. Immigrants will obey the same rule 
and can enter libertarian communities without inflicting any harm on the members. 
Another question is relevant: can we consider the moralized freedom as being com-
patible with private property? 
                                                
196 Also see chapter two on liberal egalitarianism and the arguments on the symmetry between the 
right of exit and the right of entry. 
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 Let us consider the framework of the minimal state and the morally free indi-
vidual. The individual has a full liberty of action if he respects the self-ownership of 
the other individuals and also respects them as ends in themselves. If immigrants ar-
rive at the borders of the state and they ask for the permission to enter. The members 
decide to welcome them only if they subscribe to the same values pertinent inside the 
libertarian community and understand that the self-ownership principle is the core 
value of libertarianism. If the immigrants agree then they are accepted and the bor-
ders are opened. The action of opening the borders respects both the immigrants’ de-
sire to free mobility and the access provided on their territory demonstrates that they 
are treated equally with the members inside and they are not rejected if they are of no 
use for them.  
Nozick argues that the moral constraints imposed on individuals refer to the 
side constraints present in the Kantian morality: “Side constraints upon action reflect 
the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; 
they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their con-
sent.”197 Under this interpretation, private property is independent of the status of the 
individual. To say that an individual has value due to the fact that he is the owner of 
a private property means, according to moral liberty, to treat the individual as being 
inferior to a material possession, therefore disrespecting the human life.  
The individual has independent value of the private property because he rep-
resents a human being, whose life must be valued above any material possessions. 
The answer to the above question is that the moralized freedom does not have a real 
connection with private property, because in this context, the individuals are respect-
ing each other as human beings not their properties. To own more or less does not 
increase or decrease the value of the individuals’ lives: on the contrary, in the ab-
sence of private property, an individual is still a human being who must be respected 
and treated as an end not as means.  
Another reading of libertarianism as liberty would be that freedom constitutes 
a basic human right and incorporates the right to universal mobility. Freedom of 
movement is part of the basic liberties an individual enjoys and libertarians are pro-
moters of individual rights over all other constraints. If the state constrains freedom 
                                                
197 Nozick, ASU, 30-31 
 119 
of movement of individuals, then the decision of selecting a minimal or ultra-
minimal state has no logic in the libertarian theory. If individuals are rational and 
understand the fact that they must respect the moral constraints and never treat peo-
ple only as means, then it follows that they should be able to move freely across 
communities. Constraints imposed on the individuals’ freedom to move are not justi-
fied a priori to their entrance because immigrants have not violated any of the men-
tioned rules within the libertarian framework. It is hard to say whether immigrants 
would agree or not with the self-ownership principle a priori of their entrance in the 
libertarian community.  
Next, I focus on the problematic process of collective decision-making and 
the conflict between the individual’s decision and the group decision within the liber-
tarian community.  
 
3. The problem of collective decision-making procedure 
 
 I distinguish in this final section between the individual and the collective 
decision in the immigration case. Whereas the collective decision-making is a proc-
ess that depends on the individuals’ consent over a political matter (see Steiner’s 
analogy), I argue that within the libertarian framework this issue is a problematic 
one. However, if applied to the case of immigration the collective decision-making 
procedure needs further clarification.  
I intend to offer in this section three different perspectives on this issue that 
refer to three distinctive types of ownership, which rely on different accounts of re-
sponding to the same problem: 1) collective ownership (Fabre’s account), 2) private 
ownership (O’Neill’s account), 3) no ownership. Firstly, I describe the general prob-
lem of the collective decision-making within the libertarian framework and offer my 
interpretation. Secondly, I analyze each of these accounts individually.  
If an individual agrees or rejects the entrance of a foreigner in his house or on 
his property this action regards his personal set of values and preferences. If the lib-
ertarian community decides to reject or welcome foreigners, this action implies a col-
lective set of preferences and values. The collective set of values and preferences 
must be a sum of all the individuals’ preferences and values on this issue.  
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 I construct the following imaginary scenario: how can libertarians form a per-
fect set of preferences on this matter, which does not disagree with the individual’s 
personal opinion? If, for example, 98% from the community says “yes” in the case of 
rejecting immigrants and only 2% agree with the entrance of these immigrants, then 
those 2% of members will have their personal preferences violated. For instance, 
those 2% might strongly object to the rest of 98% that are indifferent on the issue of 
immigration or simply refuse foreign competition on their territory, on the basis that 
they can have productive and useful relations with the immigrants.  
In fact, those 2% might offer the argument that even if they represent a mi-
nority, the extent of freedom they will benefit from along with the benefits brought 
by the immigrants will help them increase their businesses and resources in a rapid 
interval of time. Therefore, their future will be improved considerably in this 
scheme, as this might be their only chance to secure a prosperous future in the liber-
tarian community. What is the majority’s response in this case? They would answer: 
“we voted and you lost.” 
 The majority can further explain that even if the minority’s future depends on 
this decision, still the protection of their self-ownership right is more important than 
the benefits the immigrants might cast over the minority’s businesses. How can we 
draw a relative fair conclusion in this case that does not violate the self-ownership 
right of the parties concerned? Moreover, on what principles do we rest upon while 
making an impartial selection in this matter? One type of response can be that: even 
if the consequences might affect a minority from the community and the outsiders as 
well, the final decision is based on the majority’s consent and reflects the preferences 
of the group in rejecting the immigrants.  
Another type of response can object to the claim that the minority must not 
suffer in this context, where the only chance of improving its future rests on the deci-
sion of approving immigration. As in the democratic process, the majority usually 
wins over the preferences expressed by a minority; however, in the libertarian 
framework, the minority can claim that is coerced in its liberty to engage in transac-
tions with immigrants that can bring them profit and a greater degree of autonomy. 
The individuals within the minority are thus constrained in their liberty of action and 
their autonomy is reduced when the majority chooses closed borders instead of open 
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borders. For the individuals within this minority, welcoming immigrants inside the 
community represents a profitable action that widens their degree of autonomy in 
relation with the rest of members.  
Some might object to the idea that within the libertarian framework self-
ownership counts more than other values, such as autonomy, which is considered to 
bring to an individual more liberty of action. The majority tries to protect the self-
ownership right of the existing members overlooking the fact that the autonomy of 
some individuals is coerced. These individuals might perhaps never gain their de-
sired level of autonomy and/or wealth if immigrants are rejected from the commu-
nity. In this perspective, I consider that the collective decision-making process is 
problematic and can lead to disputes within a libertarian community.  
It is difficult to draw the line between the collective decision and the individ-
ual’s decision, where the group will violate some individuals’ decisions. This inter-
nal conflict represents also a problem for the libertarian argumentation, to derive the 
right consensus inside an association without promoting some egalitarian principle 
for it. We have no principle based on which the majority’s decision is “more suit-
able” than the minority’s decision. All the members of a community are facing a 
similar reality once the immigrants are allowed inside, since the self-ownership right 
can be violated arbitrarily. If immigrants violate the self-ownership right, libertarians 
consequently can opt for inflicting punitive measures on immigrants or for excluding 
them from the community. 
The collective decision-making process does not render more liberty to the 
members of a community, on the contrary; the effect is that individuals’ preferences 
will be blocked by other individuals’ preferences, and the rule of reaching an objec-
tive decision is missing. We cannot maximize liberty where all individuals claim that 
they are right and their preferences should be respected accordingly.198 The conflict 
points to the problem of selecting an objective decision, related to our case immi-
grants’ acceptance.  
                                                
198 I make a reference here to the discussion on collective decision-making in Thomas Christiano, 
“Freedom, consensus, and equality in collective decision making”, Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990): 160, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2381897.pdf: “Even on the broadest possible account of decisive-
ness, I will rarely be free to determine the course of common activities. Moreover, that freedom will 
be quite limited since it will only exist after the agenda has been formulated and the alternatives are 
supported fairly evenly by all the other members. This would be a freedom that would appear only at 
the very end of the decision-making process.” 
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Another problem with the collective decision-making process is that in the 
absence of a contract individuals can claim that they are coerced in their liberty of 
associating with immigrants, which can bring profits and even extend their degree of 
autonomy. In the case of a contract that stipulates that all members must conform to 
the majority’s decision and predefines the collective decision-making procedures, the 
majority’s decision to close the borders would not violate self-ownership and would 
be legitimate according to this contract. The problem resides in lessening the degree 
of autonomy of individuals without necessarily violating the self-ownership right. 
Some can object that libertarians are reducing to an alarming degree the autonomy of 
individuals, which can also mean a reduction in their liberty. 
The collective decision-making in the libertarian framework is also unclear in 
the case of the public and private properties. As I described in a previous section, if 
some parcels of land are un-owned by anyone inside a community, and some immi-
grants claim those parcels in view of a future usage, it is unclear what the decision-
making process would be in this case. If there were no contract that would stipulate 
the procedures of the collective decision-making process, then the final decision 
would be very hard to draw without violating self-ownership. However, if a contract 
exists and grounds that the final decision belongs to the majority then a decision over 
the acceptance of foreigners on un-owned parcels of land would be justified legally. 
To draw a few conclusions for this scenario: a) the collective decision-
making process is unclear in the absence of a contract that stipulates the procedures 
of this action; b) in the absence of such a contract, self-ownership is likely to be vio-
lated and the final decision rendered illegitimate; c) the same case applies to the pri-
vate and public properties where immigrants claim access or acquisition (in the ab-
sence of a contract the members of a community are in the difficulty of reaching a 
legitimate final decision); d) for public properties, but un-owned by anyone in par-
ticular, the collective decision should be clear in the case of welcoming foreigners 
and allowing them access.  
To explain in detail the last point that I made: in the case of un-owned parcels 
of land that constitute the public properties of a certain community, the collective 
decision should be clear in allowing access to foreigners. The argument is that in op-
position to the decision regarding private properties, where the landowner is the only 
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one who decides to restrict or allow access on his property, in the case of public 
properties, it is not legitimate to claim the same thing because the land is not the 
property of any of the members. Even if they contributed to the development of the 
land, claiming that they added value, still there would be unjustified to restrict the 
access on it. If foreigners can access the public properties then, at some point, if they 
use the land properly and add value to it, then they can acquire it. 
The difficulties presented in the case of collective-decision making within the 
libertarian framework point to the weak case libertarians hold for immigration. If the 
self-ownership right is violated in the case of decision-making over closing or open-
ing the borders and once a contract is established to secure the procedures for such a 
process in advance, then the premise that members of a libertarian community can be 
free in their decision over immigration control is refuted.  
I refer to the argument presented by Fabre, which considers the collective 
decision-making procedure to be severely flawed:  
 
So we consent, in advance, to not being able to decide whether a specific person or 
group will be allowed in. As we have given such consent in advance, if the decision goes 
against us, we cannot really complain that our rights of ownership have been violated. But 
the difficulty, of course is that, once the libertarian makes that concession, she has to accept 
that such a decision-making procedure will yield other results to which she objects, such as 
coercive taxation for helping the poor. It is hard to see how she can complain, in such cases, 
that taxation for those purposes violates individual rights of self-ownership.199 
 
So it seems that by agreeing to obey a contract that gives the majority the 
right to take the final decision, the libertarians can find themselves in the hard situa-
tion where they disagree with the majority, thus losing important gains. If instead of 
the immigration case the majority decides to have a redistribution scheme the mem-
bers cannot object to the violation of their self-ownership right because they agreed 
to follow such a contract. To obey a contract in the conditions where it violates either 
the self-ownership right of the individuals or leads to further damages means to co-
erce from the start the freedom of the parties involved in the contract. The contract 
might be rendered invalid sooner or later, and we arrive in the same position as the 
                                                
199 Fabre, Justice in a changing world (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 130 
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one described before, where the majority will oppose a minority in relation to accept-
ing or not immigrants.  
If libertarians want to have a contract that does not violate the self-ownership 
right in such a degree, they should instead select a constitution for example, which 
states that the majority decides in all cases, except in important aspects (such as the 
redistribution scheme, which libertarians oppose vehemently). The decision over the 
borders is entirely in the hands of the majority as Steiner argues, but in this case the 
violation of the self-ownership right of the minority is understood as part of the con-
tract obligations.  
If there is no contract, then the case remains a very difficult one as presented 
above. I next refer to the second type of scenario, which relies on the argument of 
private ownership. I prove that in this case there is no need to assume either closed or 
open borders since this issue becomes a non-issue (does not imply any further com-
plication). If a libertarian community does not assume the need for borders in the 
first place as private properties are the only properties to be defended then the issue 
of opening the borders for immigrants is not problematic. Whether the immigrants 
choose to enter the libertarian community or not resumes to the case of asking for 
permission to trespass private properties. The landowners will choose to allow or re-
ject the immigrants’ request as they find fit according to their private ownership 
rights. 
The role of the association is important in deciding the status of foreigners. If 
all individuals have the same status, without any discrimination, then all candidates 
have the same chances to be accepted. I argue that, in principle, the right of exit and 
entry should be analogous because as individuals are free to exit a protective associa-
tion after they paid the debts towards the association they should be allowed inside 
another association if they choose to obey the rules of that particular association. As 
O’Neill observes we should not draw a distinction between individuals based on their 
birth origin or any other factors that can justify the preference for a certain category 
of people.200 We can interpret that libertarian associations can be used in the broader 
                                                
200 See O’Neill’s commentary on libertarian associations in Barry and Goodin, eds., Free movement, 
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context of liberalism, where individuals live in a multicultural world and are ac-
cepted as equals.201  
According to O’Neill’s account, the issue of immigration is a non-issue be-
cause the individuals interact with immigrants only when they try to access their pri-
vate properties. The borders are open permanently to anyone who wants to come in 
(actually the borders being opened is not an action that is done with the intent of al-
lowing immigration, the borders are opened to anyone because national boundaries 
are not important private properties are). To trespass private properties is the issue 
that needs attention but as long as owners accept immigrants on their properties and 
give their permission unconstrained then the self-ownership right is respected and 
immigration is not considered to be a problem. 
In the third scenario I plan to investigate the no ownership case. Consider that 
a certain libertarian community has un-owned territories and foreigners soon find out 
and become interested in appropriating them. How do libertarians respond to such a 
case? Do they need a collective decision-making procedure or do they automatically 
give access to these foreigners if they want to claim the un-owned parcels of land? I 
consider that this scenario is slightly problematic, but offers in the end an interesting 
approach to immigration. The libertarians can opt for the collective decision-making 
procedure because in this way, all the members will have their opinions clarified in 
the case of the immigrants’ access on their territory. If the parcels of land are un-
owned some members might claim that right now they decide to appropriate those 
pieces of land before the immigrants find out. From a right-libertarian perspective 
the following objection intervenes: according to the Lockean proviso the current 
members do not need the un-owned land otherwise they would have claimed it be-
fore. They must leave as good and enough for others.  
Immigrants are entitled to access those pieces of land and appropriate them if 
they can work the land and add value to it. A left-libertarian would argue that the 
members should object to the foreigners’ entrance and deny their access in their 
community. They can claim a compensation for their generosity of welcoming them 
on their land and letting them appropriate the un-owned land. An exchange will settle 
the acquisition process legitimate and immigrants cannot be accused of violating the 
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self-ownership of the current members. In the second variant of response the mem-
bers can automatically make a contractual claim that can offer any foreigners free 
access to any un-owned piece of land that resides within their community. The ac-
cess of foreigners is justified only because they claimed the un-owned land and they 




 In this chapter I focused on the analysis of the libertarian arguments on 
immigration. I showed that although the individuals are free to decide if they close or 
open the borders, the collective decision-making process meets some difficulties 
from which we can establish that the individuals are in fact constrained in choosing 
their preference. Libertarians do not offer a clear argument for closing the borders 
when the categorical imperative and the universal right of free mobility are prerequi-
sites for the individual liberty. I conclude that in this case libertarians should be pro-




















This thesis has concerned itself with presenting three perspectives on the eth-
ics of immigration. I presented the definition of each philosophical framework fol-
lowed by arguments on the issue of immigration, focusing on both the negative and 
the positive aspects. I integrated the objections addressed to immigration and the ar-
guments in favor for it supported by moral claims. In this conclusion, I want to 
summarize the main points that highlight the ethical procedure in relation to the issue 
of immigration. Firstly, I present the essential points related to the utilitarian frame-
work, secondly I highlight the main points for the liberal egalitarian framework and 
thirdly I describe the essential remarks for the libertarian framework.  
 For utilitarians helping the vulnerable, offering aid to refugees, assisting the 
economic immigrants with primary goods represents the right conduct. Involving the 
richer countries to assume the next step in protecting the vulnerable, among which 
immigrants, means to circumscribe the special duties within the general duties. Ac-
knowledging the fact that assisting immigrants is part of the general duties of each 
state is the right ethical conduct in the utilitarian framework. There is no need to 
suppress the civic responsibility of helping the residents within a state, but moving 
towards a broader ethical account, protecting the immigrants as well as the residents, 
promotes the well-being of all individuals.  
 For liberal egalitarians freedom of movement entails an asymmetry between 
the right of exit and the right of entry. I showed the reasons for promoting a symme-
try exit/entry and sustain it in view of promoting immigration as a moral right of all 
human beings. I defended the view that freedom of association and freedom of 
movement can sometimes conflict; however, the moral claims according to which we 
sustain freedom of movement can override the moral claims behind freedom of asso-
ciation. In essence, liberal egalitarians can assume a broader ethical account in which 
open borders are allowed from the perspective of both freedom and equality, permit-
ting porous borders where extreme situations ask for institutional regeneration. 
Overall, protecting the basic liberties, among which freedom of movement, repre-
sents the right conduct for all states in relation to immigrants and residents as well.  
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 For libertarians promoting closed borders represents an inconsistency with 
both the self-ownership principle and freedom maximization. I showed that libertari-
ans are by default defenders of individual liberty and private property, which should 
not conflict with immigration. I analyzed a few scenarios according to which immi-
gration can endanger the libertarian framework, and in each case solutions where 
provided to secure residents’ rights to private property and their liberty without ex-
cluding immigrants. Immigration can be considered a non-threat from an ethical per-
spective because national boundaries are not important for libertarians. Immigrants 
are allowed on private properties if the owner decides to grant them permission or 
not.  
 Overall, in all three perspectives, immigration sets new debates on a 
philosophical level that have moral implications in the real world. My arguments 
pointed to the alternatives a philosopher can choose and apply them empirically in 
society. These philosophical frameworks showed the extent in which we can promote 
immigration and where inconsistencies within the argumentation made possible the 
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